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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
"In any case I had decided to watch at first, and not to start in 
earnest this evening. This evening, if anything did happen, it would 
be slight and accidental - and that I assumed. Besides, I had io 
study the actual play; because in spite of the hundreds of 
descriptions of roulette I had read with so much eagerness, I 
understood nothing of how it worked until I had seen it for myself. " 
Dostoyevsky - The Gambler 
1.1 Why Research? 
Horseracing and its associated activity of gambling invites academic research of a 
multidisciplinary nature. Economics, psychology, mathematics and statistics are all fields 
that have investigated the two topics. In 1976 economists discovered a new body of data 
on which_ th~y could test their theories. For many years psychologists have investigated 
human behaviour in gambling situations. Mathematicians have developed optimal betting 
strategies. Statisticians have assisted in all the investigations as well as utilised decision 
·• 
theory, probability theory and regression analysis, in their own right, within the 
discipline. 
Why do academics devote their time to this subject? The furthering of knowledge in 
general in the above fields is important. Also, because the possibility of making inoney 
with relatively little work exists, people from all walks of life will be drawn to the 
intellectual challenge of finding winners. Researchers know that in order to derive 
money making systems, research on an academic scale is. necessary. The amount of data 
available is phenomenal and although much of it is utilized by the public, some of it is 
not and that which is, is not always used in a consistent manner. 
The research in this work concentrates on all four fields mentioned above. A general 
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overview of the work done in each section is as follows. In chapters two and three, the 
betting market is examined within the framework of the efficient markets hypothesis. 
Tests of the three well known forms of efficiency are performed. In chapter four, within 
the framework of the expected utility hypothesis, the behaviour of gamblers is analysed. 
The investigation concentrates on behaviour observed at the racetrack, but draws ideas 
from other gambling situations as well. In chapter five, an investigation is made into 
horseraces, considering a race to be a sports event. This will consider the competing 
horses as athletes and will try and identify which fundamental factors are most important 
in determining the victor of such a race. In chapter six, some statistical theory, which 
has simple applications in horseracing is examined. In chapter seven, the economics of 
racetrack management is investigated. 
1.2 The History of Horseracing and Gambling 
Unlike other sports, horseracing relies on gambling to keep the fans interested. Take 
away the risk involved in betting and the intellectual challenge of the game, and its 
aesthetically colourful nature would fade quickly. The sport of kings has had its stars 
which drew the fans to the track but these are all too few, and 99 percent of the people 
at the track are there purely for the pleasure of gambling. Money has not always been 
such an important component of horseracing. Chariot races were held at the Olympic 
Games during the seventh century B.C. The winners of these races presumably received 
honour while the fans enjoyed the spectacle of athletic competition at a high level. It 
may be a little naive to believe that no gambling took place on such races, but it is also 
reasonable to assume that this activity was not of prime importance with regard to the 
races. 
The evolution of the sport into the sport of kings as we know it today probably occurred 
most rapidly in England in the twelfth century. At that time English kings were using 
horses in battle and Richard the Lion-Heart was said to have acquired great respect for 
the Arabian horse. From this time royalty paid more interest to horses for their speed 
than before and Charles II, who is known as the father of the British turf, in the 17th 
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century, participated in races as a rider as ~ell as putting up various prizes to be run 
for. In the early 18th century most races were between just two horses, (the so called 
match races) with the prize money being put up by the owners, the winning owner 
taking all the money. 
During the middle of the 18th century, open field races became more popular because 
the private nature of match races did not allow for wide participation at any level. 
Conditions were laid down with regard to which horses were eligible to race so that 
horses were raced against similar animals in order to make the races fair and exciting. 
The horses racing were thoroughbreds which had evolved as a breed from roughly the 
start of the 18th century. The evolution of such horses was strongly influenced by the 
importation to England of Arabian stallions which were mated with English mares. The 
thoroughbred combined t_he speed of the Arabian horses with the stoutness of the English 
horses. Today all registered thoroughbreds in any country can trace their heritage back 
to one of three Arabian stallions. 
The modern age· of racing is generally considered to have been marked by the 
inauguration of the English classic races: the St. Leger in 1776, the Oaks in 1779, and 
the Derby the next year. Only three year old horses are eligible to run in the classics. 
This pattern of classic races spread throughout the world. The other main type of race 
was the handicap which is in some sense the opposite of the fixed weight classic races, 
which supposedly determine the best horse of a particular generation. Handicap races 
have the specific objective of giving each horse in the race an equal chance of winning. 
As is to be expected, handicap races are exceptionally popular as betting media. 
Handicaps do not have restrictions on the age of the competing horses. 
The rules of racing, representing as they do centuries of experience, are quite complex 
in their entirety. Briefly, the race procedure begins when the jockeys weigh, out and 
report to the trainers in the parade ring. After thejockeys mount, the horses enter the 
track and parade past the public and stewards for inspection. The use of starting gates 
is virtually universal. During the race, patrol judges and stewards, supplemented by a 
video film patrol at most tracks, check for rule violations. The result does not become 
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official until the jockeys have weighed in and those that finished in the money are 
certified as having carried the correct weight. Objections against the pending result must 
be made at the time the jockeys are weighing in. If a horse involved in an objection 
finished in the first four, the stewards will view the various films of the race and reach 
a subjective decision regarding the outcome Of the race. 
More important than the history of racing as a sport is the history of the betting markets 
that have grown with racing through the years. We now consider the history of racetrack 
betting. From the beginning, gambling has been an integral part of horseracing. The 
built in wagers represented by,owners' stakes in match races necessarily were at natural 
odds (even money for a two horse race, 2/1 for a three horse race, etc.); but betting 
among spectators quickly developed, in which the odds reflected prevailing opinion as 
to the horses' relative chances of victory. Man-to-man betting was the original form, but 
this required that a person who wished to wager, find another person of opposite opinion 
but similar purse; and it was a natural step to the appearance of professionals who would 
accept bets of any reasonable amount from all comers. 
In addition to the above, as racing among fields of horses became more popular, laying 
of odds became more complicated, and the bookmaker appeared on the scene. The 
bookmaker must thus be seen as a middleman offering a service to punters. Clearly a 
bookmaker must be paid for this service. The theory of bookmaking is simple: the 
bookmaker sets his odds so that the sum of the probabilities implied in the odds is 
greater than one. This is called an over-round book. (Note that an over-round book does 
not necessarily imply profit to the bookmaker). If he then lays each horse to lose the 
same amount, he will make a profit no matter which horse wins, and this will be his 
return for the service he provides. 
An oversimplified example of the above is a race between 7 evenly matched horses in 
which a bookmaker would offer 511 (a point shorter than the natural odds) on each. 
Assuming equal amounts wagered on each horse, regardless of which one won the race 
the bookmakers's profit would be one seventh of the total wagered on the race. In 
practice however such a situation in which the bookmaker has no financial interest in 
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which horse wins, is very difficult to achieve, and despite constant adjustment of the 
odds as bets are received, the bookmaker generally stands to win or lose depending on 
the result of the race. 
In 1872 a Parisian shopkeeper devised a system whereby betting tickets, representing one 
unit each, could be purchased to any value the bettor desired. After the deduction of his 
commission, the shopkeeper distributed the receipts among the winning ticket holders 
in proportion to their number of winning tickets. The system, which he calleCI pari-
mutuel, (bet among ourselves) proved to be extremely popular, and, although the French 
government at first frowned on it, the pari-mutuel system was subsequently declared the 
only legal means of betting in France. 
In an 1891 regulation 7 percent of the pool was allocated as follows; 4 percent to the 
racing clubs, 2 percent to various charities and 1 percent to the Minister of Agriculture 
for development of horse breeding. This 7 percent, referred to as the takeout, today also 
includes tax payable to the government, and varies between countries and between 
betting pools. 
The Ekberg totalizator, a machine that mechanically records bets, was first used in New 
Zealand in 1880. A similar device known as the "Australian tote" became popular in the 
U.S. Some form of totalizator, now often integrated with sophisticated computer 
equipment, is used in all pari-mutuel operations. The mutuel system vied with 
bookmakers for supremacy and in 1940 the last bookmakers were outlawed in the U.S. 
In most countries today the mutuel system is the only legal form of betting on 
racehorses. However, England, Australia and South Africa among others, allow 
bookmakers to compete with the tote. 
The equipment used in the mutuel system was sophisticated enough to allow for various 
types of bets, all with their own pools. Thus place and show betting evolved, and later 
more complex bets such as exactas and doubles were offered. Off-track totes also made 
their appearance, thus betting did not require actually going to the racetrack, but rather 
to the closest tote. The tote was therefore in a strong position to compete with the 
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bookmakers for the public's money. 
What is the importance of racing to the society within in which operates? Firstly, it 
provides entertainment in the forms of gambling as well as a sporting contest to the 
people of the society. Secondly, it provides an easy to collect tax for the government. 
The amounts accruing to the state from gambling taxes are substantial and should not be 
underestimated in reviewing racing's standing in society. Finally, it provides jobs for 
thousands of people including jockeys, trainers, stable hands, vets, tote operators, 
officials, news reporters, bookmakers, breeders and others. For these reasons ~t is 
important that the overall state of the industry is healthy. In this work we investigate, 
among other things, whether all is well with racing in Cape Town, and offer suggestions 
to resolve any perceived problems. 
1.3 Horseracing in Cape Town 
Horseracing takes place regularly; (usually on a Wednesday and a Saturday) at one of 
the three racetracks in Cape Town. The Cape Turf Club runs racing at Milnerton and 
Durbanville, while the South African Turf Club is similarly in charge of racing at 
Kenilworth. Both clubs operate under the rules of the Jockey Club of South Africa. Race 
meetings are usually held at one of the main courses (Milnerton and Kenilworth) for a 
period of about eight weeks before reverting back to the other main course. Durbanville 
racecourse is only used for midweek racing in winter, in order to protect the grass at 
Milnerton from over usage. The three courses are shown in diagrams 1.1 to 1.3. 
A typical days program, or card, will consist of between 7 and 10 local races. On 
Wednesdays, 7 races, and on Saturdays 8 or 9 races is the norm. As well as local 
racing, the feature race of one of the other main racing centres is broadcast live on 
television to the course. In addition to this, all other races in the other main centres are 
broadcast live on speakers at the course. The other main centres of racing in South 
Africa are Johannesburg and Durban. Racing usually starts at 13h00 in Cape Town 
(14h00 on Wednesday) and races are run at intervals of about 35 to 40 minutes. 
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KENILWORTH 
Kenilworth consists of a 1200m straight course, a new oval 
course and an old oval course. both lefthanded. The old 
course is normally only used in winter. . 
1200 
1600 
I 
2000 
I 
2000 
CJ CJ D 
GRAN OST ANO 
Diagram 1.1 Kenilworth Racetrack 
The races that make up the card are usually of different class and distance so as to give 
owners as wide a choice of race as possible in which to enter their horses. The following 
is a list of the different classes of race with approximate prize money, as well as the type 
of horses that would make up the field for the race. 
Class of Race Approximate Stakes Typical runners 
Maiden Rl4,000 0 time winners 
Novice R15,000 1 time winners 
Graduation R17,000 1 to 2 time winners 
Fillies Handicaps R22,000 1 to 3 time winners 
Progress A R22,000 1 to 3 time winners 
Progress D R22,000 1 to 4 time winners 
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MILNERTON 
Consists of a 1400m straight course and a lefthanded round 
course with the choice of a long run-in of 800m (far bend) or 
a shorter run-in of 600m (near bend). · 
·-· 
Diagram 1.2 Milnerton Racetrack 
Progress E 
C Division 
B Division 
A Division 
Major Handicaps 
Weight For Age (WFA) 
Classics 
2 Year Old 
R22,000 
R22,000 
R26,000 
R30,000 
R30,000to Rl,000,000 
R30,000 to R500,000 
Rl00,000 to R500,000 
Rl4,500 to Rl6,000 
lllD 
--... 
...... 
1 to 4 time winners 
1 to 4 time winners 
3 to 6 time winners 
5 + time winners 
Handicapper's Discretion 
Handicapper's Discretion 
3+ time winners 
0 to 2 time winners 
The following are possible further restrictions on the type of runner allowed to compete 
in races. The Progress races are for the same class of horse, but the D and E races are 
over longer distances, generally over 2400m or longer. The inferior classes (Maiden, 
Novice) are sometimes restrided by age and/or sex. The classics are only open to 3 year 
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DURBANVILLE 
Consists of a lefthanded oval track, about 2000m in extent, 
with a straight run-in of nearly 600m. 
l.}OOm 
ltllllm 
• 
Diagram 1.3 Durbanville Racetrack 
old horses, and some are restricted by sex. The 2 year old races are clearly restricted 
by age and also sometimes by sex. 
The stakes are allocated approximately as follows. 
Position % of stakes 
1st 64% 
2nd 19% 
3rd 9% 
4th 5% 
5th 2% 
6th 1% 
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When nominating a horse to run in a race, the owner or trainer will usually just have 
regard to the distance of the race. Once the nominations for a particular race are made, 
each horse is allocated a weight to be carried and a barrier position, (draw) from which 
it will start if it accep_ts to run in the race. The trainer then gets a chance to examine all 
the entrants for the race and to see how his horse has been treated at the weights as well 
as the horse's luck at the draw .. In most cases the allocation of weights is mechanical, 
through the application of a formula, and therefore there would be no surprises regarding 
weights. Trainers will normally accept the horse for a race if they feel that it has a 
chance of beating the other horses entered, from its allocated draw. 
If a horse accepts for a race, the trainer must find a jockey to ride the horse. Some 
jockeys have contracts with trainers and therefore would ride all the trainer's horses. If 
this is not the case, a jockey will be found that suits the horse's racing style. A further 
consideration would be the weight allocated to be carried, since if the jockey is much 
lighter than this, the balance is made up with dead weight, which obviously would not 
contribute to the job of controlling the horse. Apprentice jockeys, as their name implies, 
are learning the trade and during this learning period are entitled to a weight allowance, 
which is either 4kg, 2.5kg, 1.Skg or nothing depending on how many winners they have 
already ridden. If a trainer accepts two or more horses for a single race, such horses will 
be viewed as being "coupled". The coupling rule is only important for betting and is 
discussed later. 
Horses normally start their racing careers as late 2 year olds or early 3 year olds, reach 
their peaks as 5 year olds and can race up until 10 or possibly even older. For racing 
purposes we distinguish 5 separate categories of horses. A colt is a male horse aged 4 
or less. A filly is a female horse aged 4 or less. A gelding is a castrated male of any 
age. A horse is a male horse aged 5 or more. A mare is a female horse aged 5 or more. 
The universal birthday of horses born in the southern hemisphere is the 1st of August. 
Obviously breeders ensure that horses are born near this date. The universal birthday of 
horses born in the northern hemisphere is the 1st of January. 
Information regarding the races can be obtained from either of the daily newspapers 
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(Cape Times and Argus), the official program of the turf club (race card), or the three 
professional tipping services (Computaform, Winning Form and Raceform). The cost in· 
· 1991 of the newspaper is approximately 70c. The race card costs Rl.50. The 
Computaform, Winning Form and Raceform cost R4.00, R3.50 and R2.80 respectively. 
The race card can be seen free of charge on the wall at all totes. Figures 1.1 to 1.5 show 
some typical information available in each publication. 
-13h15 WIN - PLACE- SWINGER- TRIFECTA 
1 PLACE A CCU MULA TOR Closes 14h25 PICK SIX Closes 1 ShOS 
: (7(100o;', OUINPOT Closes 1 ShOS 
=· 
,,., ,\ 1! JACKPOT Closes 1 ShSO 
432 TOPSPORT JUVENILE PLATE R20 000 
(Colts and Geldings) T 
(1st R12 B00/2nd R3 B00f3rd R1 800/4th R1 000/Slh R400t6th R200) 
Coupled (1 & 2) 
1 Silken Sails JGLightne~rt 6 56,0 
& 2 2 b c Argosy !USAl·S1lken Solendour byQuitk Turnover (USA) G BASSON (24) 
Messrs P Smith, SD Mann. 8 J M1kep11c11nd JN Farrell 
Aqu1m1rin1, y1/low usb. cutts ind pHk1d up 
Bred by: H1gnlands Farm Stud (Ply) Lid 
M364. 91.01.05 G MJP 1000 G Basson 56.0 6-9 1 1,25 Aouaouaver 62.00 5·2 
2 Sing Your Love JGLightnean 3 56,0 
& 1 2 br c Beemoven !GB)·All Sugr""' byContra~and !GB) F COETZEE (24) 
Messrs G C Elmer. BJ M1kep11ce, H C Evans, D McDlarmid and JP vaa Rensburv 
Bl"k. purp/1 sl11v111nd up 
Bred by: P Pe1e~n 
K346 90.12.29 G MJP 1000 WRies 54,S 7-7 1 3.50 Haunting Refrain 62.30 10·1 
K397 91.01.19 G JP1 1000 W Uys 56.0(24) 3-5 _4 6,50 Sett1onal Title 60.10 8·1 
3 Bambile 
2th ci:ao1ureH1m(USA)·Taorao (Aro) bylrmak 
Messrs DC Wlllment, 8 D Siiks and WP Miies 
Blue. grry ind black ch"k•d sletrlS. blu1 up 
. Bred by: Maine Chance Farms (Ply) Lid 
Unrated 
OColeman 
CWILKINSON 
5 53,0 
4 Rambling Cowboy G v woodruff 4 53,0 
2 enc Mexican l1ch-Moun1 SI Heiens by Volcanic (Ire) E CHEUN 
Messrs C van Dyk, DR Hodgson and Mr and Mrs C P Hopkins 
Wh/11, bl"k stars. whll1 sl11vu, orrng1 "'""and cutlr, bl"k 1nd orange qu1t11rrd cip 
Bred by: PR Groenewald 
K295· 90.12.08 G MJP 800 MUys 56.0 6-11 8 6.75 Shankaar 50.60 20·1 
5 Twisting Star 
2 b c Folmar (USA)· Tailors Twist by 810 John Taytor (USA) 
Messrs FM Ratner and S C Shub · 
M1g1nt1, grry hoop1d sl11n1, qu1111rrd up 
Bred by: Pharlap Stud 
M364 91.01.05 G MJP 1000 E Chelin 56.0 
14 
Patrick Kruyer 
GHATI 
4-9 5 4.50 Silken Sails 
"WELCOl\-tE TO RACING AT MILNERTON" 
Figure 1.1 Reproduction from the Race Card 
53,0 
62.00 8·1 
We have thus far examined the racing part of Cape racing. We now look at the 
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13.15 
TOPSPORT PLATE 
R 20000 
JUVENILE PLATE 
1000 METRES 
1-13 
Nominations : 24 
Runners 6 
LEN PRED 
NO HORSE BEH TIHE HASS OR B JOCKEY TRAINER 
« -- LAST RUN INFORllATION -·-- » 
WKS FIN LBH DIST JOCKEY SETT TlllE B :.. 
1 SILKEN SAILS 
2 SING YOUR LOVE 
5 TWISTING STAR 
6 WINTER STORH 
4 RAMBLING COWBOY 
3 BAHSILE 
COUPLINGS : (1-2) 
RESULT SP 
PAYOUT w p 
0.0 61.6 56.0 6 
1.1 61.8 56.0 3 
2.5 62.0 53.0 1 
4.0 62.3 53.0 2 
7.4 62.9 53.0 4 
53.0 5 
p 
3 
p 
BAS SON G LI GHTHEAR 
COETZEE F LIGHTHEAR 
HATT G KRUYER P 
KHAN II WATTERS II 
CHELI N E WOOORUi'F 
WILKINSON COLEHAH 0 
4 
p Sw 
4 
2 
4 
3 
8 
I J. 2 1000 SASSON G 5/ 2 
4 6-5 1000 UYS W 8/ I 
5 4. 5 I 000 CHELI H E 8/ I 
4 6.0 1000 CHELIN E 7/ I 
8 6.8 800 UYS H 20/ I 
••• HO RECENT FORH ••• 
Fav 
Sw Sw Tr 
TRIFECTA(Boxed) TRIFECTA(Win Banker) SWINGERS(Boxed) 
R 2.00: 1 xi x 5 Straight R 2.00: I x 2 • 5 R 6.00: I xix 5 
R 6.00: I , 2 , 5 R 6.00: I x 2 , 5 • 6 Rl2.00: I x 2 x 5 x 6 
R24.00: 1 , 2 , 5 , 6 Rl2.00: I x 2 .. 5 , 6 , 4 R20.00: l 1 2 x 5 x 6 x 4 
61.5 
61. 9 
62 .0 
62.3 
62 .9 
R60.00: 1 , 2 , 5 , 6 , 4 RZ0.00: I x 2 • 5 • 6 , 4 , 3 R30.00: Ix 2 x 5 x 6 x 4 x 3 
SILKEN SAILS made a proming debut when running on well to beat subseauent winner Aquaquaver at th1s 
course four weeks ago and looks well se't for the double :oaay. SING YOUR LOVE won very well at the 
first attempt, but was never in the hunt behind Sectional Title subsequentlf. He may improve on that 
here, and certainly makes a for11idable Tote coupling with.SILKEN SAILS. TW STING STAR meets SILKEN 
SAILS on 3 kgs better terms for a 4.5 length beating first time out and w111 struggle to reverse that 
result here, but should finish somewhat closer. WINTER STCRH snowed some promise behind better 
fancied stable companion Roadblock ~in his debut .and needs some improverient to win it, but he could 
well make it into the Trifecta. 
1 ISILKEN SAILS I 56.0I 6 I 2 y.o. b c by f.tfpy - Silken Splenda.ir by Qliek Turrover 
I Sasson G· Liohtheart JG :Cape I Bred by: Hignlands Farms 
"( 4)91.01.05 M 364 G HJP 1000 SASSON 6 56.0 6- 9 1 1.25 •AQUAQUAYER 62.0 61.6 5/ 2 87 
Ran on well to beat a subseQuent winner on recent debut, chance. 
2 ISING YOUR LOVE I 56.0I 3 I 2 y.o. br (by Beethoven • All Suprere by Caltralland 
I Loetzee F Liohtheart J G :Cape I Bred by: P .Petersen 
( 3l90.12.29 K 346 G HJP 1000 RIES W 54.5 ( 2 91.01.19 K 397 G HJP 1000 UYS W 56.0 
Moderllle run alter easy debut win, mighl improw. 
3 IBAMBILE I 53.0I 
I Wilkinson C 1 :nleman D :Caoe 
• FIRST RUN • '!'Jlllch betting. 
7- 7 l 3.50 *HAUNTING REFR 62.3 61.8 10/ 
3- 5 4 6.50 SECTIONAL TITL 61.3 61.9 8/ 
5 I 2 y.o. ch c by Capture Him - Tagrag(AAGJ by Irnek 
I Bred by: Haine Chance 
I 84 
I 83 
4 IRAMBLING COWBOY I 
I Chelin E Woodruff G V :Cape 
53.0I 4 I 2 y.o. ch c by t'exican Itch - lbmt St Helens by Volcmic 
I Bred by: P.R.Groenewald 
( 8)90.12. 08 K 295 G HJP 800 UYS H 56.0 6-11 8 6.75 SHANKAAR 51.8 62.9 20/ l 53 
Moderele debut. 
5 !TWISTING STAR I 
I Hatt G Kruver t' t' : Cape 
53.0j 
( 4)91.01.0S M 364 G llJP 1000 CHELIN E 56.0 
Mede a lair debut, might improve. 
.... 
11 2 y.o. b c by i'olnBr ·Tailors Twist by Big John Tayler 
I Bred by: Pharlap Stud 
4- 9 5 4.50 Sl•KEH SAILS 62.8 52.0 8/ ! 79 
STORM 6 IWINTER 
!Man M Watters M :Cape 
I 53.0I 2 I 2 y.o. b c by Foveros - Wild Winter by Golden Thatch 
I Bred by: Y 8 Stud 
( 3)91.01.12 K 380 G HJP 1000 CHELIN E 56.0 
Sh"""'9d some promise on debut, might improw. 
1- 6. 4 6.00 ROAOBLOCK 62.7 62.3 7/ 1 74 
....... TRAINER/.XX:XEY CCM!IAATIOHS fal RACE I. PERFORl'ANCES FOR QJRRENT SEASON (I st August to Present) ..... 
No Trainer Jockey Rns 1st 2nd 3rd Win\ Plc\ No Trainer Jockey Rns 1st 2nd 3rd Win\ Pk\ 
... ............ ........... 
·-- --- ---
....... ........ .......... ..... .................. .......... 
--- --- ··-
.......................... 
1 L lghtheart J Bas son G 24 4 2 I 17 29 4 Woooruff G v Cne lln E 82 16 8 13 20 45 
2 L l~htheart J Coetzee ~ 10 0 3 3 0 60 5 Kruyer P P Hatt G 98 25 8 12 26 ~ 
3 Co etMn 0 W11k tnson C 6 1 0 0 17 17 6 Watters II Khan H 123 14 16 18 II 39 
Figure 1.3 Reproduction from Winning Form 
I 
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CAPE SEVEN 5.10 · -- Gratluall11n · lOOOm ~ · -- · . - - '-'- -
PA6 BigSixS JP4 
Rat fogs: a di//crcnu of o"' poirU equals about O.S length. 
Nr 
8 Hoecrty llill 
2 Drtp Down 
9 Hurry Hrrb 
S Walk In Space 
6 Whale Soni: 
3 Harry's Mystery 
10 Llllle Harry 
11 Never R<lrcal 
7 Golden Day 
4 Sletl Blue 
I Dellinzona 
Rntint: Drnw 
87.0 7 
86.0? I 
84.0 3 
82.0 11 
82.0 s 
82.0? 10 
81.S 9 
80.0 g 
80.0 ! 6 
76.S 2 
76.S? 4 
Jad:ev IVl'itlrl BL Trainer 
Fndd 54.0 bl RRixon 
Srarkey S7.0 Millard 
Sutherland 54.0 Millard 
Roberts 57.0 ASlcyn 
GPuller 54.5 Kanncmcyer 
Uoyd 57.0 Pa)•ne 
St Martin 54.0 Schull 
Han 5 l .S Snaith 
Coctzec 54.0 Slewart 
Fortune .57.0 bl ASteyn 
Khan 57.0 Watcers 
# i11dica1rs that iht horse is likely la r11n below best on so/I. 
Co11pli11gs Zx9 
A fair si:l'd field; the pau slwuld be good. 
Hagerty Hill hasn't run to his best rating lacely and was lame 
last month; he tries blinkers this time Dad should do belier if fiL 
Dctp Do1w1 showed plenty of pace last time and should run well. Hurr_v 
llrrh has poor form. 
Walk 111 Spau returns from a break and would really have liked ii 
further; he cannot be ignored, though. lfllrale Song returns from a lay-
off and should run to his raling if fit. Harry's Mysier1 bas 
performed well upcoun1ry and seems likely to run to form. Ullle 
/lorry ran below best the last timeL 
Ne.er Retreat was hampered last time ad should run to her rating 
again. Gnldl'n Bay h3s good Durbanville form and ought to run to his 
rating. Slee/ Blue should run 10 his rating. Br/linzona needs ii 
furlhcr. 
The <doctlnn Is hurd nn a cond rn•. 
BEST FOUR: 
I. D_c<p Down. 
2. lloecrty llill 
3. llarry's Myslrry 
4. Walk In Space 
TRIFECTA/PA: 
De<p Down 
ro•inc banker 
Figure 1.4 Reproduction from Raceform 
SHORTLIST 
(2) Deep Dow• (c) 
(8) Ho11er17 Hill 
associated betting markets. There are two ways of betting in Cape Town, namely with 
a bookmaker or with the tote. We shall examine the bookmakers first. The 25 to 30 
active bookmakers in Cape Town have there rooms in the city and can usually be found 
there on non racing days. They will usually not do much business except on race days. 
If another main centre has racing on a day that Cape Town does not, they will be in the 
rooms taking bets on these away races. Most of their business, however, is done on local 
racing at the racecourse. 
One or two of the larger bookmakers will have a list of odds for all Cape races in the 
morning of any race day. These odds are also usually those with which all the 
bookmakers open their betting, on the course. At the course each bookmaker has his 
BEmNG at Cape Tattersall's yes· 
terday: 
BLOODLINE GUINEAS 
(Mllnerton, 1 600 m, today) 
16-10 Star Effort 
7- 2 Phantom Robber 
6- 1 Spook And Diesel 
8- 1 Surprise Attack 
12- 1 Empire State 
16- 1 Dunbarton, Supersonic 
Suprise. Bold Chieftain 
2(}- 1 King Kama, Special 
Squad, Deep Lustre, 
Jungle Chant 
2!>- 1 Ludwig's Music, In The 
. Saddle 
33- 1 Jackies Boy, Captain 
Marcus 
Forecast betting 
RACE 1 
8-10 Silken Sails 
2- 1 Twisting Star 
5- 2 Sing Your Love 
8- 1 Winter Storm 
sip Bambile 
1 (}- 1 others 
1 
1-15 
1.15: JUV PLT. R20 000, 1 000 m 
(R2 SwingerfTrifecta): 
I SUEH SAU 2b c J l.JghlhNll .......... Basson 
2 SING YOUR LOVE 2 br c J UghlhNrt .. F C:O.UN 
3 llAM8l.E 2 di c D Colemon . . . . . . . . . . . . W•mson 
4 RAMBUNG COWBOY 2 di c G Woodrvll ... Cllelin 
5 'IWIS11NG STAR 2 b c P Kniyot ............... Kan 
I WWTER STORM Zb c M W.n.. ........... Kiwi 
e Coupled: I and 2. 
IMIO 6 56.0 
IK10 4K10 3 56.0 
5 SJ.O 
OKOI 4 SJ.O 
OM10 1 SJ,O 
4MIO l SJ.O 
The Argus, Friday February 1 1 991 
- What the tipsters say ... -
DEREK Wll.SHAGH GIAHAM l'Onn IAllY HOPWOOD 
(The A1tv1) (The ""'") (The Atgu1) 
1 I SILKEN SAl\S I SllJ(EN SAILS I SILKEN SAILS 2 Sing Y- &.ft 6 WlntwS,_... S Twi1tint Stor 5 Twitlint Stw 2 SlftfY-i..w. 2 Si"t Y ovr Lo•• 
Figure 1.5 Reproductions from The Cape Argus and The Cape Times 
. own board displaying the current odds available on each horse. The opening betting is 
usually very cau.tious, with odds only being offered on the top 3 or 4 horses in the 
betting. Generally one bookmaker will price up and slowly the others will follow. The 
initial pricing up is usually 5 to 10 minutes after the end of the last race and about 5 
minutes after the initial display of current tote prices for the race. The bookmaker 
betting period on the course is therefore approximately 30 minutes for each race. 
The bookmakers presumably set odds given the information known to them, and within 
the competitive bookmaker market for bets. After a few minutes, the bookmakers have 
felt out the market and begin to adjust the odds. Not much money is bet early on, since 
the public have not had a chance to inspect the horses on their way down to the start. 
People with inside information, however, may bet in the initial few minutes in order to 
secure the odds then on offer. If they feel a better price will be on offer later they may 
haggle with the bookmaker now, or simply wait to get the better odds. Note that once 
a bet is struck with a bookmaker the odds are fixed for that bet. 
Once the horses have run down to the start, with approximately 15 minutes to the off 
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of the race, the bookmakers will start to experience more activity in the betting market. 
Punters have now had a chance to see their fancies and they must now bet. The 
bookmaker will now be adjusting his odds through weight of money rather than personal 
feelings or rumours. At the very end of the betting period there is usually a rush to get 
bets on and bookmakers will often take bets until the race is half over. Most big money 
bets struck with bookmakers will be on credit. If a bookmaker accepts bets which he 
feels to be too large on a particular horse he will lay some of the bets off. This means 
that he will bet on the horse concerned with another bookmaker, hopefully at odds equal 
to or greater than those which he has already laid. 
Bookmakers will normally only lay win bets, and although some will lay place bets as 
well, this is rarely seen on course. In 1989 bookmakers as a group had turnover of 
approximately two thirds of the total tote turnover. The punter gets taxed when he 
collects winnings from the bookmakers. The tax is currently 10% of the amount won 
disregarding the amount staked. For example, if a bookmaker lays a bet of 120 to 10 on 
a horse at 1211, and the horse wins, the payout will be 120 less 12 tax plus the 10 
original stake, or 118. If a horse is scratched within the betting period, a deduction from 
bets laid before the scratching, is made in accordance with a table which relates the 
scratched horse's odds to the percentage of the odds laid to be deducted. 
The Totalisator Agency Board (the tote) is authorised by the provincial authorities to 
conduct betting on racing throughout the country. The tote is essentially a medium for 
dividing the losers' money amongst the winners. All money is placed in different pools, 
a fee is charged to all bettors, and the remainder of the money is distributed to the 
winning bettors. The tote offers a variety of bets for which different charges are levied. 
Some of the charges are paid to the Province as taxes and the rest is given to the racing 
clubs in order to provide amenities for the racing public, as well as stakes for the races 
that are conducted on their racecourses. Betting with the tote can take place on the 
course, or at one of their approximately 50 off-course branches around the province. A 
telephone betting service also exists. 
The following is a description of what is required in order to win each bet offered by 
.. 
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the tote. 
Win: 
Select the winner of a specified race. 
Place: 
Select a placed horse in- a specified race. Dividends are payaMe in respect of horses 
placed: 
(i) First and second when there are four or five starters; 
(ii) First, second and third when there are six to thirteen starters; 
(iii) First, second, third and fourth when there are fourteen or more starters.· 
Swinger: 
Select two horses to finish first, second or third in a specified race, irrespective of the 
order in which they finish. 
Trifecta: 
Select three horses to finish first, second and third in the exact order in a specified race. 
Double: 
Select the winners of each of the two designated double races. A consolation· dividend 
is payable to tickets selecting a winner and a second. 
Place Accumulator: 
Select a horse placed first, second or third in each of the seven designated Place 
Accumulator races. 
Quin pot: 
Select the first or second placed horse in the five designated Quinpot races. 
Jackpot: 
Select the winners of each of the four designated Jackpot races. 
1-18 
Pick Six: 
Select the winner~ of the six designated Pick Six races. 
The charges (or takeout) applicable to these bets differ according to their complexity. 
The following are defined as exotic bets and are subject to a takeout rate of 25 % of the 
total pool for that specific bet; Pick Six, Jackpot, Place Accumulator, Quinpot, Trifecta 
and Swinger. The Win and Place bets are subject to a takeout rate of 18% of their 
respective pools, before any distribution to the winning ticket holders. 
The total takeout pe.rcentage actually exceeds the rates quoted above, because the track 
is allowed to retain the deduction from winning bettors that results from only paying bets 
to the lower lOc .on a unit bet. This additional amount is generally known as "breakage". 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE EFFICIENT MARKETS HYPOTHESIS AND 
HORSERACING 
" ... and as for profits and winnings, people everywhere, not only 
at roulette, are always winning or taking away something from one 
another." 
Dostoyevsky, The Gambler 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Efficient Market Definitions 
An efficient market is one in which all available information relevant to the market is 
accounted for immediately in the pricing of the relevant assets. An implication, 
therefore, of a market that is efficient, is that above normal profits cannot be made by 
any individual on .a systematic basis. Much work has been done by researchers arguing 
from both sides that stock markets are, or are not, efficient. In recent years (from 1976) 
some research has concentrated ·on examining horserace betting markets and subjecting 
these to tests of efficiency. 
Three classes of information were defined by Fama (1970) with regard to stock market 
information. If an individual held information in the lowest class and could not make 
above normal profits, the market was said to be weakly efficient. Similarly if an 
individual held information in the middle or highest classes, (in addition to all the 
information in the lower classes) and could not make above normal profits, the market 
was said to be semi-strongly efficient and strongly efficient respectively. 
The above three classes were defined by Fama specifically for stock market data and not 
as generally as listed above. Fama defines the lowest class of information to be past 
prices and returns of a specific share. Data of this type is used (in stock market studies) 
to test weak efficiency. The middle class of information is defined as all other publicly 
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available information. Data of this type can therefore be used to test semi-strong 
efficiency. The highest class of information is defined as knowledge which is only 
available to very few people who are usually insiders. Data of this type could be used 
to test for strong efficiency. The three tests are better thought of (from weak to strong) 
as tests of technical efficiency, fundamental efficiency and efficiency against inside 
information. This removes to some extent the somewhat arbitrary definitions of weak, 
semi-strong and strong. 
To test for efficiency in the betting market it is necessary to define the information 
relevant to such markets which fits into each of the three classes. In previous studies, 
specifically Dowie (1976) and Snyder (1978), this has been done in the following way. 
The lowest class of information is defined as containing only the odds of the horses. The 
market is therefore shown to be weakly efficient if profits cannot be made by betting on 
horses at specific odds. These odds are viewed as the subjective probabilities of the 
horses winning as determined by the market. Further, if the market is weakly efficient, 
the rate of return to all odds categories should be equal to 0% (ignoring transactions 
costs). This would imply that the public's estimates of the probabilities of winning for 
all horses was in line with empirical probabilities. 
The information in the middle class was first defined by Snyder as other data available 
regarding the race itself but not including subjective opinions on the outcome of the race. 
Examples of this data would be weight, draw, jockey etc. Losey and Talbot (1980) 
defined this class of information as incorporating such data, as well as all subjective 
information available regarding predictions of the outcomes of races. 
Snyder defined the highest class as that containing the knowledge of owners, trainers etc. 
and tipsters' information that is published in various publications. For his tests he uses 
the latter data since the former is clearly not publicly available. Losey defines this 
category to contain information held by owners, trainers etc. alone and concludes that 
the strong form cannot be tested in the absence of this information. The three classes 
have had no further redefining since Losey's paper in 1980. 
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In this work we will redefine the three information classes in terms of the data to be 
contained in them, as well as introduce two new terms. This will of course be relevant 
to the horseracing information market but will possibly be transferable to stock market 
analysis. Define the lowest class of information to contain all unprocessed information 
available to the public. Define the middle class of information to contain all processed 
information available to the public. Define the highest class of information to contain all 
information available to insiders such as owners, trainers, jockeys etc. but excluding 
public tipsters. The middle and highest classes are thus similarly defined to previous 
studies. 
Define unprocessed information as all publicly available information that is elementary 
(i.e. it is a single data point which is not a function of other data).This data includes 
jockey, trainer, mass, draw etc. Although odds are a function of all these variables we 
cannot know without investigating each individually whether their weighting in 
determining odds has been correctly made. For example, perhaps the market is efficient 
in accounting for jockey but inefficient in accounting for draw, the odds test may reveal 
the market to be efficient but inefficiencies may exist in places. Odds although a function 
of elementary data, can still be used as an overall test of weak efficiency, and therefore 
for the purposes of the argument we will regard the odds as elementary information. 
Define processed information as complex data which is determined as a function of 
elementary data and concerns subjective opinions regarding the outcome of a race. This 
would include tipsters' choices, newspapers' forecast betting guides and horses' ratings 
in tipping and rating guides. Another way of considering the data sets is as follows. 
Assume the lowest class to contain all technical information or objective information. 
The middle class then contains all fundamental information or subjective information. 
Within the framework of the E.M.H., research other than that concentrating on tests of 
informational efficiency has been done. Various tests have been performed to examine 
bettor consistency. It is important to define what is meant by the terms relating to 
efficiency and consistency used in this work. This is because similar terminology is used 
to describe differing tests in various papers. When a paper is reviewed the tests will be 
". 
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described using the framework described in the next paragraph. An indication will also 
be given as to how the author viewed the tests. 
The definition of market efficiency which states that profits cannot be made utilising 
some set of information will be used throughout. The information sets defined above will 
be used. Consistency in the betting market is defined as the inability of bettors to 
increase their return, without any additional information, but not necessarily to a level 
of profitability. Profitability is defined as a positive return after transaction costs have 
been accounted for. 
A further topic which has been mentioned but not researched, is that of betting on local 
pools at away racetracks. These topics are discussed in depth in the following sections 
which review the literature on the subject and present ideas and proposals for further 
research. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.2.1 Tests of Weak Efficiency 
The Favourite-Longshot Bias 
Dowie (1976) is the pioneering paper on the efficiency of horserace betting markets. The 
paper tests for weak efficiency in the betting markets in England, using elementary 
information (odds) only. The data are shown in Table 2.1. 
The data used are bookmaker Starting Prices (SP's) which are divided into 68 odds 
categories ranging from 1/ 11 to 150/ 1. Actual returns to each category as well as 
cumulative returns using level staking and staking to return 100 are calculated. The 
returns shown are all pre~tax of 8 % . Level staking means the bet on each horse is the 
same no matter what the odds, whereas staking to return a fixed amount will obviously 
mean betting more on horses with lower odds. The weak test is made by examining the 
rates of return to the different odds categories. A statistically significant positive rate of 
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1973 FLAT SEASON: RETURN AT EACH STARTING PRICE 
Unit Cumulative return 
stakes Winning Percentage 
Odds required Runners percentage return Level Staking 
to return staking to return 
100 100 
. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1-11 91·7 1 100·0 109·0 109·0 109·0 
2-13 86-7 1 O·O 0·0 54·5 56-1 
1-6 85·7 2 100·0 117·0 85·8 85·8 
1-5 83·3 2 100·0 120·0 97·2 96·8 
2-9 81 ·8 4 100·0 122·0 107·1 106-7 
1-4 80·0 7 85·7 107·1 107·1 106·9 
2-7 77·8 2 50·0 64·5 102·6 102·6 
30-100 76-9 1 100·0 130·0 104·0 103·9 
1-3 75·0 8 75·0 99·8 102·8 102·9 
4-11 73·3 15 66-7 90·7 98·6 98·9 
2-5 71·4 18 88·9 124·4 106-2 106-0 
4-9 69·2 21 81·0 116·6 108·9 108·7 
40--85 68·0 1 100·0 147·0 109·3 109·1 1-2 66-7 24 70·8 106·3 108·6 108·5 8-15 65·2 14 64·3 98·4 107·4 107·4 
4-7 63·6 23 60·9 95·6 105·5 105·8 8-13 61 ·9 24 75·0 121 ·5 107·8 107·7 4-6 60·0 52 67·3 112·4 108·9 108·7 8-11 57·9 58 37·9 65·6 99·9 100·7 
4-5 55·6 76 59·2 106-6 101·3 101·8 5-6 54·5 35 65·7 120·3 103·0 103·2 
10-11 52·4 79 46·8 89·5 100·7 101·2 Evens 50·0 116 46·6 93·1 99·2 99·8 
11-10 47·6 112 41 ·l 86·3 97·1 98·0 6-5 45·5 32 25·0 55·0 95·3 96·5 
5-4 44·4 134 42·5 95·7 95·3 96-4 11-8 42·1 113 35·4 84·2 94·1 95·3 6-4 40·0 186 37·6 94·1 94·1 95·1 13-8 38·1 123 36·6 96·2 94·3 95·2 
7-4 36-4 221 30·8 84·6 92·9 94·0 
15-8 34·8 101 32·7 94·1 92·9 ·94.0 
2 33·3 305 24·6 73·8 . 89·9 91 ·6 85-40 32·0 43 23·3 72·8 89·5 91 ·3 9-4 30·8 312 27·2 88·5 89·4 91·0 5-2 28·6 363 26-5 92·6 89·8 91·2 
11-4 26·7 342 24·9 93·2 90·2 91·3 3 25·0 538 23·6 94·4 90·8 91 ·6 100-30 23·1 279 22·9 99·3 91·5 92·0 7-2 22·2 590 18·8 84·7 90·6 91 ·4 4 20·0 734 21 ·l 105·6 92·7 92·6 9-2 18·2 656 13·9 76-3 90·8 91·5 
Table 2.1 reproduced from Dowie (1976) 
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5 16-7 855 15·1 90·5 90·8 91 ·4 
11-2 15·4 635 15·6 101·3 91·7 91 ·9 
6 14·3 944 13·5 94·2 92·0 92·0 
13-2 13·3 450 17·3 130·0 94·0 93·1 
7 12·5 983 9·9 78·9 92·4 92·3 
15-2 11 ·8 288 12·9 109·2 92·9 92·6 
8 11 · l 1290 8·8 78·8 91·3 91 ·8 
17-2 10·5 36 2·8 26-4 91 ·1 90·5 
9 10·0 621 7·6 75·7 90·3 90·1 
IO 9· l 1564 7·5 83·0 89·4 89·7 
11 8·3 513 4·9 58·5 88·3 89·3 
12 7·7 1798 4·8 62·2 85·3 88·0 
13 7· l 109 5·5 77·1 85·3 85·9 
14 6-7 1700 4·7 69·7 83·8 85·3 
15 6-3 56 1·8 28·6 83·6 84·4 
16 5·9 1501 2·5 41 ·9 80·3 83·2 
18 5·3 124 0·8 15·3 79·9 83·1 
20 4·8 3739 l·l 22·5 70·5 79·9 
22 4·4 141 0·0 0·0 70·1 79·7 
25 3·8 1913 1·3 34·0 67·4 78·8 
28 3·4 70 1·4 41·4 67·3 78·8 
30 3·2 115 O·O O·O 67·0 78·7 
33 2·9 3314 0·5 18·5 61 ·3 77·1 
40 2·4 152 0·0 O·O 61·0 77·0 
so 2·0 506 1·0 50·4 60·8 77·1 
66 1 ·5 59 0·0 O·O 60·7 77·1 
100 1 ·0 57 O·O O·O 60·5 77·1 
'150' 0·7 6 O·O O·O 60·6 77·1 
29307 
Table 2.1 cont. reproduced from Dowie (1976) 
return, after tax, did not appear in the data and the market is therefore deemed to be 
weakly efficient. 
The data consist of 29 307 horses which ran during the 197J season. It is noted (as it 
has been in other studies) that the rates of return are proportional to the probabilities of 
winning. This means that although profits cannot be made, a smaller loss results from 
betting on favourites than on outsiders. We call this the favourite-longshot bias which 
is examined further in chapter four. Evidence of the bias is thus obtained from this fairly 
extensive data. 
Although the market has been noted to be weakly efficient in that profits cannot be made 
} 
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by using odds data alone, bettors are inconsistent in that they could do better than the 
average loss, simply by betting on horses in certain odds categories, namely horses in 
the high probability categories (low odds categories). Inconsistency is taken to imply that 
bettors are capable of increasing returns simply by altering their betting behaviour 
without reference to any additional information. We shall see other examples of bettor 
inconsistency in the research. 
Snyder (1978) tested for weak efficiency in the horserace betting market by examining 
1 730 races in the United States between 1972 and 1974. His data consists of tote, rather 
than bookmaker SP's. His study also cites data from 5 other studies, 3 of which 
considered approximately 10 000 races each. A list of these studies is reproduced in 
figure 2.1, as well as graphs of returns versus odds categories for each study. Overall 
results are shown in figure 2.2. It was noted by Snyder that. the bettor inconsistency is 
strong and stable over time. 
Disregarding transaction costs, t-tests are performed to examine whether the rates of 
return are significantly different from 0%. It is shown that rates of return are positive 
for favourites below 311 while they are negative for odds greater than 8/1. Taking 
transaction costs into account there is no category which yields a positive return and the 
market is thus weakly efficient. This paper also showed the inconsistency of bettors in 
that returns were higher in the lower odds categories than in the longer odds categories. 
The tests utilised only elementary data (odds) and is therefore a test of weak efficiency. 
Snyder viewed the test in the same way. Unlike Dowie's study, Snyder has grouped the 
odds categories, thereby reducing the number of categories from about 70 to about 10. 
The tests were then carried out on the returns to these category groupings. · 
Complementing a point made by McGlothlin (1956) that this bettor inconsistency was 
smallest in the main race because uncertainty was least then, Snyder noted "evidence that 
the bettor bias is accentuated at smaller tracks where greater uncertainty exists." 
Investigations are carried out in this work to find in what situations bettor inconsistency 
is most marked or almost absent. For example, later races will probably show a more 
marked form of inconsistency since on average, bettors will be losing about 20 % of their 
Percent 
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HORSE RACE Sn:DIES: At:THORS. DATES ASD NUMBER OF RACES 
Author Date Published Racing Dates No. of Races 
Fabricant 1965 1955~2 10.000 
Griffith 1949 1947 1,124 
McGlothlin 1956 1947-53 9,248 
Seligman 1975 1975 1,183 
Snyder 1978 1972-74 1.730 
Weitzman• 1965 1954-63 12.000 
•Weitzman did not publish his data. but they were used again and published 
by Rosett ( 1965). 
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money and will need to back a winner at a long price to come out ahead for the day. 
More of this in section 2.2.4. 
Kreel (1988) considering data from Cape Town racetracks for 1988 and using 729 races 
examined his data in 3 different ways. Firstly the data were not grouped and resulted in 
37 odds categories. Many of these had too few observations to be analysed statistically 
so the categories were grouped, firstly, grouping the odds categories so that odds groups 
with little perceived differences were grouped together, and secondly to obtain a smooth 
monotonically decreasing curve of observed probabilities versus odds. It was noted that 
bookmakers made more percentage profit on outsiders than on favourites, which is just 
another way of reconfirming that bettors as a group tend to lose more on outsiders than 
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on favourites. Again, only odds data were used, resulting in the weak form test. An 
update of this study is performed during the research. Some of the original results are 
shown in table 2.2. The original variable names are used, as they are referred to by 
these names in the new results, which are shown in section 3.1. Specifically, p = price 
(odds), wp = number of winners, exp = number of runners, obs = observed 
probability, theo = theoretical probability, and rat = the ratio of the probabilities. 
The Affect of the Draw 
Canfield et al. (1987) tested for weak efficiency using only one fundamental factor 
applicable to each horse, namely the horses barrier position, or draw. The hypothesis 
is that simply by knowing the horse's draw and possibly other external factors related 
to the meeting as a whole, such as the weather, profits could be made. The hypothesis 
is based on the assumption that the shape of the track will influence the results of races. 
The data consist of the results and relevant draw information for 3 345 races run in 
Canada during 1982, 1983 and 1984. Races were categorised as being on a wet or a dry 
day at the track as well as being split by the distance of the race. In this case either 
sprint or route was the classification. 
One of the main conclusions of the study was that " ... the chance that a typical horse in 
post position one or two will win a given race is about double that of a horse in post 
position seven to ten." Some of the results are reproduced in tables 2.3, and 2.4. 
Rates of return to each post position were calculated from betting to win on each horse. 
The only strategy that yielded profits was betting on post position one or two on dry 
days. The profits were in the range of 10% to 15%. Further betting strategies which 
utilized the exotic (complex) betting market did not show profits at the 5% level of 
significance. It is concluded that although a physical track bias does exist at this 
particular track, it is generally incorporated into the betting behaviour of punters who 
push the odds down on horses that have a better chance in the race simply because they 
have a good draw. 
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p WP EXPP OBS THEO RAT 
0.1 2 2 1.000 0.909 0.909 
0.2 4 6 0.667 0.833 1.250 
0.25 3 4 0.750 0.800 1.067 
0.333 10 11 0.909 0.750 0.825 
0.4 10 16 0.625 0.714 1.143 
0.5 11 14 0.786 0.667 0.848 
0.6 15 29 0.517 0.625 1.208 
0.7 14 20 0.700 0.588 0.840 
0.8 11 33 0.333 0.556 1.667 
0.9 14 23 0.609 0.526 0.865 
1 12 40 0.300 0.500 1.667 
1.1 10 17 0.588 0.476 0.810 
1.2 6 21 0.286 0.455 1.591 
1.3 7 23 0.304 0.435 1.429 
1.4 16 30 ·0.533 0.417 0.781 
1.5 16 39 0:410 0.400 0.975 
1.6 11 34 0.324 0.385 1.189 
1.7 19 41 0.463 0.370 0.799 
1.8 20 54 0.370 0.357 0.964 
2 32 118 0.271 0.333 1.229 
2.2 20 63 0.317 0.313 0.984 
2.5 30 135 0.222 0.286 1.286 
2.8 10 52 0.192 0.263 1.368 
3 57 209 0.273 0.250 0.917 
3.3 5 55 0.091 0.233 2.558 
3.5 40 201 0.199 0.222 1.117 
4 46 307 0.150 0.200 1.335 
4.5 25 178 0.140 0.182 1.295 
5 52 482 0.108 0.167 1.545 
6 52 528 0.098 0.143 1.451 
7 47 590 0.080 0.125 1.569 
8 24 537 0.045 0.111 2.486 
10 23 516 0.045 0.091 2.040 
12 34 1785 0.019 0.077 4.038 
14 23 910 0.025 0.067 2.638 
16 5 244 0.020 0.059 2.871 
20 13 1030 0.013 0.048 3.773 
Table 2.2 reproduced from Kreel (1988) 
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Winning Percentages and Rates of Rewrn on H 'in Bets by Post Position in 2516 Six-Furlong 
Races Run m·er Mile Tracks. Source: Quirin ( 1979) 
Number of Number of Percent Rate of 
Post Position Horses Winners Winners Return 
I 2516 304 12.1 1.08 
2 2516 267 10.6 0.80 
3 2516 279 I I.I 0.73 
4 2516 276 11.0 0.71 
5 2516 249 9.9 0.63 
6 2481 271 10.9 0.89 
7 2375 220 9.3 0.71 
8 2208 204 9.2 0.79 
9 2025 164' 8.1 0.94 
10 1886 140 7.4 0.52 
11 1107 91 8.2 0.72 
12 727 51 7.0 0.21 
Very Outside 2516 184 7.2 0.53 
Table 2.3 reproduced from Canfield (1987) 
Movements in the Odds 
Tuckwell (1983) examined whether the movements in the bookmaker's odds were 
random or not. A movement in the odds in one direction should be followed, with equal 
chance, by another movement (should on~ occur) in either direction. Thus the probability 
of further movement in the already noted direction is 50 per cent. Using a Chi-Squared 
test, the hypothesis of randomness in odds movements is rejected at the 1 % level of 
significance and it is determined that for a given movement in the odds, a movement in 
the same direction has a probability of approximately 85 per cent. 
The above is not a test of weak efficiency in the context of this research. Tuckwell 
further investigates whether using odds data alone can lead to profitable betting 
strategies. If this were possible then in our context the market would be weakly 
inefficient. Instead of betting on horses in every odds category, Tuckwell determines in 
which odds groups the punter is expected to lose the least amount. He does this by 
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Winning Perce/I/ages bJ· Post Position in 3345 Sprint and Route Races Run 01w 332 Days at Exhibition Park in 1982-1984 
1982 1983 1984 
109 days 113 days 110 days Avge. Diff. 
Post 
Position 
from 
Number of Numher of Number of Average% Mean% Winners % Winners• Winners % Winners Winners % Winners Winners Winners statistic•• 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
173 16.05 146 12.78 162 14.78 14.54 +2.56 4.09 192 17.88 139 12.24 149 13.72 14.61 +2.63 2.06 152 14.06 132 11.60 144 13.16 12.94 +0.96 2.28 124 11.50 141 12.29 123 11.32 11.70 
-0.28 
-0.46 123 11.45 158 13.92 132 12.10 12.49 +0.51 0.46 119 11.17 132 11.76 114 10.51 11.15 
-0.83 
-1.45 83 8.19 90 8.43 91 8.74 8.45 
-3.53 
-6.50 60 6.83 91 9.44 82 8.84 8.37 
-3.61 
-3.00 44 6.49 63 7.70 59 7.65 7.2~ -4.70 
-5.82 22 4.44 55 8.61 50 8.39 7.14 
-4.84 
-2.74 
Totals and 
Averages 1092 12.81 1147 11.47 1106 11.67 11.98 
•These percentages do not necessarily add to one since different post positions have different numbers of starters. 
••With two degrees of freedom. using the three-years data, the one-tail cut-off values are 1.89 at the 10% level and 2.92 at the 5% level. So at the 10% level. positions 1-3 have an edge, 
7-10 have a disadvanlage and 4-6 are average. 
N 
I 
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regressing the observed losses in each odds category against the starting price odds, 
converted to probabilities, of that category. He derived the following regression line; 
A 2 3 L = 50.3 - 3_62.7p• +978.sp• - 773.3p• 
where L is the predicted percentage loss to punters and p* is the probability equivalent 
of the starting price odds. 
The results are reproduced in Table 2.5. Although at the higher odds, the pattern is 
similar to that seen in other studies, the pattern of losses at the lower odds is not. This 
derivation of expected losses was first presented in Tuckwell's 1981 paper which dealt 
with bettor consistency. Further comment can be found in section 2.3.1. 
Predicted Percentage Loss (L) and Starting Price odds (SPO) 
A A 
SPO L SPO L 
0.41 8.24 S.00 13.44 
0.67 17.15 s.so 14.84 
0.73 17.55 6.00 16.20 
0.80 17.61 6.SO 17.50 
0.90 17.21 7.00 18.74 
1.00 16.49 1.SO 19.91 
I.I I IS.SO 8.00 21.02 
1.25 14.20 9.00 23.04 
1.38 13.09 10.00 24.84 
1.50 12.09 11.00 26.43 
1.63 11.21 12.00 27.84 
1.75 10.46 14.00 30.24 
1.88 9.85 15.00 31.27 
2.00 9.37 16.00 32.20 
2.25 8.73 20.00 35.17 
2.50 8.45 25.00 37.76 
2.75 8.45 32.91 40.44 
3.00 8.66 40.00 42.03 
3.25 9.03 50.00 . 43.56 
3.50 9.51 66.00 45.10 
3.75 10.07 98.73 46.76 
4.00 10.70 187.30 48.40 
4.50 12.04 
Table 2.5 reproduced from Tuckwell (1983) 
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Tuckwell now tests for weak efficiency by backing all horses in the odds range between 
211 and 4/ 1 that firm in the betting market. Horses in this odds range show the smallest 
loss to punters. Also, since horses that firm in the market are likely to firm again, profit 
may be possible by betting on horses in this odds range that have already firmed. This 
is clearly not strictly a test of weak efficiency, although Tuckwell proceeds as if it is. 
Bets are placed at odds higher than the starting price, but no other details are given. It 
is assumed that the method of betting is as follows; if a horse is backed from 3/ l to 
28/10, a bet is made at 28/10 and the horse then firms further to (say) 5/2. By using this 
method a profit of slightly above 5% is achieved. Tuckwell concludes that the market 
is weakly inefficient, and that this is a result of strong inefficiency which had been 
demonstrated earlier in the paper, and which is discussed shortly. This is the only paper 
which concludes that the market is weakly inefficient. Comment on this aspect can be 
found in section 2.3.1. 
Odds as Predictors 
Asch et al.(1982) asks the questions whether the publicly determined odds are a good 
predictor of horse performance, and if not where do the discrepancies between empirical 
probabilities and the subjective probabilities lie? These questions are essentially a 
formulation of a test of weak efficiency. Horses are grouped by their level of favouritism 
rather than their actual odds. Once the horses are allocated to categories based on their 
level of favouritism, the objective probability of a horse in a category winning is simply 
the number of horses winning in such a category divided by the total number of runners 
in the category. In this case we may have two horses with the same odds but they may 
fall into different categories because they have a different level of favouritism. The 
subjective probabilities are calculated from the actual odds only after allocation to the 
categories. 
The results of the study, shown in table 2.6, indicate that a similar pattern of subjective 
and objective probabilities emerges to that observed when horses are allocated to 
categories based on their actual odds. The public overestimate the probabilities of 
outsiders winning while they underestimate the probabilities of favourites winning. 
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Subjective and objective probabilities of winning in 729 Atlantic City (NJ) 
races in 1978 (total number of horses= 5805). 
No. of Obj. Subj. (Subj. prob. -obj. prob.)/ 
Favorites3 racesb prob.c prob. st. error of obj. prob.d 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1st 729 0.361 0.325 -2119e 
2nd 729 0.218 0.205 .-0.903 
3rd 729 0.170 0.145 -1.972e 
4th 724 0.115 0.104 -0.961 
5th 692 0.071 0~012 0.074 
6th 598 0.050 0.048 -0.279 
7th 431 0.030 0.034 0.480 
8th 289 0.017 0.025 1.096 
9th 165 0.006 0.018 2095e 
a Lowest odds horses. 
bThe number of races declines because many races have only a small 
number of entrants. It should be noted that there are numerous races in 
which there is a tie for which horse is the first favorite, or second favorite, 
etc. The pool of first favorites was taken to consist of all horses with the 
lowest odds, including ties, and similarly for the other positions. 
cNote that these probabilities are the probabilities for the ith favorite 
conditional on there being an ith favorite in a particular race. Hence they 
need not sum to unity. 
dThe standard errors were computed by taking the objective probabilities 
as the 'true' probabilities and assuming a binomial process. Thus the 
standard error is [p(l-p)/n]i (sec Ali (1977)], where p is the objective 
probability and n the number of races. 
•significant at the 0.05 level. 
Table 2.6 reproduced from Asch et al. (1982) 
As another test of weak efficiency, and now using the more common method of 
allocating horses to categories, namely by using the actual odds, rates of return were 
calculated for nine categories. The results, shown in table 2. 7, again indicate that the 
market is weakly efficient after transaction costs but that bettors are inconsistent in their 
manner of betting. An interesting test was carried out here which indicates that this 
inconsistency is more marked in the last two races of the day. This was mentioned 
earlier. The data used were 729 races run during 1978 in the United States. Tote odds 
were used throughout. Odds data alone were used for the tests which are therefore tests 
of weak efficiency. 
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Rates of return from bets on horses with different odds 
levels for all races and for late races (races 8 and 9). 
Rates of return 
Odds level 0 All races Late races 
(I) (2) (3) 
0~2 -0.1366 -0.0428 
2<0~3.5 -0.3177 -0.3210 
3.5 <0~5 -0.1758 -0.0288 
5<0~8 -0.2242 -0.5238 
8<0~14 -0.1602 -0.1698 
14<0~25 -0.3255 -0.3618 
25<0 -0.6372 -0.6858 
Table 2. 7 reproduced from Asch et al. (1982) 
Asch et al. (1984) examines market efficiency from a different point of view. The main 
thrust of the paper is similar to previous studies in that it attempts to find profits using 
only odds as information. Instead of comparing empirical probabilities with subjective 
probabilities on a category by category basis, logit analysis is used. Thus empirical 
probabilities are thought of as dependent variables, while different types of odds (e.g. 
SP's and Forecast Prices (FP's)) relating to the races are thought of as the predictor 
variables. 
The paper is difficult to read because the meaning of some terms are not explained. The 
wording of the paper appears to suggest that empirical probabilities are affected by FP' s 
and SP's. The reverse is clearly the truth. However it is reasonable to use logit analysis 
if the various odds are used as explanatory variables only. The interpretation is then that 
the odds help explain the outcome of races but they certainly have no systematic 
fundamental effect on such outcomes. 
The various odds used are the FP's, SP's and marginal odds derived from the final eight 
minutes of betting. The latter are used to test for inside information and will therefore 
be discussed later. The paper notes that neither FP's nor SP's alone provide a 
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satisfactory explanation of the empirical winning probabilities. This is consistent with 
the other studies in that it implies that above normal profits cannot systematically be 
made on win bets simply by using odds information. 
Undeterred by this evidence the paper suggests three betting strategies to be used in 
conjunction with the predictive model using the FP's and SP's. All three strategies 
inevitably end up backing the favourites. It is noted that for all strategies using win 
betting, better results than the average (negative track take) are obtained. This is nothing 
unexpected if we keep in mind the well known favourite-longshot bias (inconsistency) 
of bettors. 
The horses for win bets as selected by the predictive model were bet on for places and 
shows. This resulted in fairly substantial profits, although these were shown to be much 
lower than noted at first, owing to a computer error in the original calculations, two 
years later by Asch et al. (1986). The following explanation is offered by the paper. "It 
is possible that the tendency to overbet longshots is accentuated in place and show 
betting. It is also possible that all the information contained in the win pool may not be 
efficiently impounded in the place and show pools." 
The paper concludes by noting two practical problems. Firstly any predictive model' 
working with SP's as an independent variable will be rendered useless by the fact that 
SP's are not known until the race is almost over. Secondly, any strategy that could be 
employed in the place and show pools, would have to be of very limited size as these 
pools are small relative to the win pool. The data used for all the tests were some form 
of odds and therefore the tests were of weak efficiency. 
Bird and Mccrae (1987) in testing. for semi-strong efficiency also investigate weak 
efficiency by ranking horses by their level of favouritism, at four different points in the 
betting period, and noting rates of return to these categories. The data were collected 
from Australian racetracks during 1983 and 1984. A total of 1 026 races were used, 
while bookmaker odds were used in preference to tote odds. The results, shown in table 
2. 8, indicate that Australian bettors have. similar biases in their betting behaviour as 
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bettors from the U.S.A. and Britain. The percentage return to the first favourite was 
-7.38 while the return to the seventh favourite was ~38.96. All returns in between 
decreased monotonically. The test of weak efficiency used only odds data. This paper 
is discussed further in the next two sections. 
Tipsters 
Ranking % 
I -12.29 
2 -26.45 
3 -16.62 
4 -27.66 
5 -20.71 
6 -53.27 
7 -46.09 
Rates of Return from Placing a $ l Bet on Horses Ranked Both on the Basis 
of the "Experts" Poll and Their Level of Faroritism. 
Period 
1, 12 ,, 
Favoritism Tipsters Favoritism Tipstm Favoritism Tipsters 
% % % % % % 
-15.28 -7.18 -9.00 -4.50· -5.40 -5.50 
-26.57 -22.29 -20.61 -18.06 -13.33 -18.78 
-13.38 -12.67 -17.80 -7.79 -11.54 -9.66 
-24.40 -25.54 -14.93 -19.18 -22.61 -19.61 
-35.72 -15.91 -36.20 -9.23 -33.64 -9.62 
-39.95 -52.98 -33.55 -SO.OS -20.08 -40.46 
-42.49 -44.65 -38.S6 -36.92 -41.63 -38.40 
l4 
Favoritism 
% 
-7.38 
-10.81 
-17.99 
-24.45 
-29.16 
-27.12 
-38.96 
NB. None of the differences between the returns where the horses are ranked on the basis of the tipstm' polls and on basis of the level of 
favoritism prove to be significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 2.8 reproduced from Bird and McCrae (1987) 
Figlewski (1979) also had as his main aim the testing of semi-strong efficiency but did 
test for weak efficiency along the way. His data consist of 189 races run in the U.S.A. 
in 1977 with the use of tote odds. Logit analysis is used. The dependent variable is the 
predicted probability of each horse winning. The predictor variable is the tote odds. 
From the data sample, coefficients for the explanatory variable are estimated so as to 
maximize the product of the predicted probabilities of the horses that actually won each 
of the 189 races (maximum likelihood estimation). The conclusion drawn is that the tote 
odds are a better predictor of races than no information at all (the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables set to zero). This is hardly useful, but this type of test was not the 
aim of the paper. A number of papers have thus run tests of weak efficiency in the 
racetrack betting market. These include results from different times as well as different 
countries, namely the U.S.A. , England, Australia and South Africa. Different data were 
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also used between studies in that some used tote odds while others used bookmaker odds. 
Grouping of data was another aspect which differed from study to study. The basic form 
of the test is to compare empirical probabilities of winning with those subjectively 
determined. A more complex form of the test uses logit analysis and functions of the 
odds rather than the odds themselves. 
Although the market is weakly efficient in that after transactions costs profits cannot be 
made simply by knowing the odds of the runners, the market is nevertheless inconsistent. 
This is because of the betting bias that the public show towards outsiders and against 
favourites. The public have been shown to be inconsistent in that they could increase 
their return to above the average simply by betting on favourites. 
2.2.2 Tests of Semi-Strong Efficiency 
The Subjective Views of the Press 
The data for testing semi-strong form efficiency in the stock market consists of publicly 
available information regarding shares, in addition to the past price information. In the 
context of horserace betting we will use as data the subjective information of various 
groups of people regarding the outcomes of races. Snyder was the first to comment on 
the possibility of a test of semi-strong efficiency. He suggested that a test of semi-strong 
efficiency had not been reported. We noted in the introduction that Snyder's definition 
of the semi-strong class has been updated and we therefore just consider his "strong 
efficiency" test as pertaining with more relevance to a test of semi-strong efficiency. 
For his examination of "strong efficiency" Snyder defines newspaper tipsters as being 
in the class of people who possess inside information. It will be noted here that if such 
"inside information" was published it would fail to be inside information and could not 
be used to test strong efficiency anyway! 
Snyder's study is thus applicable to an evaluation of tipsters information, which is then 
a test of semi-strong efficiency. The test is conducted by examining rates of return to 
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tipster "bets" in a similar way to the manner in which the test of weak efficiency was 
carried out. The data used were odds (FP's) predicted by various newspapers, the 
official track handicapper and the Daily Racing Form, based on 846 races run during 
1975. The odds on all the horses are noted and the horses are grouped into odds 
categories as in the test of weak efficiency. Rates of return to each odds category are 
calculated. 
Rates of return are analysed without regard of transactions costs. In this hypothetical 
situation an efficient market is one in which all rates of return are zero. Snyder's weak 
efficiency test showed the public to be inconsistent in that returns were greater than zero 
for favourites while they were less than zero for outsiders. It is now shown that the 
"experts" are also inconsistent and to a higher degree. Rates of return to favourites were 
higher for the experts than the public, while they were lower than the public's return for 
outsiders. The only conclusion that Snyder draws from this is that the experts are more 
biased than the public in determining odds. 
Losey and Talbot (1980) also take Snyder to task on his work. They suggest that 
Snyder's test is relevant only as a test of semi-strong efficiency. They then assume that 
the FP's obtained from some source (in this case the Racing Form handicapper), are 
accurate estimates of the true odds, and therefore that any deviation from these FP' s in 
the publicly determined odds, present opportunities for profit. 
The test examines the FP's and SP's for 1305 races in the U.S.A. run during 1978. 
Assuming the FP's to be the true odds, if the ratio of SP to FP is greater than 1 the bet 
will have positive expected value and so long as we confine our bets to such situations 
we will make a profit in the long run. The ratios are calculated and split into 3 
categories, viz. 1.01-1.32, 1.33-1.72, and greater than 1.72. Level stake bets were made 
on the 579 horses that qualified for a bet. Horses qualify for a bet if their FP's are 3/1 
or less. The resultant losses were 21.6%, 32.8% and 32.7% respectively. The overall 
loss was 28.4 % which was noted to be significantly different from the average bettors 
loss of 17%. Evidently something is wrong. 
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It is somewhat difficult to explain the results in the light of two observations already 
made. Firstly, simply by betting on favourites (say horses at 3/1 or less) we would 
expect to obtain a rate of return better then the average loss of 17%. Secondly, the odds 
on favourites as estimated by the Racing Form are assumed to have been overestimated 
(i.e. the probabilities inherent in the FP's for favourites are less than the empirical 
probabilities). 
The conclusion drawn from the test is that the so called experts do not know more than 
the public regarding the outcomes of races, and if anything they exhibit less knowledge. 
No explanation is offered as to why the results of the test were the opposite of what 
were expected. Using the definition of efficiency that rules out abnormal profits, the 
final conclusion of the study is that the market is semi-strongly efficient. 
Tuckwell (1983) examines semi-strong efficiency very briefly in a paper that is more 
concerned with strong efficiency. The Australian publication "Computercard" publishes 
odds for its first three rated horses on a consistent and scientific basis. A bet was made 
on all horses whose SP's exceeded the estimated odds. This led to a profit of some 6.5 
per cent, and the conclusion is that the market is semi-strongly inefficient. It is noted 
that this occurs in spite of strong inefficiency, and not because of it, as was the case 
with the weak test. 
In addition to testing for semi-strong efficiency, Bird and Mccrae (1987) investigate 
whether the information contained in the tipsters' forecasts is impounded into the odds 
as determined by the public. In the test, the choices of ten "experts" are noted. Three 
points are allocated to a horse tipped first, two for second and one for third. This gives 
an overall view of the information contained in the tipsters' suggestions. Horses are then 
categorised by their rank, as determined by the allocation of the tipster's points. Level 
stake bets are placed on all horses with the same rank and the rates of return are 
calculated. It is noted that the returns are negative for all ranks and that the higher 
ranks, (strongly fancied by the tipsters) performed better in terms of returns than the 
lower ranks, as shown in table 2.8. The conclusion drawn is that the market is semi-
strongly efficient. 
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As seen in the section on weak efficiency the horses were also grouped on the basis of 
their level of favouritism as determined by the public. Rates of return were calculated 
and t-tests performed to see if there were any differences between the returns to the 
public and those to the "experts". No significant difference was found and the conclusion 
drawn was that the odds determined by the public, incorporate the tipsters information. 
Discussion on this conclusion can be found in section 2.3.2. 
Figlewski (1979) attempted to connect the track odds and the tipsters' information in a 
more complex way. His method has been discussed in the previous section although in 
this section we consider the model for prediction to include tipsters' information as well 
as the track odds as explanatory variables. The test shows that at the 5 % level of 
significance, the two models explain as much as one another and therefore the tipsters 
are not adding any additional information to the predictions. It is concluded that the 
information held by the tipsters is discounted in the track odds determined by the public. 
All the studies thus indicate that possessing the knowledge of a racing tipster will not 
yield profits and the market is therefore semi-strongly efficient. 
Gabriel and Marsden (1990) compared payouts to winning tote bets with the 
corresponding SP's available from the bookmakers. They hypothesised that ifthe market 
was semi-strongly efficient, the returns to both bets would be the same. Data were 
collected from the racing season of 1978 when electronic tote boards were not available, 
so that tote punters in fact did not know what their return would be until after the race. 
If tote odds were consistently above bookmaker odds, surely the punters would back 
with the tote rather than the bookmakers? If they did not, this would indicate a lack of 
information on their part which would mean that the market was semi-strongly 
inefficient. It is shown that tote returns for the season were consistently higher than 
bookmaker SP's even when eliminating the higher (10/1 and above) tote payouts. The 
conclusion drawn is that the market at that time was semi-strongly inefficient. 
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2.2.3 Tests of Strong Efficiency 
Correlation Between Different Sets of Odds 
Since 1976 a few papers have examined betting markets for strong efficiency. The first 
of these was Dowie, whose paper has already been mentioned in connection with weak 
efficiency. The strong form is tested by hypothesising that if the odds set well before the 
race (FP's), are as highly correlated (or more highly correlated) with the observed 
probabilities of winning , as the SP's are, then this would be an indication of a strongly 
efficient market with no inside information. This is because of the assumption that 
persons possessing inside information would exploit it until the "off'' thereby causing the 
odds to move into line with the odds suggested by the superior information. Odds set 
well before the race would supposedly not have been adjusted for the inside information. 
The tests reveal that for the 1973 racing season the correlation between the FP's and the 
observed probabilities was as high, if not higher, than the correlation between the SP's 
and the observed probabilities. The conclusions drawn from the tests are therefore that 
the betting market is strongly efficient. This view is generally not taken by racegoers. 
Please note further comments in section 2.3.3. 
Inside Information 
Crafts (1985) commented on Dowie's paper and went on to define a different method 
for testing strong efficiency. His data were FP's and SP's collected over a four month 
period involving 16,769 runners. He calculated the ratios ofFP's to SP's and categorised 
runners showing a "marked difference" between FP and SP as follows: 
(1) 1.5 < FP/SP < 2.0 
(2) FP/SP ~ 2.0 
(3) 1.5 ~ SP/FP < 2.0 
(4) SP/FP > 2.0 
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A total of 2 280 runners fell into one of these categories, and the other runners were 
regarded as not having shown a marked change in odds. Each horse in these categories 
was then "bet" on at both FP and SP. Categories (1) and (2) yielded profits of between 
65 % and 140% of the stake, when backing at FP although bets on the same horses at 
SP yielded a loss of between 1 % and 9%. Categories (3) and (4) yielded losses of 
approximately 65 % when backing at FP and losses of between 13 % and 38 % when 
backing the same horses at SP. 
It is noted that certain bets will yield profits in the long term. These are on horses whose 
SP is markedly shorter than its FP. Such bets would have to be made at FP in order to 
be profitable. The conclusion drawn is that SP odds are a better guide to true winning 
probabilities than the FP's are and thus Dowie's result is in question. 
A similar test is performed but instead of using FP's, LP's are used. These are defined 
as the longest price at which a bet was transacted on the course. The results are similar 
to those above in that no profit can be made by backing supported horses at SP, but 
substantial profits can be achieved by backing such horses at LP. The conclusion drawn 
is that, at the start of the betting period, the punters had a better idea of the supported 
horses chances of winning than the bookmakers did. The betting market is thus found 
to be strongly inefficient. People who follow the information when it is revealed in the 
prices do not have opportunity for profits. Examples of marked changes in the betting 
markets are shown in table 2.9. 
In their 1982 paper Asch et al. examine marginal odds produced by bettors in specific 
periods within the whole betting period. They calculate the marginal odds produced by 
bettors in the final 8 minutes of betting as well as those produced during the final 5 
minutes. They obviously also have the final odds and compare these 3 different odds to 
the morning line odds (FP's). It is hypothesized that bettors with inside information 
would prefer to bet late in the betting period thereby giving as little time as possible to 
the public in which to follow such information. The data they have permit an 
investigation of such an hypothesis. 
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INSTANCES OF THE OPERATION OF BEITING MARKETS 
Date Course Horse Form and betting description 
16/9/82 Yarmouth "Compound" "dropped to 7 I 2 after visiting 7 /I 
from 5/ I (bets of £10,000-£ 1400, 
£2750-500 twice, £2250-500)". In 
previous race only 4th at I Of 11 beaten 
9 lengths by another horse again in 
opposition who was on this occasion 
more favourably weighted. 
30/9/82 Brighton "Rana Pratap" "dropped dramatically from 12/ I to 
7 / 2". In previous races had managed 
no better than 4th place. 
1/12/82 Newton Abbot "Mister Lucky" "following some 8/ 1 and 6/ 1 was 
reduced from 4/1 to 11/ 4 favourite". 
In six previous races had not reached 
the first four. 
7/12/82 Newcastle "Mossmoran" "f ea tu re was the run on Mossmoran 
who hardened through all rates from 
5/ 1 to 2/ l ".In two previous races the 
horse had been unplaced. 
Note: In each these cases the horse concerned won the race. All details are taken from 
relevant copies of Sporting Life, and the betting market descriptions are quoted verbatim. 
Table 2.9 reproduced from Crafts (1985) 
It is shown that for horses that finished first, the ratios of the SP's to the FP's are 
greater than the ratios of the marginal odds to the FP's. This is interpreted as implying 
that the marginal odds are better predictors of finishing position than SP's and therefore 
if the assumption regarding the betting behaviour of inside information holders is 
correct, then inside information does exist. Another way of thinking about it, is that 
winning horses, in general, are especially favoured by late bettors. 
Tuckwell (1983) uses as the basis for his test an, examination of the adjustment of the 
bookmaker odds during the betting period. His testing procedure, however, is somewhat 
different to that of Crafts. Tuckwell notes that from empirical observation, (various 
economic studies into gambling) the gross (net of tax) profit margin on turnover for 
bookmakers is 5 per cent. In addition to knowing what bookmakers win, the average loss 
of punters at different odds levels is calculated using a regression model. The model uses 
the probability equivalent of the starting price odds as a predictor variable, to estimate 
the percentage loss to punters at any specific starting price level. The results of the 
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regression are shown in Table 2.5. Since bookmakers win what punters lose, any 
deviation from the expected 5 % , occurring in punters losses would require further 
investigation. As seen in Table 2.5, the percentage loss t~ punters varies considerably 
from 5%. In fact the loss is around 16% at the odds level of 1/1, gradually falling as the 
odds lengthen, to about 9% at odds around 3/1. Thereafter the loss increases with 
increasing odds level, reaching almost 50% at the longest odds. The paper then sets out 
to find where the discrepancy, between the expected 5 % loss and the observed losses, 
lies. 
The answer is to be found in the adjustment of the odds. It is assumed that the 
movement of the odds during the betting period is associated with weight of money. 
Consider two horses with a starting price of 9/2. One that was backed in from 6/1, while 
the other drifted from 3/1. Table 2.5 suggests that the profit margin to bookmakers 
laying bets on these horses is about 12 % . However, because the two horses were laid 
at different prices earlier in the betting, the overall average margin of horses at the 
starting price of 9/2, may well be different from 12 % . Since the first horse was laid at 
odds longer than 912, the profit margin to bookmakers on those bets, is going to be less 
than the expected margin of 12 % , and it may even be negative. On the other hand, bets 
taken on a horse that eventually has a starting price 9/2, at an earlier price of 3/1 (say), 
will necessarily yield a greater profit margin to the bookmaker than the expected 12 % . 
Empirically it is known that horses that firm in the betting, have relatively more money 
placed on them than horses that drift in the betting. It is thus concluded that because 
more money was taken by bookmakers on the first horse, its profit margin will 
dominate, and the resultant average profit margin to bookmakers, laying horses at 
starting price odds of 9/2, will be less than the expected 12 % . Evidently the adjustment 
of the odds during the betting period was cutting the bookmakers expected margin at all 
starting price odds levels. 
A reason was now sought as to why the odds adjusted the way they did. If bookmakers 
were capable of accurately assessing a horses chances, the "correct" odds would be on 
offer at the start of the betting period, and the systematic firming and drifting of horses 
in the odds would not occur. It is suggested, that since it is unlikely that bookmakers 
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will generally have less knowledge than punters at the outset of the betting period, that 
some new information must have been introduced. Since it is unlikely that new 
information becomes publicly available during the betting period, the only possible 
remaining explanation, is that inside information, not available to the public or 
bookmakers, causes the odds to adjust and squeezes the bookmakers' margins. 
It is suggested that because of the inequity associated with inside information, that it 
should be eliminated. This inequity is not from the side of the bookmakers, but from the 
point of view of punters who do not have access to inside information. If inside 
information did not exist, bookmakers would be not faced with squeezed margins, but 
competition amongst them would most likely cut profit margins back to their original 
levels when inside information still existed. The implication of a decrease in 
bookmakers' margins in the absence of inside information, is a lengthening of odds on 
all horses, at all times, during the betting period. This would clearly be of considerable 
benefit to the average punter, at the expense of the insiders. 
Ethical considerations alone are sufficient to require the elimination of inside 
information, but Tuckwell presents another reason why insiders should be stopped. 
Racing is essentially a form of entertainment, and much of the pleasure is derived from 
exercising one's judgement, and then witnessing the results of any decisions made, in 
a short period of time. This pleasure can only be detracted from by an imperfect flow 
of information, as putting together a puzzle without all the pieces is no fun at all since 
the picture will never be clearly visible. Too much unpredictability, such as exists, if 
inside information plays a large role, tends to reduce the interest in betting. It is thus 
quite likely that many paying customers will be lost to the sport because of the existence 
of inside information. 
The nature of inside information is examined and various alternative forms are 
presented. These are reproduced verbatim, below. In addition an explanation of the 
mechanics of each alternative is given, and these too are reproduced directly from the 
text of Tuckwell' s paper. 
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" (a) An imperfect flow of information from the stable to the public, but no interference 
with race outcomes. 
(b) Indirect interference by the stable in the outcome of races. 
(c) Direct interference in race outcomes which is either stable inspired or to which the 
stable is a party. 
(d) Outside interference in race outcomes - that is, interference which does not involve 
the stable in any way." 
These alternative forms of inside information are explained more fully as follows; 
" (a) Here there is no attempt to interfere in any way with the outcome of the race, but 
there exists an inadequate flow of relevant information. The type of information would 
usually relate to the precise nature of the horse's physical condition, its likes, dislikes 
and other idiosyncrasies and perhaps more importantly, the extent to which things are 
improving or deteriorating. The stable and Hs connections are in a privileged position 
in making accurate assessments of these factors. Not infrequently, a relevant piece of 
information, known to the stable before the race, only beeomes public after the race. 
This does not necessarily mean that the information was deliberately withheld. It may 
well be a reflection on the quality of the communication channels. 
(b) This category is similar to (a) in that an inadequate flow of information exists, but 
in this case the horse's condition is deliberately manipulated by the stable in order to 
accomplish a successful betting coup for either the stable itself and/or its confidants. For 
example, the horse's training schedule may be eased slightly before one race, so that it 
runs two or three lengths below its best, and then stepped up again before the race in 
which the horse is financially supported. This is a case of deliberate interference in the 
outcome of races and, consequently, the stable has a much stronger incentive to obstruct 
the flow of information compared with (a). The interference, in nature, is indirect and, 
because of this, is virtually impossible to detect. Trainers can claim they were doing 
what appeared best for the horse at the time, but that in retrospect a slight error of 
judgement was made. What the real intentions were is more a matter of opinion than 
demonstrable fact. For practical purposes, therefore,categories (a) and (b) are 
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indistinguishable. 
(c) This direct interference, involving the stable, takes the form of not allowing the horse 
to run on its merits and, consequently, requires the jockey's cooperation. Without going 
into practical details, jockeys can achieve the desired result in a variety of ways and, 
unless it is very badly and ostentatiously executed, it is extremely difficult to be sure of 
the intentions. The authorities ask questions from time to time, but in the majority of 
cases there is little alternative but to accept the explanations offered. 
(d) This category refers to interference in races which is unassociated with the stable, 
that is, outside interference. It may take the form of obtaining the cooperation of jockeys 
or of the administration of drugs to the horse. As in the case of (c), there are the same 
problems in directly detecting complicity on the part of the jockeys. However, in this 
case it does seem possible that all contact between jockeys and the outside elements 
seeking their cooperation could be severed, given sufficient resolution on the part of the 
relevant authorities. 
The problem of drug detection is a technological one. While rapid advances have been 
achieved in this area, there may always be some doubt whether the technology of drug 
administration is still one step ahead. In this respect, prevention, in the form of stringent 
stable security, would be an essential, parallel aim." 
The importance of these problems cannot be overstated, as it is widely recognized that 
the declining financial state of racing, (specifically in Cape Town) is a result of the 
existence of inside information. 
Bookmaker Odds 
Bird and McCrae (1987) use bookmaker, as opposed to tote prices, and examine the 
adjustment of the odds during the betting period. This is similar to Crafts' analysis 
although it only examines the bookmaker odds from the opening of the betting period 
and does not consider the morning prices at all. The paper also introduces the concept 
2-31 
of "consumption benefits" that may be derived from racing other than the chance of a 
positive rate of return. This leads to a discussion on why gamblers are at the racecourse 
at all, and is dealt with in chapter three. It is worth noting though that incorporating this 
concept into our idea of an efficient market will change what is meant by such a market. 
It may now be possible to say that the market is efficient, even if returns to all odds 
categories are not zero percent (excluding transactions costs). 
The data used are from 1 026 races run in Australia during 1983 and 1984. The 
justification for using bookmaker odds is that the greater portion of win bets are struck 
with bookmakers. This means that we can get a better idea of the movement of the odds 
from the bookmakers, because large sums are virtually always wagered with them. The 
data consists of bookmaker odds at four time points during the betting period, namely, 
at the start of betting, five minutes later, thirteen minutes before the start and the final 
odds. 
The test is as follows. If we observe a certain movement in the price (probability) of a 
horse, we will bet on that horse. The size of the predefined movement was varied and 
numerous tests using different " filters " were performed. Probabilities were used instead 
of prices. The probabilities used were the standardised type as first defined by Dowie. 
The test was conducted in both directions, thus examining horses that both firmed and 
drifted in the betting. The filters used were 0.025, 0.05, 0.075, 0.1, 0.125 and 0.15. 
These are clearly arbitrary, but a good starting point. 
The paper identifies only three possible times, (and odds) when the bets could actually 
be placed. The "bet at end" strategy places a bet at the call of odds at which the horse 
was first observed to satisfy the movement criterion (filter). It is possible that a horse 
may have satisfied a particular filter before the it is first observed to do so, in which 
case it should in theory be bet on at the first price at which it satisfies the filter, not at 
the price which is conveniently available through the data. In order to use a "bet as soon 
as possible" strategy, a continuous series of prices was simulated. A problem here is that 
prices in reality are not continuous and thus we may necessarily have to accept slightly 
lower odds than we would like, given the satisfaction of our filter. Using the continuous 
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prices would obviously tend to overstate the rate of return to this strategy. 
An example may clarify the method used. Suppose the opening betting on a particular 
horse is 5/1. At the second call, the horse is 4/1, thus satisfying one of the various 
filters. The "bet at end" strategy would bet at the odds of 4/1, while the "bet as soon as 
possible" strategy would bet at some theoretical odds level, which is derived at through 
the simulation of continuous prices. Both bets are relevant to the same filter. 
The final betting strategy is the one which has implications for strong efficiency. This 
is the so called "bet at beginning" strategy. The bets for this strategy are placed at the 
odds prevailing before the horse was identified as having satisfied a filter. If we assume 
that the changes in prices are owing to the utilization of inside information not available 
at the opening of betting, then if profits can be made with prior knowledge of these price 
movements (equivalently, knowledge of inside information), the market is strongly 
inefficient. The results of the tests are shown in Table 2.10. 
Rate 1!{" Return _l;om Placing a$ I Bet at "Begi1111i11g" Odds 011 l/orses that Satisb• I 'urio11s 
Filter Stralegit·s and l lorses Desig11a1ed to Control Groups 
Bet at Beginning 
Filter 
Filter strategy Control Filter 
(no. of bets) % group% (no. of bets) 
+0.025 (1923) +8.16t -25.62 -0.Q25 ( 1532) 
+0.05 (696) +18.4tt -15.19 -0.05 (277) 
+0.075 (243) +28.0lt -52.16 -0.075 (54) 
+0.1 (77) +42.66t -37.34 -0.t (9) 
+0.125 (26) +52.31 -27.88 -0.125 (3) 
+0.15 ( 10) +196.10 -100.00 -0.15 (0) 
Difference between rate of return on filter strategy and control group: 
t Significant at 0.05 level. 
t Significant at 0.10 level. 
N.B. Significance tests only applied where the sample size exceeds 30. 
Table 2.10 reproduced from Bird (1987) 
Filter Control 
strategy% group% 
-'-46.03t ·-21.47 
-43.74t -16.79 
-47.50 -20.37 
-80.00 -38.89 
-100.00 -100.00 
- -
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It can be seen that knowledge of the p_rice movements is not sufficient for profits to be 
made. The knowledge of such price movements must be held prior to the occurrence of 
the movement, i.e. inside information not already impounded in the odds is necessary 
for profits. 
Two other interesting points discussed in the paper are the effect of the staking system 
used on the rates of return, and the use of control groups as a check on the results. The 
latter point checks if a group of horses at similar starting prices, that do not have a 
decreasing price history, will perform differently to a group of horses that do have a 
decreasing price history. The results of these tests are shown in Tables 2.11 and 2.12 
and are noted to be consistent with the previous observation that profits cannot be made 
by knowing the price history of the horses. A similar check was made using the "bet at 
beginning" odds, and this showed that profits can be made with prior knowledge of price 
movements. 
Rare ofRemrnfrom Placing a$ I Ber at "End" Odd~ on llorses that Satisfy Various Filter Strategies 
and llvrses Designated tv Control Groups 
Bet at End 
Filter Filter Control Filter Filter Control 
(no. of bets) strategy group (no. of bets) strategy group 
+0.025 ( 1923) -11.85 -16.52 -0.025 (1532) -23.21 -11.06 
+0.05 (696) -8.28 -6.94 -0.05 (277) -I0.11 -28.07 
+0.075 (243) -4.33 -5.IO -0.075 (54) -9.96 -21.30 
+0.1 (77) 0.52 18.83 -0.1 (9) -66.67 83.33 
+0.125 (26) -15.50 14.42 -0.125 (3) -100.00 208.33 
+0.15 ( 10) 47.40 -12.50 -0.15 (0) 
- -
NB. The differences between the rates of return for the filter strategy and the control group for all positive 
and negative filters are not significant at either the 0.05 and O. IO level. 
Table 2.11 reproduced from Bird (1987) 
In order to investigate the effect ofthe staking system used, similar strategies were used 
but instead of betting one unit, an amount was staked to win one unit. The latter system 
usually performs better than the former because proportionately more money is put on 
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favourites. This is noted to be the cas~ for the " bet at end 11 strategy but not for the 11 _ 
bet at beginning 11 strategy, where it is better to bet one unit on each horse. This is 
probably because the probability of an outsider winning given that he is the subject of 
an inside information tip, is very much higher than if he was not. The rate of return to 
the odds categories containing such outsiders is probably more than that for similarly 
tipped favourites. In this case a system which put proportionately more money on 
outsiders would perform better, and this is what we have observed. The results shown 
in Table 2.13 should be compared with Table 2.10. 
Rates ofReturnfrom Placing a Bet to Win $1 on Horses that have Been Identified 
as Ha1·ing Satisfied Various Filter Strategies 
Bet at 
Filter beginning 
(no. ofhctsl % 
+0.025 ( 1923) +3.07 
+0.05 (696) +10.31 
+0.075 (243) +18.8lt 
+0.1 (77) +20.64 
+0.125 (26) -2.65 
+0.15 ( 10) +.42.52 
t Significant at 0.05 level. 
t Significant at 0.10 level. 
Bet at 
end 
% 
-8.1 lt 
-7.24 
-3.32 
-5.49 
-29.54 
+42.71 
Bet "as 
soon as Bet at 
possible" Filter beginning 
% (no. of bets) % 
-6.93t -0.025 ( 1532) .:..38.22t 
-6.03 -0.05 (277) -42.24t 
-2.82 -0.075 (54) -46.70t 
-4.77 -0.1 (9) -68.97 
-27.95 -0.125 (3) -100.00 
+53.72 -0.15 (0) 
-
N.JJ. Significance tests only applied where the sample size exceeds 30. 
Table 2.12 reproduced from Bird (1987) 
2.2.4 Tests of Bettor Consistency 
Place Probabilities Estimated From Win Probabilities 
Bet at 
end 
% 
-16.21t 
-12.94 
-10.48 
-47.55 
-100.00 
-
Bet "as 
soon as 
possible" 
% 
-30.66t 
-30.59t 
-32.16* 
-60.60 
-100.00 
-
We have seen in tests of weak efficiency that bettors can increase their return (although 
not to a level of profitability) by betting consistently on favoured horses. The additional 
information required for such a system is zero, since the odds information on all horses 
is available. By consistently betting on outsiders which over the long term offer a lower 
return than favourites, bettors are demonstrating what we have defined as inconsistent 
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Rates o( Return (mm Placing a $1 Bet vn llorses Jdent{fied as hm·ing Satisfied I 'arious Filter Strategies 
Bet at 
Filter beginning 
(no. of bets) % 
+0.025 ( 192}) +8.16 
+0.05 (696) +18.41t 
+0.075 (243) +28.0lt 
+0.1 (77) +42.66t 
+0.125 (26) +52.31 
+0.15 ( 10) + 196.IO 
t Significant at 0.05 level. 
t Significant at O. IO level. 
Bet at 
end 
% 
-I l.85t 
-8.28 
-4.33 
0.52 
-15.50 
47.40 
Bet "as 
soon as Bet at 
possible" Filter beginning 
% (no. of bets) % 
-8.30 -0.025 ( 1532) -46.03t 
-5.52 -0.05 (277) -43.74t 
-2.56 -0.075 (54) -47.50t 
2.73 -0.1 (9) -80.00t 
-6.46 -0.125 (3) -100.00 
62.30 -0.15 (0) 
-
N.B. Significance tests only applied where the sample size exceeds 30. 
Table 2.13 reproduced from Bird (1987) 
behaviour. 
Bet "as 
Bet at soon as 
end possible" 
% % 
-23.21 t -38.04t 
-10.11 
-30.48t 
-9.96 -32.09 
-66.67 
-75.56 
-100.00 
-100.00 
- -
To examine bettor consistency we need to examine actual returns to similar bets which 
. . 
have identical probabilities of success. In addition to these tests we can construct 
probability relationships between different bets that we believe should hold and test to 
see if in fact they do hold. The first test along these lines was proposed by Harville 
(1973). He produced a formula giving place probabilities in terms of the win 
probabilities. The formula relies on accurate estimates of the win probabilities being 
available, and that these are sufficient information to assign probabilities to other 
finishing positions. 
The formulae are as follows: 
If Qi is the probability that horse i wins the race, then the probability that i is first and 
j is second is 
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. 
and the probability that i is first, j is second and k is third is 
In order to obtain these simple formulae to estimate the place probabilities, the 
assumption was made that the probability of a horse beating any subset of horses in the 
race is the same no matter where the other horses, not in the subset, finish. 
Further analysis of estimating place probabilities can be found in chapter 6. Harville uses 
335 races to examine the differences between observed frequencies and the frequencies 
expected on the basis of the publicly determined odds. This is done for finishing first, 
second and third. His winning frequency comparison again reveals the favourite-longshot 
bias, and he notes that bettors overrate the chances of longshots and underestimate the 
chances of favourites and near favourites. 
The second and t~ird place frequency comparisons indicate a tendency to overestimate 
the probability of finishing second or third for horses with high theoretical probabilities 
of such finishes, and to underestimate the chances of those with low theoretical 
probabilities. It is noted, however, that in the frequency of placing (finishing in the first 
two) table, the observed frequencies are very close to the expected frequencies. This is 
explained as follows; horses that have a high (low) probability of finishing second also 
have a high (low) probability of finishing first, so that the effects of overestimation 
(underestimation) of their chances of finishing second are cancelled out by the 
underestimation (overestimation) of their chances of finishing first. 
Finally, horses are categorised with regard to their expected return from place and show 
bets. The expected return is simply the final actual "payoff' amount multiplied by the 
theoretical probability of placing/showing as derived from the win probabilities. The 
results indicate that profits cannot be made simply by making bets that have an expected 
return of greater than one. 
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Tuckwell (1981) examines the apparent irregularities between the win .and place 
(finishing in the first three) betting markets in Australia. He uses the Harville formulae 
to calculate expected place probabilities, but uses a different method for calculating 
estimates of the win probabilities. A regression line is calculated such that the win 
probability for a given horse is a polynomial function, of degree four, of the bookmaker 
SP of the horse. The data used are 3 849 horses from 286 races run in Australia in 
1975. 
Estimates of the place probabilities for all horses are calculated from the calculated win 
probabilities and are divided into one of ten different probability ranges. For seven of 
the probability categories the observed probability of placing exceeded the estimated 
probability, although the difference was only significant in the category of horses that 
had an estimated place probability of between 0.05 and 0.08. This implied that backing 
horses in this category would result in long term profits. The other three categories had 
observed probabilities of placing lower than those expected and thus losses would result 
by betting such horses for a place. Of these "lossfl categories, only the category 
containing horses with estimated place probabilities of between 0.6 and 0.8 had a 
significant difference between observed and expected. 
It is thus clear that backing horses for a place will result in widely varying returns 
depending on the odds category that such horses fall into. By backing horses that have 
a low probability of placing, a greater return will be realized than by backing horses that 
have a high probability of placing. This in itself renders the market inconsistent. The 
fact that profits can be made at a certain odds level means that the market is also 
inefficient. It is shown that backing all horses that had an expected return of greater than 
one, yielded a return of about 20 per cent. This is in contradiction to Harville' s study. 
Systematic Profits 
Rausch et al. (1981) have examined betting market efficiency in the context of the place 
(first two) and show (first three) markets. The paper devises a technical system for place 
and show betting. The data consist of 1 065 races involving 9 037 horses run during 
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1978 in Canada, as well as 627 races involving 5 895 horses run in 1974 in the U.S.A. 
Estimates of place and show probabilities are calculated via the Harville formulae, 
although it is clearly stated that there is no unique method of determining such 
probability estimates. 
Actual versus theoretical probabilities are compared for win, place and show finishes. 
The results for the win probabilities indicate again the favourite-longshot bias. The 
results for place and show probabilities differ somewhat from Harville's results in that 
significant differences appear in twelve of the probability categories. Using the 
theoretical probabilities and the actual "payoffs" to each horse, an expected return per 
$1 bet is calculated for all horses. The "payoffs" are those amounts which would have 
been paid had the conditions for a winning bet been satisfied. 
Horses were then classified according to their level of expected return, and a $1 bet on 
each horse in each category was made. The results are shown in table 2.14. Note that 
as expected the actual return increases with the expected return, even if it does not equal 
. 
it. It is now assµmed that the investor wishes to maximize his long run asset growth, and 
so the Bernoulli capital growth model is introduced. This model involves calculating bets 
in order to achieve the above objective. The expression below, reproduced from Hausch 
,, ,, 
+w0 - ~ s1 - ~ Pt 
/•I l•I 
t .. i.j.lc 1 .. i.j 
where qi = the probability that horse i wins 
Q = the take out rate 
P = the place pool 
S = the show pool 
Pi = amount bet on horse i to place 
Si = amount bet on horse i to show 
Pi = our bet on horse i to place 
si = our bet on horse i to show 
w0 = our we~lth level. 
,, 
s.t. ~ (p1+ s1) c; w0, p1 ;. O.s1 ;. 0,1= l .... ,n, 
/•I 
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Results of Betting $I to Place or ShoH· 011 Horses with a Theoretical Expected Return of at Least a 
Exhibition Park 
Place Show 
Number of Tola) Nel Ner Rate Number of Tola) Net Nel Rate 
a Bets Profit($) of Rerurn (%) Bets Profit !Sl of Return (%) 
1.04 225 5.10 2.3 612 33.20 5.4 
1.08 126 - I0.10 -8.0 386 53.50 13.9 
1.12 69 11.10 16. l 223 40.80 18.3 
1.16 40 5.10 12.8 143 26.30 18.4 
1.20 18 5.30 29.4 95 21.70 22.8 
1.25 11 -2.70 -24.5 44 11.20 25.5 
1.30 3 -3 - 100.0 27 10.80 40.0 
1.50 0 0 3 6 200.0 
Santa Anita 
Place Show 
Number of Total Net Net Rate Number of Total Net Net Rate 
a Bets Profit($) of Return(%) Bets Profit($) of Return (%) 
1.04 103 12.30 11.9 307 - 18.00 - 5.9 
1.08 52 12.80 24.6 162 6.90 4.3 
1.12 22 9.20 41.8 89 3.00 3.4 
1.16 7 2.30 32.9 46 12.40 27.0 
1.20 3 -IJO -43.3 27 6.20 23.0 
1.25 0 0 9 6.00 66.7 
1.30 0 0 5 5.10 102.0 
1.50 0 0 0 0 
Table 2.14 reproduced from Rausch (1981) 
et al. (1981), is maximized subject to wealth constraints, and the optimal amounts to bet 
on each horse are thereby calculated. Results of the betting system using an initial wealth 
level of $10 000, and an expected return cut-off of 1.16 are shown in Table 2.15. 
The above system could not be used in practice because of the large number of inputs 
required in a very short space of time before the off of a particular race. The practical 
system involves identifying the horse most likely to have the highest expected return by 
inspection of the tote board, and then using a regression equation to calculate the 
expected return. If this is sufficiently high a further regression equation is used to 
. > 
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1 Results from expected log betting to place and show when expected returns are 1.16 or better with initial 
wealth S 10.000. 
: Approximate wealth level history for random horse betting. Total dollars bet is as in system I ($116.074 ). 
Track payback is 82.5%. therefore final wealth level is $10.000 - 0.175($116.074) = -$10.313 (Note: 
breakage {s not taken into considerationl 
3 Results from using the Exhibition Park approximate regression scheme (with initial wealth S2.500) at 
Santa Anita. 
Wealth Level Histories for' Alternative Betting Schemes: Santa Anita: 1973/74 Season. 
Table 2.15 reproduced from Rausch (1981) 
calculate the optimal amount to be bet on the horse. The regression equations obviously 
give approximations to the expected returns and optimal bet amounts that would have 
been produced via the above formulae. 
The results of the betting system using the regression equations are shown in Table 2.16. 
A further problem with implementation was that one was not able to bet at the final 
odds, but rather the odds prevailing with approximately two minutes to the off time. 
Thus all calculations would practically have to use information at this time. The authors 
ran a further test using only such information and the results are reproduced in Table 
2.17. lt thus appears that profitable exploitation of the inconsistencies inherent in the 
place and show betting markets is possible, and the conclusion is therefore that the 
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...l 8000 
< 
"1.l 
~ 7000 
6000 
4000 
3000 
2000 
1000 
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2 
1 Results from expected log betting to place and show when expected returns are 1.20 or better with initiai 
wealth $2.500. 
2 Results from using the approximate regression scheme with initial wealth $2,500. 
Wealth Level Histories for Exact and Approximate Regression Betting Schemes: Exhibition 
Park: 1978 Season. 
Table 2.16 reproduced from Rausch et al. (1981) 
market is inconsistent as well as weakly inefficient. 
Rausch and Ziemba (1985) extended their 1981 paper by deriving approximate 
regression schemes for the following possible variations from his original equation. 
Firstly the size of the pools that the bettor was faced with was considered. Three 
different place and show pools were used. These were $2 000, $10 000 and $150 000 
for place, and $1 200, $6 000 and $100 000 for show. Formulae for each of these pool 
sizes were derived for each of four initial wealth levels, namely $50, $500, $2 500 and 
$10 000. Nineteen new optimal-bet regression equations were derived, and it was 
suggested that for intermediate values for pool size or wealth, that interpolation be used. 
All the derived regression equations are now adjusted for differing track takes, breakage, 
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Results from Summer 1980 Exhibition Park Betting 
Regression Regression Regression Net 
estimate estimate estimate of return 
of exp~cted of expected optimal 
·based on 
return per return per bet final data 
dollar. 2 dollar. at 2 minutes with 
minutes the end before consideration 
before end of end of of our bets Final 
Date Race of betting betting betting Finish affecting odds wealth 
$2500 
July 2 9 120 122 $19,SHOW ON 4 5-6-7 
-$19 2481 
" 10 120 123 72,SHOWON 8 8-1-2 72 2553 
July 9 7 121 I JO 292,SHOW ON I 2-7-1 131 2684 
10 135 122 248,PLACE ON I 1-6-2 260 2944 
July 16 6 131 122 487,PLACE ON 9) 9-8-6 536} 682 139' 117 292,SHOW ON 9 146 3626· 
7 125 127 7,SHOWON I S-2-8 -7 36i9 
July 23 J 149 149 30,SHOWON 2 2-10-7 92 3711 
4 139 134 573,SHOW ON 10 6-10-4 201 3912 
July 30 8 121 111 215,PLACEON 4 4-1-5 129 4041 
9 123 125 591,SHOWON 6 8-1-5 -591 3450 
Aug 6 6 128 112 39,SHOWON4 4-3-1 59 3509 
" 9 124 103 51,SHOWON 2 4-1-3 -51 3458 
Aug 8 I 121 132 87,SHOWON I 1-10-4 139 3597 
3 127 111 635,SHOW ON 3 3-4-7 127 3724 
4 126 113 126,SHOWON 2 2-7-1 82 3806 
Aug II 8 121 112 94,SHOWON 8 8-6-2 113 3919 
9 131 130 688,SHOW ON S S-3-4 138 4057 
Aug 13 3 128 106 33,SHOWON 2 1-6-7 
- 33 4024 
6 131 122 205,SHOWON S S-8-4 144 4168 
7 134 133 511,SHOW ON 6 8-5-9 
- St I 3657 
10 123 109 108.SHOW ON 5 3-5-1 59 3716 
Table 2.17 reproduced from Rausch (1981) 
coupled horses and multiple bets on one race. The effect of changing the track take on 
long run profits is examined. One specific example shows that an increase in the track 
take from 14 per cent to 15 per cent led to a decrease in profit of 17.4 per cent, while 
the track take increasing from 15 per cent to 17 per cent led to a decrease in profit of 
32.5 per cent. The effect of breakage is also investigated and it is found that on average 
bettors lose 1. 79 per cent of the total payoff to 5c breakage, while they lose 3.14 per . 
cent to lOc breakage, using the betting system. A summary of the results obtained using 
the betting system is given in Table 2.18. 
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It is noted that virtually all the bets were on favoured horses that were underbet to place 
or show. 
Exotic Betting 
Ali (1979), examined bettor consistency at the racetrack by comparing the returns to two 
identical bets, i.e. the same events had to occur in order to win both bets. He compared 
returris from winning double bets with a corresponding return derived by placing a bet 
on the winner of the first leg of the double, and then placing the return from this win 
bet on the winner of the second leg of the double. It is noted that the win pools for each 
race are separately determined from the pool for the daily double, which thus comprises 
a separate bet altogether. Actual returns should only differ to the extent that the 
transactions costs involved iri placing two win bets are greater than those involved in 
placing one double bet. Any greater discrepancy would indicate an inconsistent use of 
informatiol). 
The test of consistency is made by examining the differences 
(1-a)Dt - Pt fort = 1 to n 
and testing whether they differ significantly from zero, where 
a = % transactions costs per bet (win and double) 
Dt = return to double t 
Pt = return to parlay t 
and n = number of doubles examined. 
The observed double payoff is thus decreased by the percentage additional transactions 
costs involved in betting the parlay. If the differences are not significantly different from 
zero, the implication is that identical probabilities are being attached to the winning 
horses in both pools, and therefore that bettors are consistent in their use of information. 
The data for the test consisted of 1 089 double observations made in the U.S.A. and 
Canada during 1975. The mean difference (as calculated above) is found to be not 
significantly different from zero and the inference drawn is that the market is consistent 
in its use of information. 
>-1 
~ 
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N 
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"O Summary Statistics on System Bets Made at Aqueduct in 1981 /82. Santa Anita in 1973 /74. Exhibition Park in 1978 and 1980, and at tire Kentucky 
a 
0. Derby Days 1981 /82/83 _with an Jnitia/Berring Wealth of $2500 
c: 
(") Number Number Percent of_ Average Rate of 
8. Track Number Number Expected of of Percent Bets Won Total Payout Return 
~ and of ·Of ,Track Value System Bets of Bets Weighted by Money Track . Total Per $2 on Bets 
0 Season Days Races Take Cutoff Bets Won Won Size of Bet Wagered Take Profits Bet Made 3 
::c: Aqueduct 43 380 15% 1.14 124 68 55% 65% $42,686 $6,403 $3,792 $3.33 8.9% 
~ 1981/82 c: 
en Santa 75 627 15% 1.14 192 114 59% 69% $51,631 $7,745 $2,837 $3.16 5.5% (") 
~ Anita 
- 1973/74 
-\0 Exhibition 110 1,065 18.1% 1.20 174 97 56% 72% $49.991 . $9.048 $5,198 $3.08 10.4% 00 
-
Park N 
-
I 
1978 +:-. +:-. 
Exhib.ition 10 90 17.1% 1.20 22 16 73% 77% · $ 5,403 · $ 924 $1,216 $3.18 22.5% 
Park 
1980 
Derby 3 30 15% 1.10 .19 17 89% 96% $12,766 $1,915 $5,462 $2.97 42.8% 
Days• 
1981/82/83 
Totals and 
Weighted 
Averages 241 2,192 - 531 312 59% 71% $162,477 $26.035 $18,505 $3.12 11.4% 
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Asch et al. (1986) test for consistency in the double and exacta pools. When the tests 
reveal inconsistencies, they make a case for the existence of inside information that led 
to such inconsistencies. The data used for the exacta study comprised 510 races run in 
1984 in the U.S.A. Exacta payoffs were categorised by size into 11 categories and rates 
of return were calculated for each category. It is noted that the returns exhibited no 
systematic tendency. Two of the 11 categories yielded profits of 5 and 10 per cent. The 
results are reproduced in table 2.19. 
In order to test consistency, Asch examines the subjective probabilities implicit in two 
separately determined pools, viz. the win pool and the exacta pool. The subjective 
probability of the exact finish (i first, j second) determined from the exacta pool is Sij 
= BufB 
where Bij = the amount bet on the (ij) exacta 
B = the gross exacta pool. 
Rates of Return on Exacta Bets: Constant Class lnvera/s 
Payoff range 
0-16·00 
16·01-32·00 
32·01-48·00 
48·01-64·00 
64·01-80·00 
80·01-96·00 
96·01-112·00 
112·01-128·00 
128·01-144·00 
144. 01-160. 00 
160·01-00 
No. of pairs 
in sample 
1896 
3653 
3139 
2676 
2317 
1866 
1757 
1469 
1347 
1188 
19938 
Table 2.19 reproduced from Asch et al. (1986) 
No. of winners 
in category 
162 
110 
68 
38 
34 
18 
17 
11 
5 
8 
39 
Rate of 
return 
-0·11 
-0·30 
-0·13 
-0·26 
0·05 
-0· 13 
-0·04 
-0·24 
-0·54 
0· 10 
-0·46 
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The subjective probability of winning the (ij) exacta determined. from the win pool 
probabilities, is denoted S;j • and is calculated as follows. Horses are allocated to one of 
20 probability categories on the basis of their subjective winning probabilities (i.e. their 
odds). Observed winning probabilities are determined for each category. An average 
relationship between objective and subjective ·probabilities is derived by regressing the 
one on the other. The objective probabilities of winning the (ij) exactas are calculated 
using the above calculated observed winning probabilities and the Harville formula for 
exact finish probabilities. From these objective probabilities of winning the (ij) exacta, 
the required subjective probabilities S;j• are derived. Comment on this method of 
obtaining the probabilities required for the test can be found in section 2.3.4. 
A regression of S;j • on S;j is performed in order to determine the relationship between 
the two. The analysis rejects the hypothesis that S;j • = Sij + e;j· This means that the 
probabilities associated with horses in a particular race are inconsistently determined. 
Given that inconsistent betting is occurring in the exacta pool, Asch now tries to find out 
why. He compares the actual exacta payoffs with those that are expected on the basis of 
the odds from the win pool. The comparison is made for 41 246 exacta pairs which 
includes winning and losing exactas. The hypothesis is made that if people possess inside 
information they would rather use it in the exacta pool than the win pool so as not to 
signal their information to the public. This is tested by examining the difference between 
the actual and expected returns to winning and losing exactas. It is found that the 
differences between actual and expected payoffs is significantly different for winning and 
losing exactas in the direction that implies the existence of inside information; i.e. it is 
found that the actual payoffs for winning exactas are depressed compared with the 
expected payoffs but this is not true for losing exactas. 
Asch also examines daily double betting for consistency. The data consisted of 122 
double pairs. It is found that the average payoff to the double is greater than that to the 
corresponding parlay. This, however, does not mean that the probabilities are 
inconsistently determined. The difference is in fact completely accounted for by the 
differing transactions costs involved in the bets. When an adjustment is made for the 
2-47 
higher transactions costs involved in betting the parlay, the payoffs (and therefore the 
implicit probabilities) are equivalent. The results observed here are similar to those of 
Ali's study. 
Cross Track Betting 
Rausch and Ziemba (1990) presented the first examination of cross-track betting. This 
involves betting on races other than at the local track. Since the pools at the different 
tracks are kept separate, the opportunity is available to study the differences and 
similarities between two different betting populations. In the past, the study of bettor 
consistency has been confined to one betting group, or intra group consistency. This 
paper examines inter group consistency. 
Cross-track betting in the U.S.A. is generally available only on the major races of the 
year. Examples are given of the disparity of the payoffs to identical bets at different 
racetracks. Specifically, it is shown that in order to be guaranteed a return of $1, it is 
only necessary to wager approximately 93c, provided that all bets can be placed at the 
track (one of several) that offers the best odds for each specific horse. 
The paper, in a similar vain to the authors' other papers, attempts to estimate the 
probability of an event, and to compare this estimate with the public's estimate. If the 
two differ sufficiently then profits can be made. In their past papers the "event" has been 
the placing of certain horses. In this paper the event is the victory of certain horses, and 
the estimates of the probabilities of such events are derived from the away racetracks, 
and compared with the local public's estimates of the probabilities of the same events. 
The optimal growth model that was used in their previous papers is used here again. 
The "true" probability of a horse winning is taken as the probability as defined 
subjectively by bettors at the track where the horse is actually running. Optimal bets are 
calculated by the system when the expected return from a bet is greater than a cut-off 
level. An important point is made in that the "true" odds as observed at the home track 
are adjusted for the favourite-longshot bias before using the probabilities as input to the 
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betting model. The model was tested on 11 races. The return was 15 per cent profit on 
the amount wagered. With so few races though, this is clearly not statistically 
significant. Two reasons put forward for discrepancies i~ the odds at different tracks are, 
firstly that bettors generally bet on local horses where-ever the race may be taking place, 
and secondly that bettors at different tracks have differing access to information 
regarding horses that are running at any given track. 
The practical problems involved in implementing a system to take advantage of such 
bettor inconsistencies are insurmountable. This is because all the data is needed before 
the off of the race in order to place the bets optimally. Unfortunately the data is not 
available until the race is over. Add to this that it is unlikely that we would be the last 
to wager (which is a further requirement of the system) and it is clear that approximate 
-
schemes will have to be derived. Since the costs involved with betting at many tracks 
are extensive the approximate scheme should ideally involve only one track. 
The one track model involves viewing the odds at one away track on the on course 
television monitor and comparing these with the odds available at the home track. The 
expected returns can be quickly calculated (probably by inspection) and one optimal bet 
can be isolated. The optimal growth model, now with very few inputs will generate the 
amount to bet. This is done in the same manner as the approximate schemes in the 
authors' two other papers. The profit from such a method was 9.2 per cent, although this 
was from only 11 races. The conclusion was that further work is necessary in order to 
demonstrate significant profits. 
2.3 COMMENTS, FURTHER IDEAS AND PROPOSALS 
2.3.1 Tests of Weak Efficiency 
Transformed "Sum To One" Probabilities 
Dowie's 1976 paper appears to represent an attempt at applying theories to an area in 
which the author has little practical experience. Dowie's lack of insight into the racing 
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world is evident from his assumption that the predicted odds as published in the 
newspapers 24 hours before the race, can be taken as accurate estimates of the 
probabilities of winning the race for each horse. The problems of using FP's (forecast 
prices) is discussed in detail later. 
Except for the elementary investigations into weak efficiency the paper is of little 
practical interest and further research based upon it is unnecessary. The paper does 
however make two good points relevant to the data. Firstly the odds data are 
transformed into probabilities so that the total probability of winning for all horses sums 
to one. This would obviously not be the case with the bookmakers odds. 
As an example, consider the odds from two races run at Milnerton in 1990. 
Race One Race Two 
No. Odds No. Odds 
1 17/10 1 17/10 
2 6/1 2 7/2 
3 10/1 3 7/2 
4 12/1 4 5/1 
5 20/1 5 10/1 
6 20/1 6 10/1 
7 20/1 7 16/1 
8 20/1 
9 20/1 
10 20/1 
11 2011. 
12 20/1 
13 20/1 
In both of the above races the favourite is at 09ds of 17I10 but this does not tell us 
anything about the other horses in the race It is a connection between each horse and all 
the other- horses in a particular race that is established with the use of Dowie's 
transformation. In race one the total probability sums to 1.11 while that in race two 
sums to 1.22. Thus although both favourites would be allocated to the same odds 
category, this may not be the most accurate method of allocation. From the total 
probability of both races it seems that the favourite in race one is up against less than 
the favourite in race two, and therefore logically MORE likely to win than its equally 
·2-so 
priced counterpart in race 2. 
This assumes that the estimation of the odds of all horses is fairly accurate. This is not 
usually true for the rank outsiders. If, however, we remove the rank outsiders from the 
analysis, the sum of the probabilities of the remaining horses in race one is only 0.68 
while it is 0.98 for race two. This is a clear example of why it is necessary to group 
horses by their probabilities of winning, calculated with reference to the rest of the field. 
It is surprising that the academic literature that has followed this pioneering 1976 paper 
has largely ignored this useful transformation of the raw data. In this thesis we shall use 
the raw data as well as the transformed data for similar tests of weak efficiency. 
Dowie uses every odds group that had a runner at those odds in his analysis, i.e. he uses 
no grouping of odds categories. A problem with this is the statistical validity of tests if 
the number of observations in some of the categories is small. The advantage of using 
- -
this approach is that a very high degree of homogeneity is achieved. The number of odds 
groups to use should be determined so as to achieve accuracy and reliability in estimates 
of the probabilities derived from such groups. This will usually be done after considering 
the form and volume of data available and possibly the purpose for which the estimates 
will be used. In order to test efficiency in specific areas of the market, a large number 
of odds groups will be required. This research will use groupings as appropriate to the 
data. The groupings will be motivated at that time. 
Dowie had the opportunity to use tote or bookmaker data. He uses bookmaker data, and 
it is his discussion of the various merits and demerits of both data sources that makes 
the paper more valuable. The points mentioned have been noted and will be pointed out 
where relevant in the various tests when the data is defined and discussed. Further 
comment on this paper can be found in section 2.3.3. 
Grouping of Odds Categories 
Snyder's paper in 1978 similarly shows little knowledge of the horseracing field. His 
lack of insight is apparent when testing for what he calls strong efficiency. This is 
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discussed in the next section. Tests of weak efficiency similar to· those of Dowie are 
performed. The number of odds groups tested was 10, and the odds categories were 
grouped for convenience. This again brings up the problem of how to group the odds 
categories. It may be that using only 10 groups is too few, resulting in too low a degree 
of homogeneity within the groups. 
Consider the following idea of "barrier odds". Punters may decide that they will back 
a horse if they can obtain a certain price. For example they may decide to back a horse 
if they can get 2/1 or 111 or maybe 15/10, but it is unlikely that they would have as a 
barrier to betting the "odd" price of, say, 17/10. It makes sense therefore to group 
horses together that fall between certain "barrier odds". Thus 16/10 and upwards to 2/1 
would be grouped together. The main point of this idea is to group together odds 
categories which are perceived by the punters as having very close empirical winning 
probabilities, i.e. a punter would give ~he same real world probability of winning to a 
16/10 shot as he would a 2/1 shot. When using this idea it is still important not to have 
too wide a range within groups thereby reducing the homogeneity within the groups. 
Asch's 1982 paper also examined weak efficiency in a way which used an inadequate 
method of grouping the odds categories. Horses are assigned to a category defined by 
their level of favouritism for the race. For example, the favourite is assigned to category 
one, the 2nd favourite to category two and so on for 9 categories. The observed 
probability of winning is compared with the subjective probability for each category, 
calculated from the odds of the horses in the category. 
The above method of grouping horses with different odds allows for too much variation 
of the odds within one group. For example, the favourite in one race may be 4/10 with 
the 2nd favourite at 6/ 1, while in another race the favourite may be 3/ 1 with the 2nd 
choice at 33/10. The 4/10 shot and the 3/1 chance will fall into the same group. 
Homogeneity of horses with respect to their odds is clearly violated in this group. If we 
accept that the actual odds are a better indicator of performance than a simple measure 
of favouritism, then we should have no place for this method of grouping. The research 
in this work will not examine the performance of horses based on their level of 
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favouritism except to give an indication for reference purposes of the percentage of 
favourites (1st favourites) that win and place, and returns to such favourites. 
Logit Analysis 
Asch's 1984 paper is the nadir of the research that we have uncovered to date. Not only 
is the paper poorly worded and badly structured in terms of its arguments, but it also 
lacks a logical basis and it utilizes inappropriate statistical techniques. Consider, "In 
particular, we reject the null hypothesis that the morning line odds contain no 
information not already accounted for by the track odds." The triple negative used in this 
sentence only serves to further confuse the reader as regards the thin logic that is 
proposed in the paper. Further, crucial terms appear to mean one thing in one reference 
and something different elsewhere. Few of the terms are defined. 
The essence of the paper, is that Asch is trying to model the empirical probability of 
winning using only odds data as independent variables. Thus the only variables used are 
the same as those used in testing weak efficiency. Given the overwhelming evidence 
from past studies, that profits cannot be made simply by utilizing odds information, it 
is our suggestion that the relatively sophisticated techniques of logit analysis are 
misplaced here. Clearly, no further research along these lines will be done in this work. 
It seems possible that the reason for using logit analysis may have been that it is the 
"correct" method for performing "regression" analysis on percentages or odds data. Thus 
the researchers may simply have been "trying it out". The problem was that they were 
doing so in a very well researched area where the analysis had nothing new to add. 
Logit analysis would be better used in cases where data on many variables is available 
and the aim of the exercise is to predict empirical odds. Thus although using odds data 
alone may have seemed a logical place to start with logit analysis, we believe it to have 
been inappropriate. 
Canfield et al. (1987) is the only paper that we have seen that tests for weak efficiency 
using data other than the odds of the horses. As we proposed in the introduction, weak 
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effiCien.cy tests should be formed by usfog elementary data points, The data that Canfield 
uses is the draw of the horses which is clearly elementary and therefore a logical test of 
weak efficiency. Similar tests to those performed in Canfield' s paper will be done in this 
research. This will include "blocking" to remove the effects of factors such as the track, 
(Milnerton vs. Kenilworth) and the weather (wet vs. dry). Tests using other elementary 
data points such as jockey, trainer etc. will also be performed. 
Tuckwell's approach (originally 1981, but reproduced in 1983) to estimating future rates 
of return at various odds levels seems inappropriate. He uses regression analysis to 
derive estimated returns at each odds level. He derives a trinomial function whereby the 
expected return at any odds level can be calculated. Firstly, let us note that we do not 
require rates of return to any odds level, but only those that are available on the 
bookmakers's board. Secondly, it is noted that the results of the regression are not in 
line with previous studies on the topic which utilised over 50,000 races. It is clearly 
more reaso.nable to use observed rates of return as estimates of future rates than to use 
Tuckwell's trinomial function which appears to have no logical basis. 
-
A further problem with this paper is that no details are given regarding his betting 
strategies,- other than to say that they yielded a 5 per cent profit. It must also be noted 
here that it is possible to interpret the test as a strong form test since odds data are being 
used in conjunction with information regarding the adjustment of the odds. 
The following further study of weak efficiency is undertaken. An examination of all 
races run in Cape Town between June 1990 and December 1991 which incorporated 
approximately 1100 races. An analysis is made of empirical and subjective probabilities 
as well as checking to see if meaningful profits can be made at any odds level. The data 
is split up to analyse different classes of race separately as well as split in order to 
analyse external factors such as the weather and the "number of race on the card" factor. 
Together with this investigation is an analysis of bettor bias since it is only the through 
the biases of the public that make it possible for individuals to make above normal 
profits. 
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2.3.2 Tests of Semi-Strong Efficiency 
Problems With Forecast Prices 
Snyder's test of strong efficiency, in the framework of this work, is actually a test of 
semi-strong efficiency. Using newspaper tipsters (or any group which publish forecasts 
about races), as the basis of a strong form test has the following problems. Firstly if it 
is assumed that they do not have access to inside information (which is probably closer 
to the truth than any other argument), then their predictions cannot be used as a test of 
inside information. Secondly and more importantly, if it is assumed that they do have 
access to inside information, are they likely to publish this information in the newspaper? 
Snyder'.s examination of tipster performance is riddled with problems. Firstly, the rates 
of return were calculated using the experts predicted odds as if they were the actual 
payouts. This is clearly going to distort the rates of return. Secondly, Snyder notes that 
the experts do not necessarily try to estimate winning probabilities, but rather the odds-· 
that the public are likely to set through their betting. This in itself is a violation of the 
so called strong efficiency test as the experts are not using their information anyway, but 
rather,are using their knowledge of the public's betting habits. It also however plays 
havoc with any semi-strong test that we might think of applying since we are trying to 
test whether profits can be made by using "expert" information and now we are told that 
the experts are not using their information but rather estimates of what they believe will 
happen at the track! 
Thirdly, it is noted that expert predictions must be made some time before the race and 
they may change their views by the off time of the race. This point probably only 
introduces minor inaccuracies into the rates of return. Fourthly, it is noted that experts 
have to publish odds for all races. The problem here is that they would not normally 
have an actual bet on every race on which they may have an opinion. 
Finally, and it is this point that makes all tests which use FP's virtually worthless, is that 
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in setting odds, the experts are, consciously or sub-consciously, assigning ranks to the 
horses rather than probabilities. It is surprising that this extremely important point has 
only been made in one of about 10 relevant papers, and only as a footnote at that. Asch 
et al. (1982) noted " ... this results because the professional handicappers are really 
providing a set of rankings rather than a set of odds consistent with potential payoffs ... ". 
This problem consistently leads experts to overestimate the odds on favourites while 
underestimating the odds on outsiders. The reason for this is probably conservatism 
when it comes to rating favourites and a "couldn't care" attitude towards assessing 
outsiders. Typically a horse that will start at 5/10 is quoted in the paper at 8/10. Snyder 
relates that one of the newspaper experts explained to him that "we don't want to point 
the finger too clearly at a horse's winning chances." It is also typical for the horses 
lower down in the betting (high odds) to be grouped in a category called "others" at 10/1 
or 20/1 (say). It should be clear that the expert does not regard these horses as being 
serious contenders and has probably not devoted much time to analysing their real 
chances. It should also be obvious that in a race with 20 horses, it is highly unlikely that 
the 8 horses (say) at the bottom of the betting board have in reality identical probabilities 
of winning. Given the above arguments, Snyder's conclusion, that the experts are more 
biased in determining odds than the public, was to be expected. 
Losey deserves similar comment regarding his analysis of FP's as Dowie received. He 
too assumes that the FP' scan be taken as reflecting the true winning probability for each 
horse. We suggest this is owing to a lack of insight into the racing world on his part. 
He also does not offer any explanation as to why the results he obtained were contrary 
to his hypothesis. What of the significant negative returns where positive returns were 
being sought? One explanation is that horses that drift in the betting from FP (assuming 
this is close to the opening call) to SP is that they are doing so on overriding and usually 
inside information. For example, a horse does not eat his food the night before a race 
and is therefore not backed by the stable or its connections for this reason alone. This 
piece of information has overridden any other factors which may have been in the horses 
favour. Such horses invariably do not perform at their best but are allowed to start at a 
high price which would qualify them for a bet under the above test. Further analysis 
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along the lines of Losey' s test may reveal other reasons for the apparent anomaly. Such 
tests are performed during the research. 
Tuckwell (1983) found that following the tips given by Computercard yielded a positive 
return of 6.5 per cent. The only conclusion that we can draw from this is that 
Computercard are genuinely superior to the market at finding winners at the necessary 
odds. This is because of the manner in which the test was set up. Horses were only 
backed if they had an SP greater than that estimated by Computercard. In general this 
would mean that the horse must have drifted from lower odds. Other studies have shown 
that such horses perform relatively poorly compared to their odds, yet profits were still 
made by backing these horses. This would imply that Computercard are consistently 
selecting those horses that drift but still manage to do better than their odds would 
imply.· A major problem here is that, as in the case of weak efficiency, no details 
regarding the procedure are given. 
Bird's test of semi-strong efficiency was followed by the conclusion that the publicly 
-· 
produced odds incorporated all the information supplied by the tipsters. It was also 
implied that the odds as determined by the public were largely dependent on the tipster 
selections. We do not believe that this is interpretation is sound. It is probable that 
bettors come to their conclusions regarding the outcome of races independently of the 
experts. The test would theri only show that the experts are as bad at selecting winners 
as the public are. This has already been established. 
The only way to test whether subjective information was being incorporated into the 
public's odds, would be to suggest bets that the average punter would not make unless 
he had read such tipster's suggestions. This would entail consistently suggesting bets on 
fundamental outsiders and seeing if this led to substantial public betting on· such horses. 
If the public consistently ignored such advice , we could possibly conclude that the 
tipsters information is not important in determining the public's odds. The point to note 
·here is that it is unlikely that the public are influenced by the tipsters to any large 
degree, in that they would back certain horses at certain odds whether they suggested by 
the tipsters or not. The test is relevant although the interpretation of it is incorrect. The 
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connection between the publicly produced odds and the experts information is a lot more 
subtle than the conclusion "These findings suggest that the information supplied by the 
experts is incorporated into the bookmaker odds." seems to imply. 
Figlewski, using logit analysis comes to the same conclusion as Bird, and also implies 
·that the publicly determined odds are dependent largely on the tipster's choices. It is our 
hypothesis that the information in the tipster's suggestions is accounted for in the track 
odds, but the reason for this is that both the public and "experts" are using tli.e same 
pool of factual information. We therefore agree with the results of the test, which are 
that the market is semi-strongly efficient, meaning that profits cannot be made simply 
by using tipster information and odds information. We do however believe that the 
interpretation of the results, which states that the public determines the odds based solely 
on tips available in the newspapers, is incorrect. 
We have suggested a possible method for testing the incorporation of subjective 
information into the publicly determined odds. This was evidently quite impractical. We 
now suggest another impractical test although it would certainly. test for such 
incorporation correctly. We would need to examine odds determined by two independent 
groups of bettors, one using only factual information and the other using both factual 
information and subjective information. If these groups determined the odds identically 
(highly unlikely) we could conclude either that the tipsters determine their selections in 
an identical manner to the public or that the tipsters information is not used by the 
public. If the odds .differed for the two groups then we could conclude that the public 
does incorporate the tipsters information into their choices. The degree of importance 
attached to such tipster information could be gauged by examining the deviation between 
the two separately determined odds. 
It is obvious that severe practical difficulties make it impossible for such a test to work 
in practice. Firstly, we would need two large groups of bettors with highly similar 
characteristics with regard to determining odds so that any detected differences would · 
not be owing to the groups chosen. Secondly, it is unlikely that the test could be carried 
out in a closed off room and therefore it is possible that inside information might reach 
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the groups. It is obviously also possible that the group only allowed to observe factual 
information may well note some subjective information. Tests of semi-strong efficiency 
are pretty simple to perform and interpret. Analysis of the determination of odds is 
difficult to perform and given that any results from tests are likely to be misleading 
anyway, this work will not consider this type of analysis. 
Bookmaker Versus Tote Odds 
Gabriel (1990) used data from a period when electronic tote boards were not available. 
This supposedly suited his hypothesis. Since such data is unavailable, identical tests will 
not be performed. The hypothesis assumed that a difference between tote and bookmaker 
returns would imply a semi-strongly ineffieient market. Th~ possibility does exist, 
however,that tote returns ate higher than bookmaker returns for all horses simply 
because of the manner in which the bookmaker sets his odds. Thus a similar test might 
show that ~ote returns for losing horses are also higher t~an bookmaker returns and this 
would simply mean that the profit margin of the tote is smaller than that of the 
bookmakers. 
If bookmakers generally offer shorter odds than the tote, why would anyone bet with 
them? The reason is that the bigger punters know that they will receive a fixed return 
after betting with a bookmaker, while the tote odds are not fixed until the off of the 
race. The fact that tote returns are consistently higher than bookmaker SP's should not 
be interpreted as an implication of semi-strong inefficiency. The reason is that this 
information alone cannot lead to a profitable betting strategy. The tests in this paper are 
inappropriate to the topic of market efficiency. Similar tests, comparing bookmaker and 
tote returns, are performed in section 3.4 with regard to bettor consistency, but no 
inferences are drawn regarding the efficient markets hypothesis. 
Analysis of semi-strong efficiency should simply concentrate on the selections of 
professional tipsters, the official race card and form guides. Six newspaper tipsters will 
be examined, three of the Cape Times and three of .the Argus. The official race card 
(program) is published by the race clubs and includes, for the information of patrons, 
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the selections of an "'independent pundit". These selections will be similarly examined. 
The form guides also provide a tipping guide supposedly using some method to 
consistently arrive at their selections. These are the Computaform, Winning Form and 
Race form. Their performances are examined. 
2.3.3 Tests of Strong .Efficiency 
Inequity in the Gambling Market 
Examination of the possibility of the existence of inside information in a market is what 
is meant by testing the market for strong efficiency. In recent years the market for 
shares has been rocked by scandals involving insider trading despite strict legislation 
prohibiting such behaviour. There is currently no legislation prohibiting trading on inside 
information at the racetrack. We believe therefore, that the tests of strong efficiency 
made in this work have implications for legislation at governmental level as well as for 
further investigation into probable "illegalities" and immoralities that occur at South 
African racetracks. 
It is necessary to note that any test of strong efficiency is in fact only a close 
approximation to the only real test of strong efficiency. This was defined by Vannebo 
(1980). He suggested that the alleged holder of the inside information be taken to the 
track, his bets observed and his rate of return calculated. If this was in excess of the 
average rate for bettors on a consistent basis we could conclude that the market were 
strongly inefficient. Approximate tests have been performed by Dowie, Crafts, Bird and 
Asch. 
These tests which will be described shortly all tend to underestimate the returns to inside 
traders and therefore if any of them are significant, they are actually more significant 
than they appear. This removes the problem of only being able to test approximately for 
strong efficiency. A discussion of why it is important to have a strongly efficient betting 
market (in particular), is not out of place here. If the market were found to be weakly 
or semi-strongly inefficient, this would only have implications of an inconsistent (as 
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previously defined), but UNPREJUDICED pool of bettors. This means that such bettors 
DO have the opportunity to alter their betting patterns by using freely available 
information, in order to make the market efficient. If the market is Jound to be strongly 
inefficient, this would imply that bettors are being prejudiced against by a small group 
of people who should have no more right to cheat at the track than they have at the stock 
exchange. This means that the vast majority of betto!s are NOT in a position to bring 
about market efficiency although they would undoubtedly prefer to be in a position to 
do so. 
Why is the above so important and what would be the implications of an efficient 
horserace betting market in South Africa? Conversely, what would be the implications 
for a strongly inefficient market in South Africa? In an introduction to South African 
racing at the start of the Form Stallion Register Vol.3, Faull (1986) examines these 
questions. Using an exceptionally accurate and insightful approach, he descr_ibes the 
curren_t situation in South Africa as well as giving suggestions for the future. 
The main points of the above reference are recounted here. The most essential point to 
note is that the mainstay of the racing industry, which includes both racing and gambling 
aspects, is the punter. Without the betting public, people such as trainers, jockeys, 
breeders and thousands of others who derive their livelihood from the industry, would 
be looking for other work. This is shown diagrammatically in Diagram 2.1, which is 
reproduced from the Form Stallion Register. 
The importance of the punter should be obvious to anyone. A second important point to 
come out of Faull' s discussion is that in order for the tote to observe extra turnover it 
is necessary either (1) for existing punters to bet more or (2) for new punters to be 
drawn into betting. The only way in which either of these two requirements for greater 
turnover can occur is through effective marketing of horseracing. It should be clear that 
greater turnover would naturally be better in the LONG RUN for everybody concerned 
with racing. Consider diagram 2.2 which is also reproduced from the Form Stallion 
Register Volume 3. The important connections to note are those between public 
goodwill, tote turnover and stake money. 
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CASH FLOW CHART 
..... ___ ,._rat .~•-..;p_;:;I'........... .:;..a.~J.~....... -
Diagram 2.1 reproduced from The Form .Stallion Register Volume 3 
The problem exists in South Africa that a small minority with substantial power are 
letting racing stagnate possibly for the SHORT RUN benefit of the few. (There can be 
little argument regarding this · when one· looks at statistics regarding racecourse 
attendances). By this we mean that not much is seen to be done regarding apparent 
irregularities in betting .markets'. This in turn reflects a strong negative image of racing 
·to the general public and of course to' the racing public themselves. 
The betting market is the obvious place to look for reasons regarding the extremely poor 
public image of racing. Two "hypothetical" examples are reproduced from the Form 
Stallion Register Volume 3, in diagram 2.3. 
Given that it is possible that such situatio~s may aris~ in practice; (and go by with hardly 
even any press comment), is it any wonder that in recent years many people have left 
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Diagram 2.2 reproduced from The Form Stallion Register Volume 3 
racing while relatively few h~ve been attracted to. the sport. In the U.S. and Australia 
. the existence of inside information is acknowledged and has :been dealt with in a 
practical (if not perfect) manner. Horses that have not run recently are subjected to· 
public training workout~. Australia even has a system whereby horses competing for the 
first time run in races on which ·no legal betting ritay be held. We believe that because 
of the relatively backward state of the information market in this country, it may be 
necessary. to introduce such trials, if not legislation regarding the use of inside · 
informat~on akin to that regulating the stock market. 
Hypothetical Betting Move A 
Mr X. a leading breeder who also enjoys the 
pleasures of racehorse ownership and bet-
ting, decides to retain a certain yearling filly 
whose pedigree and conformation suggest 
that she might be a talented runner and con-
sequently a valuable breeding prospect. 
Ha,ing decided to trade the profits of 
successful breeding for the pleasures of own-
ership he commissions leaQ.ing trainer Mr Y 
to condition the fillv for her racetrack career. 
l\luch to their delight the filly shows excep-
lionallv brilliant abilitv in her training and 
trial w"orkouts. ~fr X instructs Mr Y to set her 
·up for a betting coup on her debut and to en-
sure that the price is right Mr Y, well versed 
in the art of hiding an unexposed cracker-
jack, waits patiently for the right field. 
First time out he takes on a large field of 
fillies, half of which haven't raced before, the 
other half of which includes five fillies that 
were narrowly beaten on their debuts. When 
the betting opens for the race on-course, only 
eight people know the full strength of this 
filly - the trainer, his two stable jockeys, two 
grooms who ride .the stable's work, the 
owner, and the owner's brother and son who 
have accompanied him to the racetrack to 
assist \\ith the execution of the betting coup. 
2-63 
An unsuspecting group of on-course 
fans, guided solely by the bare record of 
some inconclusive form, lay their bets in the 
hope that three of the five fillies with placed 
form \\ill contest the fmish. As the field starts 
to enter the pens Messrs X and Y and their 
assistants move in to lay their bets with the 
bookmakers and tote. 
A few minutes later their filly has 
crushed her rivals to land a substantial coup 
for her connections, leaving a large band of 
helpless and disappointed customers, and of 
course a whole entertainment industry, 
poorer and betrayed for the experience. 
Hypothetical Betting Move B 
Racehorse owner, Mr A, imports from Eng-
land a three-year-old filly named Hernn 
Caires and puts her into training with ~Ir B. 
From five starts as a two-year-old her form, 
four places in maiden races and a respect-
able fifth in a minor stakes, had been fairly 
promising but nothing to suggest that she 
would be out of the ordinary. 
· Given the warmer South African cliniate 
Hevon Caires improves in leaps and bounds 
and after nine months is working like a real 
champion. Mr B enters her for her first race, 
which due to restrictions on imported horses. 
has to be a B Division event. In order to en-
sure a good price in the betting the maiden 
filly is pitted against a strong field of in-form 
n.umers. The race chosen is also one of the 
jackpot legs. Judged on her English form 
Hevon Caires can be given very little chalice 
of winning, so is ignored by the Press and the 
vast majority of jackpot punters. · 
Backed from 14/1 to outright favourite 
Hevon Caires romps home by 5 lengths. 
Messrs A and B, their jockey and a handful of 
chosen friends have a field day scooping over 
half the jackpot pool at the expense of a large 
number of disregarded punters. Is this not a 
.. surefire way to alienate the customers in the 
marketplace? 
Diagram 2.3 reproduced from The Form Stallion Register Volume 3 
The foregoing paragraphs have been necessary to set the scene so that the implications 
of the tests of strong efficiency can be more fully understood. To answer the questions 
posed earlier, it would seem that the main implication of an efficient market .in racetrack 
betting is the long term prosperity and growth of the industry and all associated with it. 
The converse situation would seemingly imply the decline of the industry. 
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It thus seems that the most important of the three tests of efficiency is the test of strong 
efficiency. Since 1976 a few papers have examined betting markets for strong efficiency. 
The first of these was Dowie, whose paper has already been mentioned in connection 
with weak efficiency. Dowie' s main problem is the faith he places in the reliability of 
the FP data that he uses. His test examines the correlation between the observed winning 
probabilities and the FP's/SP's and checks to see which set of odds data has the higher 
correlation with the empirical probabilities. 
The above is certainly not a good approach to take since the-FP's could theoretically be 
set by someone who has consistent access to inside information. This is highly unlikely, 
but we include the example to illustrate a point. Far more serious problems with the test 
are as follows. The odds set by the newspapers are normally within some tacit 
constraints. This point has already been discussed. Thus favourites are not quoted "too 
short" and outsiders are not quoted "too long". This will clearly have a distorting effect 
on the tests. Secondly, newspaper odds are set by one or two people with biases, who 
determine the odds not with money but with probably not more than what they would 
consider a thorough investigation of the data. Remember that the odds in the paper are 
predicted by people who are not going to lose any money if their winning probability 
estimates are wrong. Do their odds really reflect all public information the day before 
the race and exclude only privately held information? We think not! Dowie's test 
therefore seems shortsighted. 
The topic of Dowie's paper was taken up by Crafts (1985) who suggested that Dowie's 
tests were not appropriate. It appears from the paper that Crafts has a much better 
understanding of the horseracing scene than Do_wie. He suggests that any test of strong -
efficiency should examine "the process of adjustment of the odds in the market from 
those forecast in the morning (FP's) to those returned at the track (SP's)". This 
approximate test is reasonably close to a real test of strong efficiency, although problems 
still exist. The use of FP's in tests have been shown to be fraught with problems. A way 
around the problem in this test is to only use prices as available from bookmakers from 
30 minutes before a race. If we detected that horses whose odds moved down sharply 
from 30 minutes before to lower SP's, won a greater number of races than expected we 
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could possibly conclude that inside information exists. The problem here is that a 
decrease in the odds can occur for various reasons and not only because of the bets of 
people with inside information. This approach is carefully utilized and the situation in 
Cape Town investigated. 
There are 3 possible scenarios regarding FP's and SP's. Firstly the SP can be greater 
than the FP for a favoured horse, e.g. FP = 111 and SP =· 2/1. Secondly, the SP can 
be less than the FP for a favoured horse, e.g. FP = 2/1 and SP = 111. Thirdly, the SP 
can be greater than the FP for an outsider, e.g. FP = 10/1 and SP = 33/1. It is 
extremely rare to have the reverse of the last situation and it is therefore not considered. 
For tests of strong efficiency the most important movements are those of type 2, i.e. 
where a horse is backed from a high FP to a lower SP. Note that from observation the 
FP's should be lower for favoured horses and higher for outsiders. Thus a change as in 
scenario 1 is actually more marked than we observe. A change as in scenario 2 is 
actually less marked than we observe, and a change as in scenario 3 is generally much 
less marked than we observe. 
Crafts did attempt to tackle the problem of the predicted FP's. Unfortunately he made 
what appears to be an incorrect assumption in trying to connect the two sets of odds. He 
first notes that no fine distinction is made between the outsiders and concludes that often 
the SP of such horses will exceed there FP for this reason alone. He then goes on to say 
that "the compilers' implied probabilities are sometimes very conservative in the sense 
that they sum to a considerably larger total than those implied in the SP." This however 
is not true of favourites as we have seen. For example, a horse that will have an SP of 
5110 is often quoted by the press as an 8/ 10 shot. In this case the papers are being 
conservative but not in the sense suggested by Crafts! 
The reason for Crafts' observation then is that he is using all the horses to calculate the 
total probability. Consider the following example. A race has 5 runners and the betting 
is as follows: 
Horse A 
FP 
111 
SP 
5/10 
.FP prob 
0.500 
SP prob 
0.667 
Horse B 
Horse C 
Horse D 
Horse E 
2/1 2/1 0.333 
10/1 50/1 0.091 
10/1 50/1 0.091 
10/1 50/1 0.091 
Total Probability 1.106 
Total Probability 
(excluding "others") 0.833 
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0.333 
0.002 
0.002 
0.002 
1.006 
1.000 
The reason that the FP probabilities sum to more than the SP's is normally because of 
the incorrect assessment of the outsiders. If we exclude the "others" category we usually 
find that in fact the SP probabilities sum to more than the FP's. 
One of Crafts' conditions for using a horse in the analysis is if SP > FP then the horse 
is used only if the sum of the FP's is larger than the sum of the SP's by less than 0.01 
per horse after excluding the outsiders. The other condition is that either the SP or the 
FP must be less than or equal to 10/L These conditions will ensure that for scenarios 
1 and 3 discussed above using the FP's will not be a problem. However it is neither of 
these scenarios that is most important for tests of strong efficiency. We will use Crafts' 
formulation of his conditions although our initial requirement of the first condition will 
be that the FP must be higher than the SP. 
A similar investigation is feasible which looks at the rankings of the horses in the 
morning as per some odds prediction and compares these with the rankings as 
determined by the SP's. Clearly some information is lost using a test such as this, but 
it will avoid the possible error in using the seemingly "arbitrarily" determined FP's. 
(These prices are obviously not arbitrary but are possibly random within small bands of 
prices). 
Crafts cites some examples of betting "coups" from which one may easily conclude that 
inside information did exist although it was quickly transformed into public information 
when the bettors holding it made their bets. These "coups" were on horses that had no 
fundamental reason to win, but did win after being backed at long odds and obviously 
starting shorter than their FP's. The logic behind the test is thus fine but as we have 
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already noted, it is not easy to interpret the newspaper prices. Crafts also tests the 
reverse of the above by examining horses that drift in the betting from low FP to higher 
SP. This is similar to Losey's test of semi-strong efficiency. This may however also 
have meaning in a strong form context, because such horses would be expected to 
perform poorly in the long run relative to their SP's. 
This paper is one of the best in academic research on horseracing and with slight 
adjustments all of its ideas and tests can be applied to the South African racing ·scene. 
We believe that the most important section of Crafts' paper comes at the end, when he 
discusses the implications of his tests. We reproduce some of his work here verbatim 
and in capitals to imply the importance thereof. 
"ARGUMENTS FOR THE TIGHTER REGULATION OF THE HORSE RACE 
BETTING MARKET CAN PRESUMABLY ONLY BE STRENGTHENED BY THESE 
FINDINGS. EQUALLY, THE EXISTENCE OF THE INEFFICIENCIES REVEALED 
IN SECTION TWO WOULD PRESUMABLY CONFLICT WITH THE ROYAL 
-COMMISSION ON GAMBLING'S PHILOSOPHY THAT THOSE WHO GAMBLE 
SHOULD KNOW AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE ODDS AGAINST THEIR . 
WINNING. THE JOCKEY CLUB'S OWN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY ARGUED 
THAT "THE PUBLIC IS ENTITLED TO BE SATISFIED THAT EVERY 
PRECAUTION IS TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT RACING IS FAIRLY CONDUCTED 
AND THAT MALPRACTICES ARE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM." IF THIS VIEW 
IS ACCEPTED BY THE JOCKEY CLUB, THEN IT MAY WELL BE THAT THEIR 
OFFICIALS SHOULD ENQUIRE MORE FREQUENTLY INTO HORSES SHOWING 
IMPROVED FORM WHERE THE BETTING MARKET INDICATES THE 
POSSIBILITY OF SIGNIFICANT INSIDER INFORMATION, AND THAT THE 
JOCKEY CLUB SHOULD CONSIDER WHETHER IT IS ENFORCING ITS RULES 
OVER "NON-TRIERS" STRICTLY ENOUGH. IN PARTICULAR, PUBLIC 
CONFIDENCE WOULD SURELY BE ENHANCED IF CASES SUCH AS THOSE 
RECORDED IN TABLE 3 HAD BEEN ENQUIRED INTO BY THE STEWARDS 
WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING THE REASONS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT 
IN FORM AND THE PREVIOUS INFERIOR PERFORMANCES." 
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In his 1982 paper Asch tested for strong efficiency by examining the marginal odds 
produced by bettors in the last few minutes of the betting period. The idea of using 
marginal odds is a logical one, but unfortunately he also uses FP's. We think that using 
the FP's in this test is unnecessary and that only the SP's and the marginal odds could 
have been used. Ratios of SP' s to marginal odds of greater than one would indicate 
betting support in the marginal period and we could examine the finishing position 
records of all horses. If the assumption of betting behaviour holds and we observe 
significant differences between performance records of horses with differing ratios then 
we could conclude that inside information may exist and is being utilized in the final 
minutes of betting. Another test would be to examine the finishing positions of horses 
that changed their level of favouritism in the marginal period. Tests using these ideas 
will be carried out using bookmaker data (already available) as well as tote data. 
Tuckwell (1983) used the adjustment of the odds as the basis for his test. The author is 
very insightful and has some useful comments related to the equatability of the betting 
market. These were covered in some detail in section 2.2.3. His tests however, rely on 
knowledge of bookmakers' profit margins which are not available in South Africa, and 
therefore no similar tests could be performed. 
We now get to a paper that does not use FP's in its tests. In the clearest, most ingenious 
and logical paper in racing literature, Bird and McCrae (1987) propose tests of strong 
efficiency that are closest to Vannebo's optimal test. These were carefully set out and 
explained in section 2.2.3. All the points made in this paper are relevant to tests of 
strong efficiency. As mentioned above we will test using bookmaker odds and possibly 
using tote odds as well. We suggest that any test of strong efficiency be performed along 
the lines set out in this paper. This would include consideration of the new concepts 
introduced, namely, consumption benefits, control groups and the effect of the staking 
system used. Bird noted that 11 ••• (bookmaker data) is the only data which provide a 
meaningful series of prices throughout the course of betting. In addition, bookmaker 
odds provide the best means to gauge the advent of information onto the market since 
the largest and most knowledgeable gamblers concentrate their betting activities via 
bookmakers. 11 Bird's test still has one problem in that the bookmaker prices that he uses 
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are reported as an average of a few bookmakers prices. No indication is given if bets are 
actually struck at these prices. This research solves this problem as outlined below. 
The essential element of any test of strong efficiency, in the absence of the ability to 
view the bets of real insiders, (trainers, owners etc.) is to analyse the adjustment of the 
odds through the betting period. It is therefore essential that the data used (odds) is 
representative and relevant for the purpose it is being used for. We have seen that using 
FP's is not relevant to such tests. This is clearly because the process of adjustment 
examined must only be of one set of odds, for example those odds set by bookmakers 
(FP's are set by newspapers while SP's are set by bookmakers). The odds must however 
also be representative of what is happening at the track as well as being accurate. 
By representative is meant that if the reported opening price of a horse was 2/1, that 
means that the first bet struck on the course on that horse was at 2/1. This is clearly not 
the case with the reported odds. Further, this research places in doubt the recording 
accuracy of publications like Computaform for recording the odds as reflected on 
bookmakers boards at various times in the betting period. Tote odds at any time are 
relevant, representative and accurate but the same cannot be said of reported bookmaker 
odds. Since it is the adjustment of bookmaker odds that is more important, (if we assume 
the big punters bet with the bookmakers) we have obtained from a bookmaker his actual 
record of every bet struck on the racecourse over a two year period. This data will thus 
fulfil the above requirements. Details of the testing procedure are set out in section 3.3. 
Tote odds are also used in a specific test using the marginal odds idea, although this data 
source is more limited. 
2.3.4 Tests of Bettor Consistency 
Inefficiency and Inconsistency 
In this section we shall examine the consistency of the bettors in the betting market. By 
consistent we mean that bettors cannot raise their rate of return above the average 
without access to more information. In our case more information would be inside 
2-70 
information. Consistency within one betting pool, e.g. win.bets, has been examined and 
has revealed the well known favourite-longshot bias. Consistency between two or more 
betting pools, e.g. place and swinger bets, is examined. Finally, consistency between 
identical pools at different tracks is examined. 
The difference between inconsistency and inefficiency in the betting market should be 
noted again. Inefficiency, (i.e. the achievement of long ru·n profits) is a result of the 
inconsistencies of bettors. Thus inefficiency implies inconsistency of some form, but the 
reverse is obviously not always true. We will examine this topic in chapters two and 
three. In this chapter we obtain insight into what actually goes on in the market and 
whether any inconsistencies can be exploited profitably. In chapter three we will ask why 
bettors behave the way they do in creating .such inconsistencies. 
Bettor consistency is concerned with examining the probabilities implied by the bettor 
determined odds on various types of bets. Bets fall into two categories, namely simple 
and exotic. The simple bets are win and place. Exotic bets involve bets on more than 
one horse simultaneously and these are swinger, trifecta and daily double. The pools for 
each type of bet are separate. There should be some fairly obvious relationships between 
the probabilities implicit in the various pools. If these relationships are violated for 
whatever reason, profitable exploitation may be possible. 
Profitable systems to exploit bettor inconsistencies do not necessarily require that we 
have our own estimates of the empirical probabilities, (which presumably would be a 
better predictor of results than the publicly determined probabilities) but any system 
would probably give better returns if we were able to calculate more accurate estimates 
of winning probabilities than the public. 
A simple example of a logical relationship between implicit subjective probabilities is 
that the probability of winning should be less than the probability of placing. At 
extremely high probabilities, (0.9+) it has been observed that the opposite is possible. 
For example a horse with bookmaker odds of 1/10 could be paying Rl.10 for a win but 
Rl.20 for a place! This is clearly a case of bettor inconsistency that could be exploited 
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profitably in theory. In practice it would be more difficult as we would have to be one 
of the last bettors, and note as well that our bet would affect the final odds. 
The above is a very simple example of inconsistency and it probably only' occurs once 
a year offering a profit of maybe 1 % on outlay of up to RlOO with virtually no risk. It 
is therefore not of much use to be able to observe such situations. We need to investigate 
other situations where inconsistencies may exist. Firstly, we should examine the 
relationship between win and place probabilities. For example, if two horses are paying 
RlO for a win, but one is paying R2 for a place while the other is paying R4, we may 
regard the win and place odds on the former to be consistent with each other, which 
would imply that we believe the odds of the latter are inconsistent. Note that the problem 
could arise either from false win odds or false place odds on the latter horse; If we 
ass1,1me that the win odds are fairly close approximations of the empirical odds, we could 
say that the place odds on the second horse are too high. The connection between win 
probabilities and place probabilities was first examined by Harville (1973). 
We have still only.considered relationships between single probability bets. We must also 
examine relationships between single and compound probability bets, as well as those 
between two compound probability bets. For example, a relationship should exist 
between the probabilities implicit in daily double bets and the probabilities implicit in 
the win pools corresponding to the daily double races. An· analysis of payoffs to daily 
doubles and payoffs to the corresponding "parlay" bet will be made. A parlay involves 
backing each horse in a specified double combination separately in the win pool for each 
of the two races. If the first horse wins, the total return from the winning bet is placed 
on the selected horse in the second race. The payoffs should be close, since the events 
that must occur for both bets to be successful, are the same. 
In Cape Town, however the daily double pool is not divided only between the ticket 
holders predicting the winners of both races. Eighty percent of the pool is divided 
between such tickets while ten percent each is divided between ticket holders a winner 
and a second in the two races. This makes comparison along the lines of the above 
analysis more difficult since psychological factors may be involved. Do bettors consider 
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the likely consolation payoffs at all when-they bet on the double? For testing consistency 
we shall have to assume that consolation payoffs are not considered. We can then 
increase the observed double payoffs by twenty percent to obtain the public's implicit 
winning probabilities. Adjustments to this percentage added back can be made if the· 
twenty percent appears unrealistic. This adjustment to our original adjustment may be 
needed because of the fact that double returns are displayed and this will affect the 
number of tickets bet on each combination. Clearly a fairly complex relationship exists 
between implicit win probabilities in the win pools and the corresponding implicit win 
probabilities in the double pool in Cape Town. 
A relationship simpler to examine is that between implicit place probabilities in the place 
pool and implicit place probabilities in the swinger pool. For example, given that we 
have probabilities of placing from the place pool, we will be able to calculate expected 
· payoffs from the corresponding swinger bet assuming the market is consistent in pricing 
both bets. Clearly if actual returns on swinger bets just before the off are higher than 
expected, profits could be made in the long run. This will depend . on the implicit 
probabilities in the place pool being close approximations to the empirical place 
probabilities. We would do better still, if we were able to obtain more accurate estimates 
of the empirical probabilities, but these are not necessary for profitable exploitation. 
Examination of the trifecta payouts would require knowledge of win probabilities from 
the win pool as well as probabilities of placing second and third from the place pools. 
The trifecta is a very complex bet to analyse using probabilities and it is virtually certain 
that inconsistencies exist between the pools. Lack of data regarding all (as opposed to 
winning) trifecta combinations meant that no study was made of this bet. Analysis of 
winning trifectas could have been made, but it was thought that such analysis would not 
lead to any useful or meaningful results. Examination could also be made of the even 
more complex exotic bets, namely the jackpot and the pick-six, but this would be 
unlikely to reveal anything meaningful. It is surely meaningless to try and establish a 
logical relationship between probabilities implicit in six separate win pools and compare · 
these with win probabilities implicit in the pick-six pool when people are choosing their 
horses for the pick-six with the help of their phone numbers! 
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Harville (1973) was the first paper to examine relationships between probabilities in 
respect of horseracing. He developed formulae based on certain assumptions. Further 
discussion on this topic of probability, permutations and order statistics can be found in 
section chapter five. Harville's examination of actual versus theoretical frequencies of 
finishing second and third as well as placing will be similarly used in this work. 
Two papers appeared almost simultaneously in 1981. These were from Rausch et al. 
(U.S.A.) and Tuckwell (Australia). Both papers extended Harville's investigation into 
frequencies of placing (first three) and tried to find a profitable strategy that could take 
advantage of the bettor inconsistencies that were noted in the preliminary investigations. 
The main thrust of each paper was to identify situations where a positive expected return 
existed (given the assumption that the win pool was "true") in the place pools. 
Tuckwell' s paper is simpler and uses an inappropriate method to derive estimates of win 
probabilities given an odds level. This has been discussed in section 2.3.1. The betting 
system used when profitable opportunities were identified was a simple unit staking 
system, i.e. betting the same amount on every horse that qualified for a bet. Rausch, on 
the other hand, developed a very sophisticated betting model which took into account 
many factors before arriving at an optimal amount which should be bet on a specific 
horse. Thus the main difference between the papers is their implementation of a betting 
strategy. Our approach shall be to follow Hau sch' s methods precisely, except that we 
shall either use a level staking system which is far easier to implement than Hausch's 
system, or devise our own system which is also simple to implement, but which does 
follow the notion of optimizing the amount bet on particular horses in some sense. The 
complexity of Hau sch' s staking system is considerable, and its economic applications and 
implications, seem beyond the scope of this work. 
Ali (1979) made a useful study of bettor consistency, although he implied that it was 
actually a study of market efficiency. In the context of our work, he only examined 
consistency. There are two problems with his approach. The first is that he only 
examined consistency with regard to winning doubles. How do the bettors evaluate the 
probabilities associated with losing horses? This question is addressed in this work. 
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The other problem is that congruence between double probabilities and parlay 
probabilities does not necessarily imply consistent behaviour by the betting public. The 
reason for this is that the double probability is a compound probability which we do not 
decompose into its two components, so that we cannot know how it was arrived at, and 
therefore we cannot compare it with the two individual win probabilities derived from 
the win pool. We get around this by building a second compound probability estimate 
of the double event and comparing this with the probability from the double pool. This 
assumes, however that bettors are not "wildly" inconsistent or that at least one of the 
two horses in the double is "fairly" consistently bet on by the public. 
Consider the following example. Ignore transactions costs. 
Double return = 100 (bettors subjective probabilities for both horses = 0.1) 
Parlay return - 100 (bettors subjective probabilities for the horses are .05 and .2 
respective! y) 
This scenario over many observations would imply that bettors are consistent, although 
we can see that they are in actual fact wildly inconsistent. We shall assume that this type 
of scenario does not occur, and we can therefore safely continue to test consistency 
along the lines of Ali's test. The test will be adjusted slightly, as described above, to 
allow for the specific conditions prevailing in Cape Town. 
Asch et al. (1986) examined exacta and daily double betting with a view to testing for 
consistency among bettors as well as testing for inside information. There are three 
major problems with the paper which demonstrate a lack of insight into racing. The 
techniques used are also somewhat inappropriate. Firstly, the derivation of the subjective 
probability of winning the (ij) exacta, using the win probabilities from the win pool, uses 
regression analysis which brings in observed probabilities. The observed probabilities 
are totally unnecessary in this context as is the regression analysis. Such probabilities 
should be derived directly using the subjective win pool probabilities and the Harville 
formulae. 
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Secondly, it seems inappropriate to attempt a test of inside information in the complex 
world of exotic betting. Since their are no bookmakers in the U.S.A. it may seem logical 
that this is a sound way to test for inside information. However, the factors affecting the 
payoffs to exotic bets are numerous and trying to isolate one (inside information) is 
difficult, and the results of tests are unlikely to be meaningful. 
Asch also examines consistency and inside information in daily double betting. He found 
that the double is not consistently priced and is in fact underbet (i.e. the return to the 
double is higher than that to the corresponding parlay). The reason for this is probably 
because the money is tied up for two races as well as the fact that the transactions costs 
for the double are lower. Thus, thirdly, Asch's explanation as to why he could not show 
the existence of inside information in double betting is somewhat suspect. He states that 
holders of inside information will not bet the double since this signals the information 
to the public, as "will-pays" are displayed after the running of the first leg. Our point 
against this explanation, is that the assumption that inside information is so freely 
available so as to affect every double payout under discussion, is false. 
Rausch and Ziemba (1990) examined the application of their optimal betting model to 
cross-track betting. Since it is a relatively new form of gambling, not much research has 
been done regarding it, and data tended to be sparse. In South Africa, however, cross-
track betting forms a significant part of the total amount bet at a single track. 
Unfortunately, we were only able to obtain data from one racing centre, and that only 
applicable to the local tracks. Tests will be performed to examine bettor consistency 
using winning bets only, as these are published weekly for all racing centres in the 
newspaper. The bets examined will be win and trifecta. The results can only be of 
theoretical interest, since the implementation problems involved are insurmountable. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
E.M.H RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
nit is true that only one person in a hundred wins. But what do I 
care about that? n 
Dostoyevsky - The Gambler 
Chapter two covered the literature review regarding the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. 
This chapter presents the results of our own tests which are based entirely on South 
African data. 
3.1 Weak Efficiency 
The method of systematically selecting horses using a single piece of unprocessed 
information, is so simple that it is virtually always overlooked by bettors. For example, 
most punters would not bet on a horse solely because the horse had a good draw or 
solely because a top jockey was aboard. Bettors will rather assimilate all the information 
regarding the horses in a race before making a decision to bet, and if so, on which 
runner. If bettors do not attempt to systematically analyse all the available information, 
they would probably combine their prior perceptions/beliefs with advice provided by 
newspaper tipsters or tipping guides, (processed information) in the belief that such 
tipsters have analysed the available information sufficiently. 
The betting market is weakly inefficient if profit can be made by using only unprocessed 
information pertaining to the race. This would entail betting on the horse in each race 
with the best draw, (say). Paradoxically, since the method is so simple, it is generally 
not employed by any punters for that reason. They would demand a more complex 
method of determining betting opportunities. For this reason it may be possible to find 
a simple system whereby profit can be made. 
The simplest way of trying to find winners systematically is to find horses with a certain 
3-2 
characteristic whose observed probability of wmnmg ariy given race, (frequency 
interpretation) over a long enough period of time, exceeds the expected probability of 
a horse with that characteristic doing so. Alternatively, the observed return from betting 
on such horses must be greater than the expected return of the bets. For example, a 
horse at odds of 1/1 is expected to win one every two races, i.e. for any particular race, 
the theoretical probability of winning is 0.5. If we observe enough 1/1 horses over an 
extended period and we see that they win on average more than once in two races, we 
should back any horse running at 1/1, since whatever factors go into determining the 
odds, they are on average understating the true probability of such horses winning. 
If we examine the draws of winning horses, and we assume that each draw leads to an 
equivalent chance of winning, we expect to find an even distribution of the draws among 
the winning horses. In this case it would not simply be enough for one draw to have a 
.. 
greater observed probability of winning than expected, because this may still not lead 
to profit. In this case we need the observed return of backing horses with a particular 
draw to be greater than the expected return. 
The first test is to group all horses by their starting price (SP) and note the number of 
winners from each category. Initially we will ignore the tax of 10% applicable to 
winning bets. The Computaform reports the SP's of all horses. These were transformed 
for each race, such that the probabilities of winning summed to 1 for the race. The first 
data set was then grouped by odds category. The transformed data set was grouped by 
probability category. The data used were of 1141 races run in the Cape Province from 
9 June 1990 to 28 December 1991. There were 13 560 runners in total. The odds 
categories ranged from 1/10, (probability of winning 0.909) to 20/1 (probability of 
winning 0.0476). The probability categories ranged from .025 to .575 (these being the 
mid range values of the categories). The winners of the 1 141 races were similarly 
divided into odds/probability categories. 
Observed rates of winning for each category were then calculated. These were compared 
to the expected rates implied by the odds, or the average expected probability for the 
transformed data. The expected rates are calculated as follows. If the odds are n/m i.e. 
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invest m to get back m+n, then the theoretical probability of winning is m/(n+m). If 
the range of probability is x to y, then the theoretical average probability of winning is 
(x+y)/2. The data, rates and graphs are shown in Tables 3.1 to 3.3 and Figures 3.1 to 
3.3. In Tables 3.1 to 3.4 and 3.6 to 3.9 an asterisk (*) means there exists a significant 
difference (at the 5% level on a two sided alternative) between the expected and actual 
probabilities of winning at that probability level. Where the number of observations is 
less than thirty, the results of the test cannot be reasonably accepted, and should be 
treated with caution. 
The variables in the following tables and graphs are defined as follows: 
P = odds category expressed as the return to 1 unit. 
WP = number of winners in each odds category. 
EXPP = number -of horses running in each odds category. 
OBS = WP/EXPP = observed rate (probability) of winning for each odds category. 
THEO = theoretical rate (probability) of winning for each odds category. 
RAT = THEO/OBS = ratio of expected rate and observed rate. 
The results are comparable with Dowie (1976) and Kreel (1988) in that profit can be 
made in some odds categories, although no pattern is discernable. The question as to 
why profit can be made in these categories, and not similar surrounding ones, remains 
unanswered. Given the small number of observations in some categories, and the strange 
results that emerged, it was necessary to group the odds categories and investigate 
further. The categories were grouped in two ways. Firstly in order to create a smooth, 
decreasing curve of observed rates, which is what we expected in the initial study. 
Secondly, the categories were grouped so that, each odds category within a group, was 
perceived by the betting public as having approximately the same winning probability 
as the other categories in the group. The "equal perception" groups were derived, based 
on the author's personal observations of gamblers at the track. 
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p WP EXPP OBS THEO RAT 
0.1 1 1 1.000 0.909 0.909 
0.2 2 2 1.000 0.833 0.833 
0.25 1 1 1.000 0.800 0.800 
0.33 7 9 0.778 0.752 0.967 
0.4 6 6 1.000 0.714 0.714 
0.5 9 13 0.692 0.667 0.963 
0.6 9 23 0.391 0.625 1.597 * 
0.7 23 46 0.500 0.588 1.176 
0.8 30 57 0.526 0.556 1.056 
0.9 19 40 0.475 0.526 1.108 
1 15 62 0.242 0.500 2.067 * 
1.1 11 22 0.500 0.476 0.952 
1.2 34 63 0.540 0.455 0.842 
1.3 13 29 0.448 0.435 0.970 
1.4 10 47 0.213 0.417 1.958 * 
1.5 21 '51 0.412 0.400 0.971 
1.6 19 40 0.475 0.385 0.810 
1.7 8 61 0.131 0.370 2.824 * 
1.8 27 80 0.338 0.357 1.058 
2 59 165 0.358 0.333 0.932 
2.2 31 110 0.282 0.313 1.109 
2.5 44 211 0.209 0.286 1.370 * 
2.8 13 60 0.217 0.263 1.215 
. 3 45 241 0.187 0.250 1.339 * 
3.3 24 91 0.264 0.233 0.882 
3.5 65 292 0.223 0.222 0.998 
4 74 414 0.179 0.200 1.119 
4.5 49 306 0.160 0.182 1.135 
5 103 718 0.143 0.167 1.162 
6 85 723 0.118 0.143 1.215 
7 68 919 0.074 0.125 1.689 * 
8 65 1066 0.061 0.111 1.822 * 
10 53 1216 0.044 0.091 2.086 * 
12 46 2500 0.018 0.077 4.181 * 
14 25 1437 0.017 0.067 3.832 * 
16 13 870 0.015 0.059 3.937 * 
20 14 1453 0.010 0.048 4.942 * 
33 0 115 0.000 0.029 N/A 
Table 3 .1 Theoretical and observed probabilities for all odds categories 
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PS WPS EXPS SOBS STHEO 
0.45 107 198 0.540 0.690 
1.1 60 147 0.408 0.476 
1.4 44 127 0.346 0.417 
1.7 54 181 0.298 0.370 
2.1 90 275 0.327 0.323 
2.65 57 271 0.210 0.274 
3.15 69 332 0.208 0.241 
3.75 139 706 0.197 0.211 
4.5 49 306 0.160 0.182 
5 103 718 0.143 0.167 
6 85 723 0.118 0.143 
7 68 919 0.074 0.125 
8 65 1066 0.061 0.111 
10 53 1216 . 0.044 0.091 
12 46 2500 . 0.018 0.077 
14 25 1437 0.017 0.067 
16 13 870 0.015 0.059 
20 14 1453 0.010 0.048 
33 0 115 0.000 0.029 
Table 3.2 Theoretical and observed probabilities after smoothing 
. ~ 
The grouping of categories were as follows; 
Smooth Curve 
Group 1: 1110 to 9110 
Group 2: 1/1 to 12/10 
Group 3: 13/10 to 15/10 
Group 4: 16/10 to 18/10 
Group 5: 2/ 1 to 22/10 
Group 6: 5/2 to 28/10 
Group 7: 3/1 to 33/10 
Group 8: 7/2 to 4/1 
RATS 
1.276 * 
1.167 
1.203 
1.241 * 
0.986 
1.303 * 
1.159 
1.069 
1.135 
1.162 
1.215 
1.689 
1.822 * 
2.086 * 
4.181 * 
3.832 * 
3.937 * 
4.942 * 
N/A 
Thereafter the groups concided with the original categories as no further grouping was 
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PE WPE EXPE EOBS ETHEO RATE 
0.25 17 19 0.895 0.800 0.894 
0.7 90 179 0.503 0.588 1.170 * 
1.2 83 223 0.372 0.455 1.221 * 
1.65 75 232 0.323 0.377 1.167 
2.233 134 486 0.276· 0.309 1.122 
3.15 147 684 0.215 0.241 1.121 
4 74 414 0.179 0.200 1.119 
4.5 49 306 0.160 0.182 1.135 
5 103 718 0.143 0.167 1.162 
6 85 723 0.118 0.143 1.215 
7 68 919 0.074 0.125 1.689 * 
8 65 1066 0.061 0.111 1.822 * 
10 53 1216 0.044 0.091 2.086 * 
12 46 2500 0.018 0.077 4.181 * 
14 25 1437 0.017 0.067 3.832 * 
16 13 870 .. 0.015 0.059 3.937 * 
20 14 1453 0.010 0.048 4.942 * 
33 0 115 0.000 0.029 NIA 
Table 3.3 Theoretical and observed probabilities after equal perception smoothing 
necessary. 
Perceived Equal Probability 
Group 1: 1/10 to 4/10 
Group 2: 5/10 to 9/10 
Group 3: 1/1 to 14/10 
Group 4: 15110 to 18/10 
Group 5: 2/1 to 512 
Group 6: 28/10 to 7/2 
The groups now, again, coincided with the categories. 
The results are shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, with an Sas a suffix or prefix to variable 
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3-10 
names, to indicate the Smooth groups, and an E to indicate the Equal Probability groups. 
In the smooth groups we now almost have a monotonically decreasing smooth curve of 
observed probabilities. This results in profit only being possible in one group, namely 
2/1 to 22/10. The profit is small, is not significant at any conventional testing level, and 
there does not appear to be a fundamental reason why profit should be realized in this 
group. Taking tax of 10%, on winning bets into account, would remove this profit. 
A profit is also made in the highest probability category (lowest odds) when odds 
categories are grouped by the Equal Perception criterion. The numbers in this group are 
small and therefore no statistical statements can be made regarding the profit. We note, 
however, that even taking tax into account, a small profit is possible. 
The probability categories whereby horses were grouped for the investigation using 
transformed probabilities were as follows. 
(1) 0.5 to 0.65 
(2) 0.4 to 0.499 
(3) 0.3 to 0.399 
(4) 0.25 to 0.299 
(5) 0.2 to 0.249 
(6) 0.15 to 0.199 
(7) 0.125 to 0.149 
(8) 0.1 to 0.1249 
(9) 0.08 to 0.099 
(10) 0.06 to 0.079 
(11) 0.04 to 0.059 
(12) 0.03 to 0.039 
(13) 0.02 to 0.029 
The results are shown in Table 3.4. The variables are defined as follows. 
APROB = average theoretical probability of winning 
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APR OB WINS RUNS ARATIO PRATIO 
0.575 11 54 0.204 2.823 * 
0.45 55 117 0.470 0.957 
0.35 134 262 0.511 0.684 * 
0.275 71 241 0.295 0.933 
0.225 138 465 0.297 0.758 * 
0.175 187 760 0.246 0.711 * 
0.1375 137 781 0.175 0.784 * 
0.1125 122 1032 0.118 0.952 
0.09 65 1167 0.056 1.616 * 
0.07 63 1975 0.032 2.194 * 
0.05 93 3398 0.027 1.827 * 
0.035 47 2655 0.018 1.977 * 
0.025 18 653 0.028 0.907 
Table 3. 4 Theoretical and observed probabilities using "sum to one" transformed 
probabilities 
WINS = number of winners in each category 
RUNS = number of runners in each category 
ARA TIO = WINS/RUNS = actual percentage of winners to runners 
PRATIO = APROB/ARATIO =ratio of theoretical to actual winning probability. 
The results confirm the existence of the favourite-longshot bias. Low odds runners are 
underbet, while high odds runners are overbet. Exceptions are the shortest and longest 
odds categories. The shortest odds category is overbet, while the longest odds category 
is slightly underbet. Since these actual probabilities are based on transformed odds, (i.e. 
odds that would make the game fair) any profitable categories can obviously not be 
exploited. We have seen, however, that even if the odds were completely fair, (to the 
extent that the probabilities of winning sum to one) the bias of overbetting short odds 
horses still exists. 
The odds reflected by the tote are determined in a different way to those of the 
bookmakers. All the money is placed in a pool, the take out is removed, and the 
remainder is paid to the holders of tickets on the winner. There is no need to transform 
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the tote odds, because the required relationship between all horses in the race already 
exists, i.e. the probabilities of the horses sum to one. The data was available in the form 
of win bets placed on all runners. From this, the win probability for each horse and the 
equivalent odds were calculated as follows. (An example of the data is shown in Table 
3.5.) 
Win probability = win bets I total pool. 
Odds = (1 I win probability) - 1. 
All horses were grouped by odds into the nearest recognized bookmaker odds category. 
Winning horses were noted and similarly allocated. Observed and expected rates were 
calculated as before. The data was supplied by the Cape Racing Computer Division from 
10. November 1990 until 30 November 1991. This included 787 races in which 8 883 
runners participated. The analyses were the same as those used for the bookmaker odds 
investigation. The letter T was used as a suffix or prefix to the variables previously 
used, to indicate that tote odds were being considered. The results are shown in Tables 
3.6 to 3.8. 
There is a similarity in these results when compared with the bookmaker odds results, 
in that profits are possible in certain categories, but with no evident pattern to such 
profits. The main difference is that profit appears possible at the longer odds categories 
as well as the shorter ones. This is in contradiction of the favourite-longshot bias so 
evident in other studies. The odds categories reflected here do not take account of the 
18% take out on win bets (whether the bets win or lose). Taking the take out into 
account and affixing a 1 to the variable name to indicate the difference, we notice that 
almost all the profits disappear, table 3.9. 
Profit is still possible at prices around 2511 (after take out) on the tote. The reasons for 
these odd patterns of profit, and isolated categories returning profit, are not known. It 
should be noted that the tote tends to reflect the odds set by the bookmaker. Another 
point is that the tote odds indicate the return after tax and charges, whereas the 
bookmaker odds are shown before tax. The reasons for betting biases are investigated 
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DATE: 30-NOV-91, TIME: 18:06:42, SESSION: 1584, CAPE RACING 
C 0 L L A T I 0 N S R E P 0 R T 
W I N 
RACE 2, LOCATION 1 : CAPE TOWN PERFORMANCE SO 
RUNNERS ENTERED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
CURRENT RUNNERS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 B 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
RUNNER SELL-PAY 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
B 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
195.00 
140.00 
4.670.00 
3.557.00 
147.00 
749.00 
667.00 
103.00 
175.00 
967.00 
403.00 
37.00 
458.00 
428.00 
62.00 
95.00 
1.121.00 
485.00 
1.022.00 
TOTAL 
------------~-195:00 
140.00 
4,670.00 3 , s s 1 • o o-··----·------ ··---- --· ·- · · ·· -··· · ··· ··----- --·- -··· ------- ··--·--- ---
141. o o 
749.00 
667.oo 
103.00 
175.00 
967.00 
403.00 
37.00 
458.00 
428.00 
62.00 
95.00 
7,121.00 
485.00 
1.022.00 
-------------------- --------------------22.087.00 TOTAL 22.087.00 
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TP TWP TEXPP TOSS TTHEO TRAT 
0.6 1 3 0.333 0.625 1.875 
0.7 10 28 0.357 0.588 1.647 * 
0.8 1 6 0.167 0.556 3.333 
0.9 6 17 0.353 0.526 1.491 
1 15 25 0.600 -0.500 0.833 
1.1 14 34 0.412 0.476 1.156 
1.2 17 35 0.486 0.455 0.936 
1.3 12 24 0.500 0.435 0.870 
1.4 22 39 0.564 0.417 0.739 
1.5 2 22 0.091 0.400 4.400 * 
1.6 8 13 0.615 0.385 0.625 
1.7 4 20 0.200 0.370 1.852 
1.8 14 38 0.368 0.357 0.969 
2 50 103 0.485 0.333 0.687 * 
2.2 31 100 0.310 0.313 1.008 
2.5 45 108 0.417 0.286 0.686 * 
2.8 20 95 0.211 0.263 1.250 
3 28 132 0.212 0.250 1.179 
3.3 28 102 0.275 0.233 0.847 
3.5 33 144 0.229 0.222 0.970 
4 41 172 0.238 0.200 0.839 
4.5 26 182 0.143 0.182 1.273 
5 54 251 0.215 0.167 0.775 * 
6 62 344 0.180 0.143 0.793 * 
7 29 285 0.102 0.125 1.228 
8 39 417 0.094 0.111 1.188 
10 15 431 0.035 0.091 2.612 * 
12 13 348 0.037 0.077 2.059 * 
14 6 358 0.017 0.067 3.978 * 
16 32 455 0.070 0.059 0.836 
20 25 442 0.057 0.048 0.842 
25 21 561 0.037 0.038 1.027 
33 39 674 0.058 0.029 0.508 * 
50 23 1077 0.021 0.020 0.918 
100 1 1798 0.001 0.010 17.802 * 
Table 3.6 Theoretical and observed probabilities using tote odds 
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TPS TWPS TEXPS TSO BS TSTHEO TRATS 
0.75 18 54 0.333 0.571 1.714 * 
1.1 46 94 0.489 0.476 0.973 
1.4 36 85 0.424 0.417 0.984 
1.7 26 71 0.366 0.370 1.011 
2.1 81 203 0.399 0.323 0.808 * 
2.65 65 203 0.320 0.274 0.856 
3.15 56 234 0.239 0.241 1.007 
3.75 74 316 0.234 0.211 0.899 
4.5 26 182 0.143 0.182 1.273 
5 54 251 0.215 0.167 0.775 * 
6 62 344 0.180 0.143 0.793 * 
7 29 285 0.102 0.125 1.228 
8 39 417 0.094 0.111 1.188 
10 15 431 0.035 0.091 2.612 * 
12 13 348 0.037 0.077 2.059 * 
14 6 358 0.017 0.067 3.978 * 
16 32 455 0.070 0.059 0.836 
20 25 442 0.057 0.048 0.842 
.25 21 561 0.037 0.038 1.027 
33 39 674 0.058 0.029 0.508 * 
50 23 1077 0.021 0.020 0.918 
100 1 1798 0.001 0.010 17.802 * 
Table 3. 7 Theoretical and observed probabilities using tote odds and smoothing 
further in chapter four. 
All horses were also categorised by the ratio of their tote odds, (excluding charges) to 
their bookmaker odds (excluding tax). In general in Cape Town, tote odds are higher 
than bookmaker odds at bookmaker prices of 10/1 and below, and virtually always 
higher at bookmaker odds of greater than 10/1. The ratio ranged from about 0.5 to 20. 
A split of the data was made, so that horses with bookmaker odds of less than 10/ 1 were 
analysed separately. Horses were divided into four categories as follows. 
(1) Ratio 0.5 to 0.999 
(2) Ratio 1 to 1.499 
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TPE TWPE TEXPE TE OBS TETHEO TRATE 
0.75 18 54 0.333 0.571 1.714 * 
1.2 80 157 0.510 0.455 0.892 
1.65 28 93 0.301 0.377 1.253 
2.233 126 311 0.405 0.309 0.763 * 
3.15 109 473 0.230 0.241 ·1.046 
4 41 172 0.238 0.200 0.839 
4.5 26 182 0.143 0.182 1.273 
5 54 251 0.215 0.167 0.775 * 
6 62 344 0.180 0.143 0.793 * 
7 29 285 0.102 0.125 1.228 
8 39 417 0.094 0.111 1.188 
10 15 431 0.035 0.091 2.612 * 
12 13 348 0.037 0.077 2.059 * 
14 6 358 0.017 0.067 3.978 * 
16 32 455 0.070 0.059 0.836 
20 25 442 0.057 0.048 0.842 
-
25 21 561 0.037 0.038 1.027 
33 39 674 0.058 0.029 0.508 * 
50 23 1077 0.021 0.020 0.918 
100 1 1798 0.001 0.010 17.802 * 
Table 3.8 Theoretical and observed probabilities using tote odds and equal perception 
smoothing 
(3) Ratio 1.5 to 1.999 
( 4) Ratio 2 and greater. 
Winners and place? runners were similarly divided. The results are seen in tables 3.10 
to 3.13. Chi-squared tests of association were performed and all tests showed a highly 
significant relationship between the ratio category and the probability of winning or 
placing. The interpretation of this is simply that given that a horse has won or been 
placed, it is more likely that it was in ratio categories 1 or 2. An interpretation that 
implies winning probabilities are determined by ratio category is clearly illogical. Table 
3.13, where the expected value of one of the cells is less than 5 should be treated with 
caution. 
A further investigation was made to see whether profit could be made by backing certain 
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TP1 TWP TEXPP TOSS TIHE01 TRAT1 
0.312 1 3 0.333 0.762 2.287 
0.394 10 28 0.357 0.717 2.009 * 
0.476 1 6 0.167 0.678 4.065 * 
0.558 6 17 0.353 0.642 1.819 * 
0.64 15 25 0.600 0.610 1.016 
0.722 14 34 0.412 0.581 1.410 * 
0.804 17 35 0.486 0.554 1.141 
0.886 12 24 0.500 0.530 1.060 
0.968 22 39 0.564 0.508 0.901 
1.05 2 22 0.091 0.488 5.366 * 
1.132 8 13 0.615 0.469 0.762 
1.214 4 20 0.200 0.452 2.258 * 
1.296 14 38. 0.368 0.436 1.182 
1.46 50 103 0.485 0.407 0.837 
1.624 31 100 0.310 0.381 1.229 
1.87 45 108 0.417 0.348 0.836 
2.116 20 95 0.211 0.321 1.524 * 
2.28 28 132 0.212 0.305 1.437 * 
2.526 28 102 0.275 0.284 1.033 
2.69 . 33 144 0.229 0.271 1.183 
3.1 41 172 0.238 0.244 1.023 
3.51 26 182 0.143 0.222 1.552 * 
3.92 54 251 0.215 0.203 0.945 
4.74 62 344 0.180 0.174 0.967 
5.56 29 285 0.102 0.152 1.498 * 
6.38 39 417 0.094 0.136 1.449 * 
8.02 15 431 0.035 0.111 3.186 * 
9.66 13 348 0.037 0.094 2.511 * 
11.3 6 358 0.017 0.081 4.851 * 
12.94 32 455 0.070 0.072 1.020 
16.22 25 442 0.057 0.058 1.027 
20.32 21 561 0.037 0.047 1.253 
26.88 39 674 0.058 0.036 0.620 * 
40.82 23 1077 0.021 0.024 1.120 
81.82 1 1798 0.001 0.012 21.710 * 
Table 3.9 Theoretical and observed probabilities using tote adds with tax and charges 
deducted · 
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VARIABLE: ODDS <=10/1 
OBSERVED TABLE 
RATIO CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
WON 74 345 155 77 651 
LOST 362 1584 919 913 3778 
TOTAL 436 1929 1074 990 4429 
EXPECTED TABLE 
RATIO CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
WON 
LOST 
TOTAL 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 3 
TEST STATISTIC = 55.30 
64.09 
371.91 
436 
283.54 157.86 145.52 
1645.46 916.14 844.48 
1929 1074 990 
CHI-SQUARE (5%) = 7.81 
CHI-SQUARE (0.5%) = 17.73 
CONCLUSION: SIZE OF WIN/PLACE RATIO AND PROBABILITY OF WINNING 
ARE HIGHLY CORRELATED. 
651 
3778 
4429 
T~bl~ 3.10 Chi-Square test of association between ratio category and probability of 
wmmng where odds were less than or equal to 10/ 1 
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VARIABLE: ODDS<= 10/1 
OBSERVED TABLE 
RA.TIO CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
PLACED 239 974 435 248 1896 
UNPLACED 197 955 639 742 2533 
TOTAL 436 1929 1074 990 4429 
EXPECTED TABLE 
RATIO CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
PLACED 
UNPLACED 
TOTAL 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 3 
TEST STATISTIC = 202.05 
186.65 825.78 459.77 423.81 
249.35 1103.22 614.23 566.19 
436 1929 1074 990 
CHI-SQUARE (5%) = 7.81 
CHI-SQUARE (0.5%) = 17.73 
CONCLUSION: SIZE OF WIN/PLACE RATIO AND PROBABILITY OF PLACING 
ARE HIGHLY CORRELATED. 
1896 
2533 
4429 
Table 3.11 Chi-Square test of association between ratio category and probability of 
placing where the win odds were less than or equal to 10/ 1 
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VARIABLE: ODDS> 10/1 
OBSERVED TABLE 
RATIO CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
WON 6 19 23 33 81 
LOST 77 355 323 2905 3660 
TOTAL 83 374 346 2938 3741 
EXPECTED TABLE 
RATIO CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
WON 
LOST 
TOTAL 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 3 
TEST STATISTIC = 72.92 
1.80 8.10 7.49 63.61 
81.20 365.90 338.51 287 4.39 
83 374 346 2938 
CHI-SQUARE (5%) = 7.81 
CHI-SQUARE (0.5%) = 17.73 
CONCLUSION: SIZE OF WIN/PLACE RATIO AND PROBABILITY OF WINNING 
ARE HIGHLY CORRELATED. 
81 
3660 
3741 
Table 3.12 Chi-Square test of association between ratio category and probability of 
winning where the odds are greater than 10/ 1 
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VARIABLE: ODDS > 10/1 
OBSERVED TABLE 
RATIO CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
PLACED 13 97 74 223 407 
UNPLACED 70 277 272 2715 3334 
TOTAL 83 374 346 2938 3741 
EXPECTED TABLE 
RATIO CATEGORY 
1 2 3 4 TOTAL 
PLACED 
UNPLACED 
TOTAL 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 3 
TEST STATISTIC = 161.59 
9.03 40.69 37.64 319.64 
73.97 333.31 308.36 2618.36 
83 374 346 2938 
CHI-SQUARE (5%) = 7,81 
CHI-SQUARE (0.5%) = 17.73 
CONCLUSION: SIZE OF WIN/PLACE RATIO AND PROBABILITY OF PLACING 
ARE HIGHLY CORRELATED. 
407 
3334 
3741 
Table 3.13 Chi-Square test of association between ratio· category and probability of 
placing where the win odds are greater than 10/1 
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horses based on their ratio category. Where bookmaker odds were less than 10/ 1, a loss 
of approximately 20% was made in categories 1 and 2 for both bookmaker and tote 
odds, after adjusting for charges and tax. This is about what is expectedfrom betting at 
random. Where bookmaker odds were greater than 10/1, a profit of 46% and 15.5% was 
made in category 1 for bookmaker odds and tote odds respectively, after all charges. 
This was mainly owing to the presence of three horses winning at bookmaker odds of 
20/ 1, out of only 6 winners. These numbers are small and should be interpreted with 
caution. In category 2, losses of 18% and 17% were made by bookmaker odds and tote 
odds respective! y. 
A slightly more sophisticated approach to testing weak efficiency is to introduce one or 
two other elementary factors by which to group horses. The factor used thus far has 
been the odds. We now consider a specific group of horses, namely the favourite in each 
race. The second factor we are concerned with is therefore postion in the betting, and 
we shall consider only those which are first. We therefore first examine the return to 
favourites grouped by their SP's. Other factors will then be introduced to further 
subdivide the data. The factors which we considered might have an influence on the 
return to betting on favourites were; 
a) the course 
b) the distance 
c) the going 
d) the number of the race 
e) the size of the field. 
If any of these factors consistently affect the outcomes of races enough, profit may be 
possible, even though betting on all favourites leads to losses. The reasons these factors 
were considered are as follows. Firstly, note that any negative factor affecting most of 
the horses in a race makes it more likely the the result willbe an upset (defeat of the 
favourite). This is because it is likely that the favourite will be one of the majority of 
the horses affected. Horses race throughout the year and are exposed to wet conditions· 
during the minority of meetings. Most horses do not adapt to such conditions when they 
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do occur. Therefore we might expect favourites to fare relatively poorly on wet days 
since they are likely to be one of the many, (but not all), horses affected by the 
conditions. 
A similar line of logic applies to the course the race meeting is held at. Some courses 
are more difficult for most, (but not all), horses to negotiate and we might expect a 
greater number of upset results at such courses. The distance of the race is possibly only 
important with regard to whether the race is being run on the straight course (sprints) 
or the turn (distance). Races around the turn where jockeyship will count more are more 
liable to upsets than straight sprints where the jockey simply needs to sit on the horse 
and keep it on a straight path. 
The number of the race on the card is thought to affect the return to favourites, because 
of the tendency of bettors to bet proportionally less on favourites as ·the day progresses. 
The reasons for this will be examined in detail in chapter three, but the obvious one is 
that collectively bettors have lost 18% (the take out) of their stakes at any time, while 
absolutely the amount grows with each race. Bettors therefore need to back horses at 
ever lengthening odds in order to just break even for the day. The f~vourites, (horses 
with the shortest odds in the race) are thus avoided more and more as the day 
progresses. The size of the field influences results in that there may be inteference to 
some of the runners in larger fields. Also it is intuitive that it is easier for a favourite 
to beat 5 horses than 15. 
The results of the analyses are shown in Tables 3.14 to 3.21. The tote return excludes 
the original stake. The bookie return has been adjusted for 10 % tax on winnings. This 
makes the two returns comparable since the tote return is calculated from actual tote 
returns from which 18 % take out has been deducted. The average winning SP is 
calculated using the tote return. The average SP is calculated using the total bookie odds 
for all favourites (winners or not). 
·. 
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OVERALL ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES 
RACES 1603 
WINNERS 568 
% WINNERS 35.43 
TOTE RETURN 793.3 
BOOKIE RETURN 797.62 
LOSING BETS 1035 
PROFIT OR LOSS -241.7 
% PORL -15.08 
-
AVERAGE WINNING SP 1.40 
AVERAGE SP 1.66 
PLACES 1067 
% PLACES 66.56 
TOTE RETURN 382.4 
LOSING BETS 536 
PROFIT OR LOSS -153.6 
% PORL -9.58 
1 anal sis of favountes Table 3.14 Overal y 
The observed winning percentage for favourites is 35.43% which is in line with the 
commonly held belief that one third of favourites win. The loss incurred by backing all 
favourites is 15.08% which is slightly better than the expected loss of 18% which should 
result by backing at random. This result is significant at the 1 % significance level using 
a two sided alternative. Following from this, it was noted that virtually all subdivided 
categories of favourites also performed significantly (at either the 1 % level or stronger) 
3-25 
. 
better than betting at random. As The average price for favourites was 1.66 to 1 or 
almost 17/10 in bookmakers terms. The average price of winning favourites is somewhat 
lower at 14/10. The percentage of favourites placed was 66.56, which is also about that 
expected. Backing all favourites to place, yielded a loss of only 9.58%. 
Examining table 3.15 we note the percentage winners decrease with increasing odds 
which is expected. We may compare the observed percentage of winners in each 
category with that expected on the basis of the average winning odds in the category. In 
the first category the actual winning percentage is 58.16% while the expected percentage 
is 59 .17 % . The actual and expected percentages for the other three categories are, 41. 88 
(A) and 44.84 (E), 28.37 (A) and 37.45 (E), 24.30 (A) and 30.58 (E) respectively. The 
larger these differences, the larger is likely to be the loss incurred by betting on 
favourites in the specific odds category. Thus we note the loss for category one is 1. 6 % , 
while for category three, the loss is 24.33%. This means bettors are avoiding short 
priced favourites and showing a preference for longer priced favourites. This confirms 
the well known favourite-longshot bias even when examination is restricted to favourites. 
The comparison of returns from bookmakers and the tote shows that short priced 
favourites are backed to a larger extent with the bookmakers than the tote, while the 
reverse is true of long priced favourites. The percentage of placed favourites decreases 
from category 1 through 4 which is expected. Note that a small profit was made by 
backing very short priced favourites for a place. This is because the favourite-longshot 
bias operates more strongly in the place pool, since the probabilities of winning money 
are high while the absolute returns are very low, and bettors avoid such bets. The 
positive return of almost 1 % was achieved in about 2 years, and therefore such a route 
to profit does not seem practical. 
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ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES BY 
ODDS 
< 1/1 · 11/10 TO 16/10 TO 22/10 TO 
15/10 2/1 5/1 
RACES 294 351 423 535 
WINNERS 171 147 120 130 
% WINNERS 58.16 41.88 28.37 24.30 
TOTE RETURN 118.3 180.2 200.1 294.7 
BOOKIE RETURN 103.36 169.92 198.00 326.34 
LOSING BETS 123 204 303 405 
PROFIT OR LOSS -4.7 -23.8 -102.9 -110.3 
% PORL -1.60 -6.78 -24.33 -20.62 
AVERAGE SP 0.62 1.17 1.64 2.58 
AVERAGE WINNING SP 0.69 1.23 1.67 -2.27 
PLACES 248 257 260 302 
% PLACES 84.35 73.22 61.47 56.45 
TOTE RETURN 48.6 79.6 95 159.2 
LOSING BETS 46 94 163 233 
PROFIT OR LOSS 2.6 -14.4 -68 -73.8 
% PORL 0.88 -4.10 -16.08 -13.79 
Table 3.15 Anal sis ot tavountes b y y odds cate o g ry 
Examining table 3.16 we note little difference in returns to favourites at Milnerton and 
Kenilworth. This is what was expected since there is no difference between the courses. 
The differences between these two courses and Durban ville, is however, the opposite of 
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what was expected. Given that Durbanville is a more difficult track to run and ride at, 
(very sharp turns), we expected to find a lower return to favourite betting. The returns 
for win and place betting are better than at both other courses. The reason for this seems 
to be that the public and the bookmakers are already under the impression that 
Durbanville is a course where more upsets occur than usual. This is reflected in the 
average SP, as well as average winning SP figures. In both cases these are higher at 
Durbanville than the other courses. The public are thus biased even more against betting 
on favourites at Durbanville. 
ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES BY 
·couRsE 
MILNER TON KENILWORTH DURBANVILLE 
RACES 595 
.. 
803 205 
WINNERS 203 293 72 
% WINNERS 34.12 36.49 35.12 
TOTE RETURN 284.9 385.2 123.2 
BOOKIE RETURN 287.51 389.68 120.42 
LOSING BETS 392 510 133 
PROFIT OR LOSS -107.1 -124.8 -9.8 
% PORL -18.00 -15.54 -4.78 
AVERAGE SP 1.68 1.60 1.85 
A VERA GE WINNING 1.40 1.31 1.71 
SP 
PLACES 370 553 144 
% PLACES 62.18 68.87 70.24 
TOTE RETURN 130.3 192.4 59.7 
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LOSING BETS 225 250 61 
PROFIT OR LOSS -94.7 -57.6 -1.3 
% PORL -15.92 -7.17 -0.63 
Table 3.16 Analysis of favountes by course 
A similar scenario exists .when we differentiate between good and and heavy (wet) going. 
We expected a higher return to favourites when the going was good, while the return to 
win betting is better when the going is heavy. Betting for a place is more profitable 
when the going is good. The reason again, is that bettors and bookmakers alike also 
perceive that favourites will have a more difficult time in the rain. Therefore the average 
SP for such favourites was 1.91 to 1, whereas for favourites on good going it was 1.57 
to 1. The average winning· SP's show similar differences. The results show that the 
difference between the winning percentages is small, and there is therefore no reason to 
price favourites differently given a difference in weather. 
ANALYSIS OF.FAVOURITES BY GOING 
GOOD WET 
RACES 1158 445 
WINNERS 416 152 
% WINNERS 35.92 34.16 
TOTE RETURN 549.2 244.1 
BOOKIE RETURN 540.58 257.04 
LOSING BETS 742 293 
PROFIT OR LOSS -192.8 -48.9 
% PORL -.16.65 -10.99 
AVERAGE SP 1.57 1.91 
AVERAGE WINNING SP 1.32 1.61 
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PLACES 797 270 
% PLACES 68.83 60.67 
TOTE RETURN 274.2 108.2 
LOSING BETS 361 175 
PROFIT OR LOSS -86.8 -66.8 
% PORL -7.50 -15.01 
Table 3.17 Analysis of favountes by the state of the gomg 
The analysis of favourites by distance shows results that were expected. The percentage 
of favourites winning, is higher down the straight, as are the return to win and place 
betting. The public and bookmakers also seem aware of this, as the average SP for tum 
races is higher than for straight races. 
ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES BY DISTANCE 
TURN STRAIGHT 
RACES 939 664 
WINNERS 308 260 
% WINNERS 32.80 39.16 
TOTE RETURN . 454.4 338.9 
BOOKIE RETURN 444.82 352.80 
LOSING BETS 631 404 
PROFIT OR LOSS -176.6 -65.1 
% PORL -18.81 -9.80 
AVERAGE SP 1.72 1.58 
A VERA GE WINNING SP 1.48 1.30 
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PLACES 606 461 
% PLACES 64.54 69.43 
TOTE RETURN 222.9 159.5 
LOSING BETS 333 203 
PROFIT OR LOSS -110.1 -43.5 
% PORL -11.73 -6.55 
. Table 3.18 Analysis of favountes by distance of the race 
The analysis of favourites by race number, gives some strange results, in that there 
appears no pattern of betting through the afternoon. The percentages of favourites 
winning and placing also show no consistency which is what was expected (for the first 
4 races at least). A profit was made, betting on all favourites in first races, as well as 
betting for places on favourites in the sixth and ninth races. Further analysis and 
discussion on this topic can be found in section 4.2. 
ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES BY RACE NUMBER 
ONE TWO THREE 
RACES 201 ' 200 200 
WINNERS 92 64 76 
% WINNERS 45.77 32.00 38.00 
TOTE RETURN 114.l 85.7 106.3 
BOOKIE RETURN 128.03 86.22 105.30 
LOSING BETS 109 136 124 
% PORL 2.54 -25.15 -8.85 
AVERAGE SP 1.58 1.55 1.68 
AVERAGE WINNING SP 1.24 1.34 1.40 
.. 
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PLACES 149 . 152 135 
% PLACES 74.13 76.00 67.50 
TOTE RETURN 
-
41.5 45.5 49.6 
LOSING BETS 52 48 65 
PROFIT OR LOSS -10.5 -2.5 -15.4 
% PORL -5.22 -1.25 -7.70 
Table 3.19 Analysis of favountes by race number 
ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES BY RACE NUMBER 
FOUR FIVE SIX 
RACES 199 199 199 
WINNERS 62 55 79 
% WINNERS 31.16 27.64 39.70 
; 
TOTE RETURN . 77.3 73.1 113.2 
BOOKIE RETURN 75.72 83.57 110.75 
LOSING BETS 137 144 120 
PROFIT OR LOSS -59.7 -70.9 -6.8 
% PORL -30.00 -35.63 -3.42 
AVERAGE SP 1.70 1.81 1.70 
A VERA GE WINNING SP 1,.25 1.33 1.43 
PLACES 110 125 150 
% PLACES 55.28 62.81 75.38 
TOTE RETURN 38.7 52.8 59·.8 
LOSING BETS 89 74 49 
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PROFIT OR LOSS -50.3 -21.2 10.8 
% PORL -25.28 . -10.65 5.43 
Table 3.19 Anal SIS of tavountes b y y race number 
ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES BY RACE NUMBER 
SEVEN EIGHT NINE 
RACES 199 150 56 
WINNERS 65 55 20 
% WINNERS 32.66 36.67 35.71 
TOTE RETURN 98.5 93.7 31.4 
BOOKIE RETURN 93.10 81.99 32.95 
LOSING BETS 134 95 36 
PROFIT OR LOSS -35.5 -1.3 -4.6 
% PORL -17.84 -0.87 -8.21 
AVERAGE SP 1.65 1.61 1.54 
AVERAGE WINNING SP 1.52 1.70 1.57 
PLACES 112 94 40 
% PLACES 56.28 62.67 71.43 
TOTE RETURN 39.9 36.6 18 
LOSING BETS 87 56 16 
PROFIT OR LOSS -47.1 -19.4 2 
% PORL -23.67 -12.93 3.57 
able 3.1~ Anal SIS ot tavountes b y y race number 
The analysis of favourites by class is shown in Table 3.20 and a reproduction of similar 
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analysis from Kreel (1988) is shown in Table 3.22. A profit was made, betting on all 
favourites in Juvenile races. This might have been expected, because in such races there 
is little or no exposed track form for any of the runners. The favourite is often the horse 
with the most potential. This information is usually inside information and not known 
by the public until shortly before the off when the particular horse is backed to favourite 
by its connections. This generally results in public betting on the horse which leads to 
a very short priced favourite. Note the average winning SP of Juvenile favourites is the 
lowest of all the classes at about 11/ 10. Owing to the high percentage of such favourites 
that win, however, profit appears possible. 
The Classic and A Division categories resulted in a small loss and no loss respectively. 
This is probably because the horses competing in such events are high quality, and 
usually have a good deal of consistent exposed form on the track. These races are 
therefore easier to analyse and once a favourite has been determined, it is likely to do 
well, barring any mishaps. Profit was also made by betting on Classic favourites for a 
place. Note that the sample of Classic races is small and that the results in general, 
differ somewhat from the similar study undertaken four years ago. 
ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES BY 
CLASS 
MAIDEN NOVICE PROGRESS B DIVISION 
RACES 470 359 337 132 
WINNERS 177 104 111 33 
% WINNERS 37.66 28.97 32.94 25.00 
TOTE RETURN 245.7 155.5 161.8 61.1 
BOOKIE RETURN 244.70 154.80 165.06 57.66 
LOSING BETS 293 255 226 99 
PROFIT. OR LOSS -47.3 -99.5 -64.2 -37.9 
% PORL -10.06 -27.72 -19.05 -28.71 
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AVERAGE SP 1.63 1.72 1.83 1.76 
AVERAGE WINNING SP 1.39 1.50 1.46 1.85 
PLACES 338 212 228 53 
% PLACES 71.91 59.05 67.66 40.15 
TOTE RETURN 99.5 77.5 89.2 49.2 
LOSING BETS 132 147 109 79 
PROFIT OR LOSS -32.5 -69.5 -19.8 -29.8 
% PORL -6.91 -19.36 -5.88 -22.58 
Table 3.20 Analysis of favountes by class of race 
ANALYSIS OF 
FAVOURITES BY CLASS 
A DIVISION CLASSIC JUVENILE 
RACES 100 54 151 
WINNERS 44 24 75 
% WINNERS 44.00 44.44 49.67 
TOTE RETURN 56 27.6 85.6 
BOOKIE RETURN 55.62 25.49 94.29 
LOSING BETS 56 30 76 
PROFIT OR LOSS 0 -2.4 9.6 
% PORL 0.00 -4.44 6.36 
AVERAGE SP 1.45 1.24 1.46 
A VERA GE WINNING SP 1.27 1.15 1.14 
PLACES 75 45 116 
• 
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% PLACES 75.00 83.33 76.82 
TOTE RETURN 24.5 12.9 29.6 
LOSING BETS 25 9 35 
PROFIT OR LOSS -0.5 3.9 -5.4 
% PORL -0.50 7.22 -3.58 
able 3. LU Anal sis ot tavountes b y y class ot race 
Analysis of favourites by field size, (table 3.21) shows results that were not expected. 
The winning percentage increases with increasing field size. This, together with the 
increasing average SP of favourites with increasing field size, leads to a profit of 2.52 % 
by backing favourites in large fields. ~imilar results are obtained for place betting, and 
a small profit is made betting on favourites for a place in large fields. 
ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES BY FIELD SIZE 
--4-9 10 - 14 15 - 20 
RACES 533 808 262 
WINNERS 173 295 100 
% WINNERS 32.46 36.51 38.17 
TOTE RETURN 182.7 442 168.6 
BOOKIE RETURN 191.86 439.02 166.74 
LOSING BETS 360 513 162 
PROFIT OR LOSS -177.3 -71 6.6 
% PORL -33.26 -8.79 2.52 
AVERAGE SP 1.45 1.71 1.95 
A VERA GE Wim:p:NG SP 1.06 1.50 1.69 
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PLACES 354 521 192 
% PLACES 66.42 64.48 73.28 
TOTE RETURN 98.1 211.4 72.9 
LOSING BETS 179 287 70 
PROFIT OR LOSS -80.9 -75.6 2.9 
% PORL -15.18 -9.36 1.11 
Table 3.21 Analysis of favountes by field size 
The following are categories where profit was made; (since a loss was not made in A 
Division races, its results are included here) 
Win Betting Category Profit 
Race Number One 2.54% 
Class A Division 0.00% 
Class Juvenile 6.36% 
Field Size 15-20 2.52% 
Place Betting Category Profit 
Odds < 1/1 0.88% 
Race Number Six 5.43% 
Race Number Nine 3.57% 
Class Classic 7.22% 
Field Size 15-20 1.11% 
The above profits suggested further investigation. In addition, the two areas where profit 
was shown possible in Kreel, (1988) namely Maiden favourites at 2/1 or better, as well 
as Juvenile favourites at less than 1/1 were also considered for further investigation. The 
results are shown in Table 3.23. 
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ANALYSIS OF FAVOURITES BY TWO 
FACTORS 
1 
RACES 31 
WINNERS 16 
% WINNERS 51.61 
TOTE RETURN 27.3 
BOOKIE RETURN 26.50 
LOSING BETS 15 
PROFIT OR LOSS 12.3 
% PORL 39.68 
AVERAGE SP 2.02 
AVERAGE WINNING SP 1.71 
PLACES 22 
% PLACES 70.97 
TOTE RETURN 7.7 
LOSING BETS 9 
PROFIT OR LOSS -1.3 
% PORL -4.19 
Table 3.23 Analysis of favountes by two factors 
Categories: 
1) = Class Juvenile, .Field Size 15-20 
2) = Race Number One, Field Size 15-20 
3) = Class Maiden, Odds > 2/1 
4) Class Juvenile, Odds < 111 
2 3 4 
201 133 44 
91 39 26 
45.27 29.32 59.09 
116.1 92.1 17.3 
128.00 96.60 15.50 
110 94 18 
6.1 -1.9 -0.7 
3.03 -1.43 -1.59 
1.58 2.56 0.61 
1.28 2.36 0.67 
148 90 35 
73.63 67.67 79.55 
42 39.2 8.4 
53 43 9 
-11 -3.8 -0.6 
-5.47 -2.86 -1.36 
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The analysis shows a substantial profit is made through backing Juvenile favourites in 
large fields. The number of races that had such favourites, was however small at only 
31. This result is significant at the 1 % level of significance. Betting on favourites in race 
number one in large fields also yielded a profit of just over 3 % , which is significant at 
the 10 % level. 
An analysis of Juvenile favourites in race one was not made, because over 90% of the 
time, race one was a Juvenile event. Further analysis of A Division races was not 
pursued as splitting this category further, resulted in very small numbers of races. 
Analysis was made of two categories which yielded profits in a previous investigation. 
Unfortunately both of these categories now yielded small loses. Neither of these losses 
were statistically different from a 0% return at the 5% level of significance . 
.. 
Further examination of returns to place betting was not carried out. The two race 
numbers which yielded profit, appeared to have no logical basis and were discounted as 
anomolies. Combining any of the other three categories and subdividing the data, 
resulted in the number of races becoming too small too use. 
An interesting test of weak efficiency which also has implications for strong efficiency, 
is an examination of the ratio of win payoffs to place payoffs, approximately 30 minutes 
before the off of the race. This is when the odds are publicly displayed by the tote for 
the first time. About 10% to 20% of the final pools have been bet at that time. Our 
hypothesis is that win betting, prior to the display of the odds, is more indicative of 
winning probabilities than place betting. The data used were collected by hand from the 
tote display board at the racetrack, and included 59 races and 678 horses. Ratios of win 
to place payoffs were calculated and split somewhat arbitrarily into 2 categories, namely 
where the ratio was between 0.5 and 1.999, and where the ratio was greater than or 
equal to 2. The results are shown in Table 3.24. They may be interpreted as supporting 
our hypothesis. Owing to the limited data, no examination of returns was made. 
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VARIABLE: WIN/PLACE RATIO 
OBSERVED TABLE 
FINISHING POSITION 
CATEGORY 
1 2 
0.5 - 1.999 24 22 
2 upwards 35 37 
TOTAL 59 59 
EXPECTED TABLE 
FINISHING POSITION 
1 2 
0.5 -1.999 16.10 16.10 
2 upwards 42.90 42.90 
TOTAL 59 59 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 3 
TEST STATISTIC = 18.38 
3 UNPLACED TOTAL 
24 115 185 
35 386 493 
59 501 678 
3 UNPLACED TOTAL 
16.10 136.70 185 
42.90 364.30 493 
59 501 678 
CHI-SQUARE (5%} = 7.81 
CHI-SQUARE (0.5%} = 17.73 
CONCLUSION: SIZE OF WIN/PLACE RATIO AND PROBABILITY OF PLACING 
ARE HIGHLY CORRELATED. 
Table 3.24 Chi-Square test of association between the ratio of the win to place odds at 
the opening of betting, and the probability of winning . 
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3.2 Semi-Strong Efficiency 
The purpose of all tests of semi-strong efficiency is to attempt to detect areas of the 
betting market, which may be exploited for profit, using subjective publicly available 
information. Before any tests are done, it is proposed that this is the area of information 
that is least likely to yield any opportunity for profit. The reason for this is that such 
information is the starting point of any public investigation into systematic betting 
techniques. The prospective punter would first ask himself, " How good is the 
information provided by this tipster? " rather than, " What is the true probability of, a 
horse at odds of 2/1, winning? " which is a question relating to weak efficiency. 
In respect of weak efficiency and semi-strong efficiency, the betting market and the stock 
market present the opportunity to examine the opposite approaches taken by investors 
in these markets. In the betting market, fundamental information, such as tips offered 
by tipsters, (assuming such tips to be an assimilation of the majority of publicly available 
fundamental information) is more easily understood, analysed and acted upon than 
elementary technical information, such as the percentage.of horses at odds of 2/1 that 
have won in the last year (say). 
This scenario is the opposite of that existing in the stock market, where it is easier to 
understand and act upon technical buy/sell information, such as an observation that the 
previous days volume traded in a particular share was 5 times greater than an average 
of the past 3 weeks trade in that share, than it is to interpret and act upon stockbrokers 
reports on companies. Bottom line advice (tips) are given along with detailed analysis 
of companies, and this is obviously easy to understand, but it is still far more difficult 
to quantify in investment terms than a tip on a horserace. Note also that experts on the 
stock market often base their advice on technical information whereas in the betting 
market this is not the case. 
In some sense, therefore, publicly available information offered by experts in the betting 
market is equivalent to the technical (price/volume etc.) information available in the 
stock market, since they may both be the starting point for investment decisions within 
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their particular markets. Given this and the above comments, as well as the fact that 
much research has shown stock markets to be weakly efficient, it is highly likely that the 
betting market is semi-strongly efficient. Even if inefficiencies could be detected, it is 
unlikely that they could be exploited because of the easy access of the information that 
would be used for such exploitation. 
We start with an analysis of newspaper tipsters. Of all the information available to the 
public, that obtained from the newspaper is the cheapest, most easily accessible and 
possibly the easiest to understand. Research has shown that the most read page of a 
newspaper is its racing page. How do these newspaper tipsters perform relative to a 
random betting system, and a system that simply bets on the favourite in each race? Is 
the market efficient with respect to the tips contained in the various newspapers racing 
pages? 
These questions can be answered after some simple (but tedious) analysis of the tipsters 
selections and the race results. The data used were the tips contained in the racing pages 
of the Argus and. the Cape Times. The Cape Argus tipsters were Derek Wilsnagh, 
Graham Potter and Barry Hopwood, while the Cape Times tipsters wrote under the pen 
names Pioneer, Intuition, Recondite and Sceptre. The newspaper pages (which were used 
for various purposes) were collected from 17 December 1990 until 8 December 1991. 
. Every first selection of each tipster was noted and a Rl win bet was placed on all such 
selections. It was then noted whether the horse won or not. If a horse tipped did win, 
the bookmaker odds at the end of the betting period as reflected in the Computaform 
results, were used to calculate the return to the tipster. These odds are the official SP's. 
The results are shown in Table 3.25. Note that because each tipster did not give 
selections every week, the number of selections differs between tipsters. 
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NEWSPAPER TIPSTERS 
CAPE TIMES 
PIONEER INTUITION RECONDITE SCEPTRE 
RACES 718 679 583 745 
WINNERS 231 203 172 196 
% WINNERS 32.17 29.90 29.50 26.31 
RETURN 318.4 . 288.5 249.8 323.9 
LOSING BETS 487 476 411 549 
PROFIT OR LOSS -168.6 -187.5 -161.2 -225.1 
-· 
% PORL -23.48 -27.61 -27.65 -30.21 
CAPE ARGUS 
WILSNAGH POTTER HOPWOOD 
RACES 511 429 466 
WINNERS 182 147 145 
% WINNERS 35.62 34.27 31.12 
RETURN 216 178 197.3 
LOSING BETS 329 282 321 
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PROFIT OR -113 -104 -123.7 
(LOSS) 
% P OR (L) -22.11 -24.24 -26.55 
Table 3.25 Returns and wmnmg percentages of newspaper tlpsters 
Notably, none of the tipsters show a profit using the system of betting a level stake on 
their first selections for a win. In addition, all the tipsters showed significantly (at 5 % 
or stricter) larger losses than the expected loss of 18 % , which being the take out from 
the win pool, results from random betting. The Cape Argus tipsters seem to perform 
consistently better than those of the Cape Times. Analysis of betting on the favourite in 
each race, shows that such a system yields a loss of only 15 % . The results obtained here 
are similar to those of industry surveys as well as other local academic literature~ The 
results of a similar analysis done by Lipshitz (1986) show losses, resulting from betting 
Rl on all newspaper tips, of between 15% and 30%. A tipsters competition in a 
magazine called Racing Digest, show the losses incurred by each tipster range from 15 % 
to 50% over a similar period. 
The other sources of subjective racing information are the Computaform, Winning Form 
and the official Race Card. It is not the job of the Race Card to offer subjective 
information, but rather to inform the public of the program on offer for the day. None 
the less, a short comment is given on the expected performance of each horse, and a 
selection as to the winner and placed horses is also made. The business of the other two 
publications is to offer subjective information so that it can be used for profitable ends. 
The Race Card is about twice as expensive as a newspaper, while the other publications 
are approximately twice as expensive as the Race Card. The Computaform offers two 
first selections, one being called the Compataform selection, and the other called the 
speed rating selection. An analysis identical to that used for the newspapers was used for 
the two Computaform tips, the Winning Form selection and the Race Card selection. 
Computaform and Winning Form data was examined from 2 June 1990 until 23 
November 1991. The Race Card was examined over the same period as the newspapers. 
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The results are shown in Table 3.26. 
TIPPING GUIDES 
COMPUTAFORM SPEED WINNING RACE 
RATING FORM CARD 
RACES 916 910 1035 723 
WINNERS 294 206 252 193 
% WINNERS 32.10 22.64 24.35 26.69 
RETURN 319.7 274.5 509.2 301.1 
LOSING BETS 622 704 783 530 
PROFIT OR LOSS -302.3 -429.5 -273.8 -228.9 
% PORL -33.00 -47.20 -26.45 -31.66 
Table 3.26 Returns and wmnin gp g pp g g ercenta es of ti in uide ti s p 
Again we note that none of the tipping guides offer a profit to a bettor backing each of 
their selections with a level stake. The difference between their returns and the average 
expected return is significant at the 1 % level. These publications in fact perform more 
poorly than the newspapers. Why should the more expensive, supposedly more 
knowledgeable publications fair worse than the newpapers, and in turn, why should the 
newspaper tipsters, who are full time journalists, perform worse than the public? 
Firstly, the tipping guides are published 3 or 4 days prior to any race meeting. Thus 
their selections are made earlier than the newspapers (24 hours prior) and the public, 
who make final decisions minutes prior to individual races. The advantage the public has 
over the tipsters is that they can observe the weather conditions, the condition of the 
horses and the betting market which may reflect inside information. Such inside 
information is usually only released into the market in the last minutes of the betting 
period. 
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The second problem is that the tipsters are forced to make a selection regarding every 
horserace, whereas they might only bet on l or 2 horses at any meeting. Bettors, of 
course, bet only when they want to. The Computaform publish a best bet for the day 
based on the Computaform rating as well as a be~t bet based on speed rating. If they 
believe that their is nothing worth betting on, they state that there is no best bet for the 
day. Examining such tips is certainly a more suitable test of semi-strong efficiency. 
Winning Form publish four best bets for any meeting, regardless of how many races are 
on the card. They seem to force a second selection, i.e. choosing the most likely winners 
from the tips already given. Examining such bets still yields a more suitable test of semi-
strong efficiency than those already performed. Such tips were examined over the same 
period as before, for each publication, and the results are shown in Table 3.27. 
TIPPING GUIDES BEST BETS 
COMPUTAFORM SPEED RA TING WINNING 
FORM 
RACES 118 115 510 
WINNERS 51 39 128 
% WINNERS 43.22 33.91 25.10 
RETURN 52.3 51.9 247.2 
LOSING BETS 67 76 382 
PROFIT OR LOSS -14.7 -24.1 -134.8 
% P ORL -12.46 -20.96 -26.43 
able 3.2/ returns and wmmn gp ercenta es of best bet ti s of the ti m g p pp g g mdes 
Firstly, note that the Computaform data set here is relatively small, so the results must 
be interpreted with some caution. The t-test on this data set shows a significant 
difference at the 5 % level, which suggests that the Computaform Best Bet selections 
perform better than a random betting system. Profit is still not possible and therefore the 
market is efficient with respect to subjective public information. The Winning Form best 
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bets perform almost as poorly as the Winning Form selections, probably because of the 
compulsory nature of announcing their best bets as well as the fact that they publish four 
best bets instead of just one. The difference in return to these bets is significantly (1 % 
level) different from the average. 
Figlewski noted that subjective information (i.e tips from newspapers or tipping guides) 
could not be used to enhance the accuracy of the odds as a predictor of race results. We 
have shown similar results with respect to our local betting market and publicly available 
subjective information. This confirms Figlewski's observation that in a market where 
pricing is taking place, the determined price will include the market participants views 
of subjective information efficiently. This means that no profit can be made by using 
tipsters' selections. 
3.3 Strong Efficiency 
The importance of strongly efficient markets is well documented and has been discussed 
in length earlier in this work. The advantage that this work has over previous research 
is that actual bookmaker data was used as opposed to the usual average bookmaker 
prices that abound in other studies. Before proceeding to the test using bookmaker data, 
a test was performed using tote data, although this data source was very limited. The 
data consisted of tote odds 30 minutes before the off of the race as well as the final tote 
odds for each runner. The data incorporated 59 races and 650 horses. 
The ratio of final odds to opening odds was calculated for all runners. The data was then 
divided into one of three categories depending on this ratio. Category 1 includes horses 
that were backed (ratio = 0.5 to 0.999), category 2 horses that drifted (ratio = 1 to 
1. 999) and category 3 horses that drifted a lot (ratio = 2 to 9). The results are shown 
in Table 3.28. 
Examination of table 3. 28 reveals a significant relationship between finishing position 
and ratio category. In overall terms we see that more horses were placed than expected, 
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·. 
VARIABLE: WIN/OPEN RATIO 
OBSERVED TABLE 
FINISHING POSITION 
CATEGORY 
1 2 
0.5 - 0.999 23 35 
1 - 1.999 32 13 
2-9 4 11 
TOTAL 59 59 
EXPECTED TABLE 
FINISHING POSITION 
CATEGORY 
1 2 
0.5 - 0.999 26.05 26.05 
1 - 1.999 22.33 22.33 
2-9 10.62 10.62 
TOTAL 59 59 
DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 6 
TEST STATISTIC = 20.10 
3 UNPLACED TOTAL 
32 197 287 
17 184 246 
9 93 117 
58 474 650 
3 UNPLACED TOTAL 
25.61 209.29 287 
21.95 179.39 246 
10.44 85.32 117 
58 474 650. 
CHI-SQUARE (5%) = 12.59 
CHI-SQUARE (0.5%) = 18.85 
CONCLUSION: SIZE OF WIN/OPEN RATIO AND PROBABILITY OF PLACING 
ARE HIGHLY CORRELATED. 
Table 3.28 Chi-Square test of association between the ratio of the final odds to the 
opening odds, and the probability of winning 
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when these horses were backed, whereas more horses were unplaced then expected when 
such horses drifted a lot in the betting. This evidence is clearly not conclusive in any 
direction owing to the small numbers used. 
The main test of strong efficiency is conducted along the lines of the tests of Bird and 
Mccrae (1987). As pointed out, their tests suffered from the problem of using average 
prices instead of actual bets laid. This problem was solved for this work by obtaining 
a bookmaker's actual betting sheets. The bookmaker's clerk records all bets for a 
particular race, horse by horse using columns on the page. More often than not it was 
found that only 25 % to 50% of the field attracted any bets at all, while usually only 4 
or 5 runners (at most) in any race attracted any significant support. Significant support 
is a somewhat arbitrary term, but for the purposes of this work, we define it to mean 
either, that in excess of Rl 000, or more than 10 individual bets were placed on the 
horse considered. Only horses attracting such support were investigated further. 
This eliminated the problem of apparent large drifts in the odds. For example, the 
Computaform may report the opening betting on a horse to be 3/ 1, and its closing odds 
to be 10/ 1. On examination of the bookmaker's betting sheet, however, horses with such 
patterns inevitably showed no betting activity. In addition it may be found that if there 
was any betting activity, it first occured at 7/1 and then later at 1 O/ l. This is an example 
of a horse drifting in the betting, but not to the extent that would be assumed from the 
Computaform data. 
The data covered 1 442 races from 2 Aug 1989 to 28 December 1991 and included 16 
852 horses. Each betting sheet was examined and horses to be included for further 
investigation were determined by the criterion regarding significant betting activity 
described above. Horses were then grouped according to the change in probability from 
their first recorded odds to their final recorded odds. A filter test identical to that of Bird 
was performed. The results shown in Table 3.29 should be compared with Table 2.10. 
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Filter No. of bets Bet at beginning Bet at end 
+0.025 1260 +12.20% -8.18% 
+0.05 541 +19.67% -4.52% 
+0.075 233 +28.57% +5.71% 
+0.1 153 +32.01% +8.24% 
+0.125 61 +28.11% +7.44% 
+0.15 12 -33.33% -50.00% 
-0.025 844 -35.83% -19.35% 
-0.05 256 -48.70% -26.99% 
-0.075 120 -49.74% -25.04% 
-0~1 45 -73.39% -56.17% 
-0.125 16 -48.45% -42.43% 
-0.15 4 -100.0% -100.0% 
Table 3.29 Rates of return from placing Rl on all horses satisfying a filter requirement. 
Note that the positive returns for the filters +0.025, +0.05, +0.075, and +0.1 are 
significant at the 5 % level of significance. This certainly indicates profitable betting 
opportunities for those who know which horses to bet on at the start of the betting 
period. The profit is greatly reduced for those following horses that have their odds cut 
- during the betting period. In fact a loss results if the cut in odds from the opening bet 
was not large enough. If we assume that the bookmakers know at least as much as the 
punters in terms of available information, and can assess such information as well as 
punters, then the· change in the original bookmaker odds must be owing to private 
information which is not widely available. The above returns are certainly indicative of 
private information. which was not available to bookmakers when they initially set the 
odds on their boards. The negative aspects of such a conclusion have been discussed 
earlier. 
The interpretation of the negative filters is more difficult. Since we know that 
bookmakers are generally conservative in their initial pricing of all horses, we would 
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expect some negative movements in the horses probabilities of winning. The horses 
considered here, however, are all backed to some significant extent. We must therefore 
conclude that th~ private information held in respect of such horses is somehow imparted 
to the bookmakers during the betting period and they are therefore prepared to lay such 
horses at lengthening odds. The information may not be overt, but maybe indirectly 
signalled to bookmakers via betting patterns on other runners. 
One further test was carried out using the idea of a control group obtained from Bird's 
paper. This is a check to see if a group of horses at similar prices that don't have a 
decreasing price history, will perform differently to the group of horses whose odds have 
decreased during the betting period. Only betting at the. end of the period was 
considered. The results shown in Table 3.30 should be compared with table 2.11. 
Filter No. of bets Filter Strategy Control Group 
+0.025 1260 -8.18% -17.77% 
+0.05 541 -4.52% -10.54% 
+0.075 233 +5.71 % -19.14% 
+0.1 153 +8.24% -20.41 % 
+0.125 61 +7.44% -35.35% 
+0.15 12 -50.00% -80.00% 
-0.025 844 -19.35% -23.66% 
-0.05 256 -26.99% -22.97% 
-0.075 120 -25.04% -14.55% 
-0.1 45 -56.17% -30.50% 
-0.125 16 -42.43% -44.29% 
-0.15 4 -100.0% -100.0% 
Table 3.30 Rates of return from placing Rl at final odds on horses that satisfy a filter 
strategy and horses designated to a control group. 
The control group performance ~hould in general, not be far from the average loss which 
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results from betting at random of 18 % . Significant differences (at the 5 % level where 
at-test is appropriate) were detected between the positive filter strategies and the control 
group in all instances. This evidence again suggests the existence of private information 
which is not impounded in the odds on offer at the commencement of betting. It should 
be noted here that the inefficiencies exhibited here are more than likely contributing to 
the decline of racing in general at the Cape. 
3.4 Bettor Consistency 
The examination of bettor consistency in the win and double pools will consider possible 
payoffs to the double and equivalent parlay rather than the probabilities involved. 
Implicit in using this approach is the assumption that bettors are reasonably consistent 
in their estimates of winning probabilities from pool to pool. This was discussed _in inore 
detail in section 2.3.4. The test is thus based on that of Ali (1979). Ali's test is not 
directly applicable because of the· dividend structure of the local double bet. Eighty 
percent oflhe available pool is divided among ticket holders naming the winners of both 
races, while ten percent each is divided among those naming a winner and a second 
placing. The test of consistency is thus to examine the differences; 
X=0.8xD-(1 +a) x( 1 +bj) 
where ai = odds of horse i of leg 1 of double 
bj = odds of horse j of leg 2 of double 
D = possible return of the double 
P = (1 +aJ*(l +b) = return to the parlay. 
This clearly ignores any benefit, gained by bettors of the double, relating to consolation 
payoffs as described above. Note that a, b, and D are determined from distinctly 
different betting pools and hence D and P are separately market determined. The data 
involved 5 054 double observations. Estimates of the mean and variance of the difference 
between double and parlay were computed. The mean difference for the sample was 
16.40 while the standard error of the mean was calculated as 4.31. The difference is 
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significant at the 1 % level (two sided alternative). This means that the return to the 
double is significantly more than that to the equivalent parlay. 
The difference is simply explained by the fact that the parlay involves two separate 
charges whereas the double involves only one charge. Adding back the extra charge of 
18%, applied to the win pool, to the parlay yields different results. The mean difference 
is now only 6.07 while the standard error of the mean is 5.80. The computed Z statistic 
is 1.04 and indicates that there is no significant difference between the two returns. This 
result simply explains the differences that in reality do exist. The conclusion is that 
bettors are inconsistent in their pricing of the two bets. This observation does not imply 
inefficiency of the market. The results here imply that if a bettor bets on both winners 
in the races comprising the double, he. would do better by betting the double instead. 
The test of bettor consistency relating. to swinger and place betting is based on the 
probabilities involved in each bet. As with the double and win pools, the swinger and 
place pools are separate. The test is based on the following difference for each possible 
swlnger combination in the race; 
x .. = s .. - p.p. IJ IJ I J 
where Sii = the probability of winning a swinger involving horses i and j 
and Pi = the probability of horse i placing. 
Both these probabilities are publicly determined. Note that not only winning 
combinations are used, but all possible combinations for a particular race. 
The data used were from 100 races and included 4 668 possible swinger payoffs. Place 
probabilities were calculated as l/(place payoff), while swinger probabilities were 
calculated as l/(swinger payoff). In order to win a swinger it is necessary for both 
selected horses to finish in a place (first 3). Therefore equivalent swinger probabilities 
can be calculated by multiplying the place probabilities of any two horses. Thus the term 
PiPj represents the equivalent swinger winning probability, derived by using estimates 
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of place probabilities from the place pool. 
The average difference in equivalent swinger probabilities and actual swinger 
probabilities was 0.088, with a variance in the difference of 0.0088. The standard error 
of the mean was 0.0046 and the computed z value was 19.20 which is highly significant. 
The reason for the difference cannot be explained by additional charges in the swinger 
· pool as these are the same as in the place pool. The difference can possibly be explained 
by noting that the swinger involves betting for a place on 2 horses in the same race 
whereas place betting involves betting on only one horse. 
Analysis was made of returns to win and trifecta bets _at different racing centres, but on 
the same races. We are looking for a significant difference in return to these bets. Our 
hypothesis prior to investigation was that returns should be lower in the centre where the 
event is actually being held, the information relevant to the race being more easily 
available there. This hypothesis can be tested even if we only have data on winning bets, 
and not all bets, as we have had for some of the above tests. This is indeed the case for 
this test. 
Data were collected as follows. The win and trifecta payouts for races in the Transvaal 
and Natal were collected and these were regarded as the "home" payouts, as they were 
the payouts from courses in their particular centres. In addition the Cape payouts on 
these bets were collected and designated the "away" payouts. The data were subdivided 
by size of the payout. In the case of win bets the two categories were as follows; (i) 
either "home" or "away" payout being less than R4.00, or (ii) similarly, below :i,:ll0.00 
but greater than R4.00. Payouts greater than Rl0.00 were ignored. The categories for 
the trifecta were similar, but the cut off values were RlOO and RlOOO respectively, 
higher payouts again being ignored. 
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One hundred payouts for each bet and centre were collected randomly. The results are 
as follows. 
Win Bets (payouts < R4) 
Centre Cape (Away) 
mean 2.60 
std. dev. 0.217 
Centre Cape (Away) 
mean 2.37 
std. dev. 0.380 
-
Natal (Home) 
2.26 
0.160 
T'vaal (Home) 
2.26 
0.321 
Win Bets (R4 < = payouts < RlO) . 
Centre Cape (Away) Natal (Home) 
mean 5.34 5.15 
std. dev. 2.774 
Centre Cape (Away) 
mean 4.81 
std. dev. 2.504 
1.746 
T'vaal (Home) 
4.53 
1.630 
Trifecta Bets (payouts < RlOO) 
Centre Cape (Away) 
mean 57.2 
std. dev. 26.3 
Centre Cape (Away) 
mean 51.8 
std. dev. 23.0 
·Natal (Home) 
56.3 
24.2 
T'vaal (Home) 
55.6 
25.9 
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Trif ecta Bets (RlOO < = payouts < RlOOO) 
Centre Cape (A way) 
mean 435.2 
std. dev. 334.5 
Centre Cape (Away) 
mean 425.2 
std. dev. 298.4 
Natal Cllome) 
359.3 
249.9 
T'vaal (Home) 
402.5 
228.2 
The hypothesis was strongly supported against a two sided alternative, for win bets in 
the short odds ( < R4) category in both Transvaal and Natal. The interpretation is that 
for these short priced favourites, the information relating to their true probability of 
winning is not as well impounded in the "away" odds as in the home odds. This is what 
we had expected on logical grounds. Both differences were significant at the 1 % level. 
The only other category to show a significant difference, but here only at the 10% level, 
was that of trifecta bets paying between RlOO and RlOOO for Natal races. This can be 
similarly explained by the above line of reasoning. 
The papers of Tuckwell (1981) and Rausch et al. (1981) investigated the inconsistencies 
of bettors forming the win and place pools. Both indicated that systematic profit was 
possible implying not only an inconsistent market but an inefficient one as well. The 
findings of both studies were similar despite the difference in gambling law applicable 
in the two countries of investigation. Tuckwell is based in Australia while Rausch used 
United States data. In addition _to the tote, Australia also has legal bookmaking, so their 
situation is much like that of South Africa. 
Although the hypothesis, (market efficient or not) was the same in both papers, the 
methodology differed somewhat. In our work, we follow both approaches to testing the 
efficiency of the local market. Our results shown in Table 3.31 should be compared with 
those reproduced from Tuckwell, which are shown in Table 3.32. Our results were 
obtained in an identical manner to those of Tuckwell. 
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The data consisted of 2 534 horses for which place probabilities were estimated. These 
probabilities were then subdivided into ten different ranges and the average probability 
of placing within each range was compared with the proportion of horses running a 
place. This was done for all horses within each probability range and also for two 
classes, (1) where the odds-equivalent of the predicted place probability was exceeded 
by the place odds on the tote, implying a positive expected return, and (2) where the 
. odds-equivalent of the estimated place probability exceeded the tote place odds and the 
expected return was negative. 
Range of Positive Negative Combined 
Estimated Place Expected Expected 
Probability Return Return 
x n/a ·0.0201 0;0201 
0.0 and under 0,03 y n/a 0.0368 0.0368 
n 0 244 244 
x 0.0427 0.0397 0.0397 
0.03 and under y 0 0.0406 0.0399 
0.05 n 4 246 250 
x 0.0630 0.0641 ** 0.0640 ** 
0. 05 and under y 0 0.1319 0.1280 
0.08 n 7 235 242 
x 0.1016 0.1041 ** 0.1040 ** 
0.08 and under y 0 0.2000 0.1949 
0.013 n 7 270 277 
x 0.1781 * 0.1634 ** 0.1641 ** 
0.013 and under y 0.3125 0.1909 0.1973 
0.2 n 16 288 304 
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Range of Positive Negative Combined 
Estimated Place Expected Expected 
Probability Return Return 
x 0.2563 0.2474 0.2481 
0.2 and under 0.3 y 0.2307 0.2571 0.2548 
n 26 280 306 
. 
x 0.3544 0.3467 * 0.3477 * 
0.3 and ·under 0.4 y 0.3226 0.3184 0.3189 
n 31 201 232 
x 0.5075 ** 0.4871 0.4925 
0.4 and under 0.6 y 0.5744 0.4513 0.4842 
n 94 257 351 
x 0.7005 0.6659 0.6843 
0.6 and under 0.8 y 0.7096 0.6788 0.6951 
n 124 109 233 
x 0.8649 ** 0.8879 0.8271 ** 
0.8 and under 1.0 y 0.7846 0.8666 0.8104 
n 65 30 95 
Table 3.31 Com anson ot estimated p ilace p . p robab1htles with actual ro o p p rtion placing 
x = average estimated place probability in range 
y = proportion of horses actually running a place 
n = number of horses in sample 
** = significant at 5 % or lower 
* = significant at 10% 
The hypothesis being test~ is for a difference between actual and average estimated 
place ·probabilities. The range of probabilities refers to those place probabilities as 
estimated from the win probabilities. 
As can be seen, the results differ in some categories and are quite congruent in others. 
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Profit is theoretically possible in all categories where the the observed proportion of 
horses running a place is significantly higher than the average place probability estimated 
from the win probabilities. 
Comparison of estimared place probabili~ with proportion placing 
Range of estimated Positive expected Negative expected 
place probability return return All 
.x 0·019 0·017 0·017 
O·O and under 0·03 y O·O 0·025(0·006) 0·025(0·005) 
n 30 829 859 
.x 0·042 0·039 0·040 
0·03 and under 0·05 y 0·087(0·059) 0·054(0·015) 0·057(0·0141 
" 
23 239 262 
.x 0·066 0·064* 0·064* 
0·05 and under 0·08 y 0· 136(0·073) 0·108(0·017) 0·110(0·017\ 
n 22 324 346 
.x 0·100 0·102 0·102 
0·08 and under 0· 13 y 0· 1l4(0·048) 0· 127(0·018) 0·125(0·01il 
n 44 355 399 
.x 0·165 0·163 0·163 
0· 13 and under O· 20 y 0· 181(0·045) (}191(0·020) 0· 190(0·018) 
n 72 397 469 
.x 0·240 0·248 0·248 
0·20 and.under 0·30 y 0·231(0·044) 0·291(0·025) 0·278(0·022) 
n 91 323 414 
.x 0·352 0·343 0·346 
0· 30 and under 0·40 y 0·337(0·046) O· 360(0·034) 0·352(Q·02i) 
n 104 200 304 
.x 0·497 0·484 .0·492 
0·40 and under 0·60 y 0·438(0·032) 0·456(0·033) 0·447(0·024) 
n 235 226 461 
.x 0·698* 0·667* 0·690* 
0·60 and under 0·80 y 0·604(0·037) 0·452(0·063) 0·564(0·032) 
n 174 62 236 
.x 0·888 0·867 0·884 
0·80 and under 1 ·00 y 0·873(0·037) 0·750(0·097) 0·849(0·036) 
n 79 20 99 
.x = average estimated place probability in range 
y =proportion of horses running a place (standard errors in parentheses) 
n =number of horses 
* denotes a significant difference at the 5 per cent level 
Table 3.32 reproduced from Tuckwell (1981) 
As mentioned above, Hausch's method was slightly different from that of Tuckwell. The 
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estimates of the place probabilities were made in the same way and these were then used 
to calculate an expected return for each $1 bet on the particular horse. The formula used 
to calculate the expected return, EXh is more complicated for the American bettors 
because the return to successful show (first three) bettors on horse i depends on which 
horses finish with i in the first three positions. In South Africa the pool is divided 
equally among the three (or sometimes four) horses that finish in the places and therefore 
the return, to ·successful bettors of horse i for a place can be determined at the start of 
the race rather than after it has been run. 
The formula for the expected return in the South African context is, 
EX = ·[ _!_ x INTG ( Q x (P + l) x 10)] xR 
I 10 . . 3x(P1+1) I 
where Q = (1 - the track take) = 0.82 for South Africa 
P = the place pool in rands 
P1 = the amount in rands bet on horse 1 to place 
R1 = the probability that horse 1 places derived from the win probabilities. 
If there are 14 or more horses in a race, the 3 is replaced by a 4 in the formula. An 
adjustment is made in order to allow for the rounding down of all dividends to the lower 
ten cents. The same data sample as used for the tests relating to Tuckwell's paper was 
used here. For each horse the expected return from a Rl bet was calculated. The 
expected returns ranged from about 2.5, implying an expected profit of 150% to about 
0.4, suggesting an expected loss of arourid 60%. A theoretical Rl bet was placed on 
horses having an expected return of 0.8 or more, and the results were tabulated after 
being split by ranges of expected return. The following results in Table 3.33 be 
compared with the results of Rausch' s original investigation which are shown in Table 
2.14. 
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a > 1 
a Number of Bets Return Profit % Profit 
1.04 68 68.1 0.1 0.1 ~ 
1.08 72 78.5 6.5 9.0 
1.12 47 47.4 0.4 0.8 
1.16 45 43.4. -1.6 -3.5 
1.20 18 16.3 -1.7 -9.4 
1.25 31 33.0 2.0 6.4 
1.30 27 34.6 7.6 28.1 
1.50 35 36.9 1.9 5.4 
2.00 19 40.0 21.0· 110.5 
2.00+ 9 29.2 - 20.2 224.4 
a < 1 
a Number of Bets Return Profit %. Profit 
0.95 113 96;2 -16.8 -14.8 
0.90 136 117.3 -18.7 -13.7 
0.85 148 128.6 -19.4 -13.1 
0.80 115 104.9 -10.1 -8.80 
Table 2.33 Results of betting Rl to place on horses with a theoretical expected return 
of at 1east a. 
As is evident from the above table, profit is certainly possible as long as the expected 
return is high enough, (greater than 1.2, say). The cutoff point for bets in Hausch's 
paper was 1.2, a figure which our results also suggest as a value of EX, above which 
we should bet. As has been noted already, the inputs required to calculate EX, are not 
available until the race is already being run and no further betting is allowed. In order 
to make the system operational, it is therefore necessary to use information available just 
before the off of the race, and to be able to process it very quickly, in order to place a 
bet. 
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The method used by Hausch was followed here. It was noted t~at a requirement for a 
bet under the system conditions implied that the horse in question would have attracted 
a larger proportion of the win pool than the place pool. The variable (w/W) I (p/P) was 
constructed for all horses. Here wi is the amount bet on horse i to win, W is the total 
win pool, Pi is the amount bet on horse i for a place, and Pis the total place pool. These 
values were calculated using the final odds on offer. To make the system operational, 
the values used will have to be those available with approximately two minutes to the 
off of the race. 
The above variable was used as the independent variable, to predict the variation in the 
dependent variable EX. The results of the regression analysis are shown here. The 
coefficient of the variable, (here called B) is positive and significant. The value of R2 
LS // Dependent Variable is ER 
Date: 6-24-1993 / Time: 13:38, 
SMPL range: 1 2513 
Number of observations: 2513 
==================================================================== 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT STD. ERROR T-STAT. 2-TAIL SIG. 
==================================================================== 
c 
B 
0.1995391 
0.6300575 
0.0048734 
0.0047808 
40.944536 
131. 78982 
0.000 
0.000 
==================================================================== 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 
S.E. of regression 
Durbin-Watson stat 
Log likelihood 
0.873689 
0.873639 
0.149272 
1.039161 
1214.895 
Mean of dependent var 
S.D. of dependent var 
Sum of squared resid 
F-statistic 
0.707969 
0.419925 
55.95050 
17368.56 
==================================================================== 
Table 3.34 Regression results 
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is 0.873, which implies a good correlation between EX (here called ER) and B. Clearly 
EX cannot be calculated for all horses just prior to the off of the race as time is limited. 
EX is therefore estimated shortly before the off, for the horse that by inspection has the 
largest value of (w/W) I (p/P). If the value of EX is sufficiently large, then a bet is 
placed on the horse in question. 
We tested our·derived regression model in theory and in practice. Firstly we estimated 
EX using the odds on offer at the end of the betting period for a further 557 horses. In . 
31 of these cases EX was observed to be greater than 1.2 with a maximum of 1.84. The 
return from backing each of these horses would have been 40.8 or a profit on turnover 
of 31. 6 % . We then visited the track for 5 consecutive race meetings and applied the 
model to the odds on offer as dispfayed by the tote approximately 2 minutes before the 
off of the race. We actually placed bets on 18 horses (all in different races) whose value 
of EX was estimated to be greater than_ 1.2. The maximum value we estimated for EX 
was 1.50. The return to the 18 bets was 19.6, or a profit on turnover of 8.9%. 
Back home, with the final oCfds available to us, we ran our model on these data (some 
481 horses in 44 races). We now found that our estimated EX exceeded 1.2 for 31 
horses, and betting on these yielded a profit of some 25.1 % on turnover. The difference 
can generally be explained by the appearance in the second group (final odds), of horses 
whose EX values were just below 1.2, shortly before the off and greater than 1.2 at the 
end of betting. Evidently most of those horses did indeed place. However, there was 
one instance of a horse whose EX based on final odds was 1.47, and whose EX shortly 
_prior to the off was unlikely to have been below 1.2. This horse also placed, and we can 
therefore ascribe some of the difference in returns between the two groups to an over 
pressurised experimenter. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RATIONAL DECISION MODELS 
nBut I, with strange perversity, deliberately went on staking on red 
after noticing that it had turned up seven times running. I am sure 
vanity was half responsible for this; I wanted to astonish the 
spectators by taking senseless chances and - a strange sensation! -
I clearly remember that even without any promptings of vanity I 
really was suddenly overcome by a terrible craving for risk. n 
Dostoyevsky - The Gambler 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter concerns itself with the decision making process as observed under certain 
conditions. These conditions are those applicable to gamblers (decision makers) at the 
racetrack. For example, we note that the decision makers have chosen to be in their 
situation, which may be untrue for decision makers in other situations. We investigate 
-· 
the decision makers goals by examining their actual decisions at the track and also 
attempt to explain the process whereby such decisions were made. In other words, what 
do gamblers do once at the track, and why do they do it. 
Gambling is the betting or staking of something of value, with consciousness of risk and 
hope of gain, on the outcome of a game or uncertain event, the result of which may be 
determined by chance, strategy or a combination of both. Many activities involve 
elements of risk and hope of gain, and may depend on the outcome of an uncertain event 
or events - business ventures, buying and selling stock and military strategies for 
example; indeed, participation in such enterprises is often referred to as gambling or 
taking a chance. 
In the seventeenth century, Galileo and Pascal were approached by gamblers who had 
lost money at games of dice, and wanted to know why. Their investigations, among 
others, led to the theory of probability. Is it possible that a study of gamblers' 
behaviour, can lead to acceptable theories regarding utility and choice? One of the 
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factors influencing decision making is surely, the reason.s for being in such a decision 
making position in the first place; i.e. in our case, are decisions related to gambling 
affected by the reasons for gambling? Anthropologists have tried to discover whether or 
not gambling was distributed among the cultures of the world in systematic patterns that 
might reveal a general association between gambling and other cultural traits. The 
studies showed that no consistent association between gambling and characteristics of the 
economy, the system of wealth or the type of religion could be found. 
A substantial problem in the way of deriving a model of human behaviour is the general 
lack of understanding of, and belief in, elementary probability theory. Theories of 
decision making have to assume some level of sophistication as far as people's 
knowledge of probability goes. This knowledge need not be conscious, as long as 
individuals act as if they have an understanding of probabilities. In the past people have 
been taught that everything happens for a reason and therefore that chance has no role. 
It is these traditional beliefs that hold people back from b~lieving that any event on earth 
can occur purely by chance. The idea of purely random activity is basic to the 
comprehension of. the relationship between chance and probability. 
In this work we shall attempt to discover, using analysis of racetrack gamblers, the 
reasons that people take chances. Given that we are successful in this attempt, the next 
question becomes; are these findings regarding ·human behaviour transferrable to 
activities other than gambling on horse races? Such questions will not be the subject of 
this work but speculation, suggestions and possible direction for further research will be 
offered. 
Decision making with reference to horseracing basically comes down to deciding which 
horse to bet on (if any) and how much to bet on it. Another decision would involve 
deciding on the type of bet to make (e.g. win or place). Decision analysis is concerned 
with quantifying the decision procedure and its consequences. By studying people 
making decisions in a natural environment we can gain some idea of human behaviour 
in certain situations. From these observations we can presfict behaviour in similar 
situations and 'can offer advice on behaviour modification if our quantified model of the 
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decision process indicates that optimal decisions are not being made. 
Decision analysis thus involves the consideration of the goals of the decision maker, the 
alternative courses of action available, the risks and uncertainties relevant to such 
courses of action and the consequences of taking each course of action.In order to 
quantify the goals and consequences we shall need to assume some fonction which 
attributes value to such ·goals and outcomes for the decision maker. In the past an 
expected value approach was used, but did not cover decision making with regard to 
gambling and insurance. Thus utility theory was introduced to cope with problems which 
expected value theory could not explain. In gambling situations, utility functions, which 
assign utility values to monetary amounts, are often used to quantify the· value of 
outcomes of an event to a decision maker. 
Risk and uncertainty, where they occur in the decision making process, are quantified 
in terms of probability models. A model can give the likely value of a dependent 
variable for certain values of some independent variables and predetermined parameter 
values. thus, quantification of the decision process involves the specification and 
estimation of probability models for unknown variables as well as utility (or other) 
functions which attach "value" to goals and outcomes. It is generally expressed in 
current literature that such models are inadequate to predict human behaviour, (assuming 
this to be the model's goal) and other approaches such as heuristic modelling are now 
finding favour with researchers. 
A point on terminology that may cause confusion needs to be cleared up here .. When 
referring to subjective probabilities in this section, we mean those probabilities which 
are derived from the actions of bettors (i.e. from the observed odds), and not from 
questioning bettors regarding their degree of belief in the probabilities of the outcomes 
of an event. 
4.2 Literature Review 
Since much of the analysis related to decision theory is connected to psychology, it is 
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appropriate that we initially analyse the subject from the psychological point of view. An 
original paper that is referred to in some later works, is that of Preston and Baratta 
(1948). The ideas of value of outcome, and probability of outcome, are connected by the 
concept of mathematical expectation. This expectation is used to define "rational" human 
behaviour. It is observed that if the player of a game pays more than the mathematical 
expectation to play the game, he will lose systematically. This behaviour is called 
irrational, although it is further observed that people are in fact prepared to play such 
games. 
Reasons for such irrational behaviour is considered. The parameters involved are i) the 
probability of winning, ii) the value of the prize, and iii) the price to play the game. The 
following options are suggested as to why people are prepared to play the game if the 
price is greater than the expected return. Firstly, people overstate the probability of 
winning. Secondly, they may overvalue the prize, and thirdly and similarly th~y may 
undervalue the price they have to pay. 
In previous work, .economists had proposed utility theory which essentially, at that time, 
stated that the objective scale of money differed from its subjective value. They therefore 
believed that irrational behaviour was owing to misjudgements regarding the monetary 
amounts involved. They gave no regard to the possibility that it may have been the 
probabilities that were being misjudged, (or any other factor for that matter). Peculiarly, 
this 1948 paper gave little space to the consideration of the subjective scale for money, 
but pursued instead a psychological scale of probabilities. 
The experiments conducted had as their aim to show among other things, i) the existence 
in a game situation of a scale of psychological probability and its functional relationship 
to the scale of mathematical probability, and ii) the lack of existence in a game situation 
of scales of psychological prize value and price as distinct from the numerically defined 
prize values and prices. Two other interesting goals, were the attempt to determine the 
extent to which psychological probability was independent of formal experience with 
mathematical probability, and the determination of existence and location of a point of 
indifference in the scales of psychological and mathematical probability. 
The results of the experiments revealed mathematical probabilities greater than 
psychological probabilities at very small mathematical probabilities, while the opposite 
was true for mathematical probabilities greater than about 0.25. This observation is 
consistent with the favourite longshot bias observed at the racetrack. The point of 
indifference occurred at about 0.2 on the mathematical scale. The observations were 
noted to be the same for those who possessed considerable knowledge of mathematical 
probability, (mathematicians, statisticians and psychologists) as for those who were 
relatively naive of the topic (students). Lack of consistency in the results forbade a clear-
cut conclusion regarding the existence of a subjective scale of money, and further 
research was recommended. 
Further research was indeed carried out by Ward Edwards, and the results published in 
a series of papers during 1953 and 1954. The first of his papers (Edwards 1953) builds 
on the experiments of Preston and Bai:atta. The question "how do people· actually go 
about making decisions in gambling situations?" is posed. It is noted that experiments 
up to that point only dealt with a limited set of situations and much further research was 
neciled to clarify such questions. Edwards defines the "objective model" of the decision 
making process as that which predicts the subject will choose the bet with the highest 
expected value. The problem of determining why people make decisions that violate the 
objective model, is tackled by requiring subjects fo make decisions in circumstances in 
which the objective model is inapplicable. This situation arises when all choices (bets) 
offered to the subjects have equal expected values. 
Eight possible bets were formulated for each of three levels of expected value, namely 
positive, zero and negative expected value. Each bet was paired with all others at the 
same EV level. Subjects were then asked to choose among the two bets, after which a 
pinball machine determined whether they won or lost on that particular bet. ff subjects 
preferred bet A to B, B to C and C to A, the set of such preferences was called an" 
inconsistent triad". Kendall's "coefficient of consistency" showed that subjects were in 
general consistent in choosing among bets. 
It was found that two factors contributed to decision making between bets of equal EV. 
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The first relates to the conditions of the gambling situation. If gambling for real money, 
subjects preferred long shots much more than if they played for fun. Thus the taking, 
or avoidance of big risks depended on the experimental conditions. The second factor 
affecting choices was existence of preferences for some probability levels over others. 
The analysis centred on the probabilities of winning or losing rather than the amounts 
of money won or lost. This was owing to the belief that monetary utility curves are not 
the best way of accounting for the results. The most important probability preferences 
were found to be a preference for the probability of winning 4/8, and an avoidance of 
the probability of winning 6/8. 
Some important final comments are made in the paper. These are that if probability 
preferences do indeed exist, they present a serious stumbling block to the utility curves 
proposed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. Choices among bets can be only be used 
to determine such utility curves, if .the probabilities entering the equations upon which 
the curves are calculated are the same as the probabilities used by the subjects when 
making their choices. If these objective and subjective probabilities differ, (specifically 
- if subjects prefer. some probabilities to others), the results derived from any utility 
analysis is likely to be untenable. It is further noted that the decision making process is 
influenced by (at least) two variables, namely the probability and the value as seen by 
the subject. These two (and others) interact in a certain way to produce a decision. It 
would be wrong to measure one of the variables unless it were known that the other was 
being held constant. This was deemed impossible by Edwards. 
Edwards' following experiment was designed to capture similar information regarding 
the decision making process, but this time each of the eight bets in the three categories 
of EV had slight differences in their expected value (Edwards 1954(i)). Bets in the 
positive EV category had EV's ranging from 60c to 85c, while bets in the negative EV 
category had identical negative EV's. The EV's in the zero EV category ranged from 
-13c to 13c. The method of pairing each of the bets with all the others in their category, 
was used as in the constant EV experiment. The experiment is thus designed to identify 
which variables determine choices among bets with differing expected values. 
-4-7 
The results of the experiments showed that subjects do not consistently prefer bets with 
higher expected value to those with a lower expected value. For bets with positive EV, 
it was found that the major determinant of choices was the differences in EV and not the 
preferences for certain probabilities. However, in the zero EV category it was found that 
the major determinant of choices was indeed probability preferences rather than 
differences in EV. This may have been because of the small absolute size of the EV for 
each bet. For the case of negative EV, it was found that both EV differences and 
probability preferences played a role. The mathematical model provided by utility theory 
thus remains problematic. 
The last paper in the series continues in the same manner as the previous ones (Edwards 
1954(ii)). The aim of the new experiments is to determine ~hether subjects exhibit 
preferences for certain variances of return, when choosing between bets. The theoretical 
model that is currently used for prediction is that which states that subjects will act as 
to maximi~e subjective expected utility. This is equival~nt to the objective EV model,. 
except that the variables in the equation are the subjective probabilities and values as 
seen by the subject. If it can be shown that subjects prefer certain variances, the model 
(if it could be derived), would seem unsuitable for prediction of choices. 
The method of testing for variance preferences is the same as that used in the previous 
experiments. All bets have zero EV but different variance of return. The variance is 
naturally the objective variance; a2 = pq(A-B)2 , where p is the probability of winning, 
q = 1-p, A = amoun.t won if you ,win, and B = amount you pay if you lose. Two 
categories of variance are considered, namely high variance, in which the variances of 
the bets range from 1.1 to 2.52, and the low variance category in which the variances 
range from 0.275 to 0.63. 
The main finding of the experiment was that .although variance preferences are useful 
in predicting behaviour under certain conditions, probability preferences are still the 
major determinant of betting behaviour. When probability preferences were held 
constant, the existence of variance preferences could be detected. Some subjects 
preferred bets of high variance while others preferred bets of low variance, and an 
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attempt to construct a utility curve based on several subjects proved imposs.ible. This 
· seems to imply that people are too different in this respect. It is suggested that the 
existence of variance preferences will not have an effect on the subjective utility model, 
since they are only secondary in predictive ability to probability preferences. Whether 
they are also secondary to utilities, was posed as an experimental question for further 
research. The introduction of conditions into the experiment, making high variance 
desirable~ produced more bets of high variance, but similar conditions making low 
variance desirable did not produce more low variance bets. This indicates that people 
tend to change their habits when they lose money, but not when they win. 
Rosett (1970) attempted, through a series of five laboratory experiments, to verify 
theories proposed by Yaari (1965) and those of utility theory proposed by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern. All the hypotheses tested rely on the assumption that subjects faced 
with a c:hoice under uncertainty will implicitly calculate the expected utility of each and 
choose the one with the greatest expectation. 
Some comments on Yaari (1965) are needed here. He states that to explain the co-
existence of insurance and gambling, we must either assume that the decision maker 
exaggerates the utility of large monetary gains, or that he exaggerates the probability of 
rare events. Since utility and probability are two theoretical components of an integrated 
decision process, choosing between the two hypotheses is a matter of taste. Yaari states 
however that empirical data do discriminate between the two hypotheses . 
. The set of all bets that a decision maker is prepared to accept, on a given event, is 
examined. The concern will be the convexity or otherwise of this set. A set is said to 
be convex if it contains every line segment whose end-points are in the set. It is noted 
that if the set of accepted bets is indeed convex, then a theory of choice under risk is 
deficient if it implies that the set of accepted bets is not convex. One such theory is that 
under which the decision maker acts to maximize his expected utility. 
Experiments were carried out in the probability range of about a half as well as for 
extremely unlikely events where the probability was 0.001. In virtually all cases 
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convexity of the acceptance set was satisfied. It is concluded that a general psychological 
law exists that exaggerates low probabilities and diminishes high probabilities. 
Rosett's first two experiments examined how accurately subjects were able to estimate 
probabilities involved in simple gambles and whether these were then used to calculate 
expected utilities. The results were inconclusive, as the answers to identical questions 
put to subjects, 20 times, varied greatly. The third experiment confirmed Yaari's 
findings that acceptance sets are convex. 
The fourth and fifth experiments indicated a relationship between the probability of an 
event and the proportion of responses that were consistent with the expected utility 
hypothesis. Consistency with the hypothesis was more likely ~hen the probability was 
around 0.5 than when it was about 0.025. It is suggested that at low probabilities, 
subjects become unsure of what they actually prefer and therefore their bets become 
more nearly random. Quite unfortunately for the researcher, it is noted that the results 
seemed to depend heavily on the experimental conditions. The tests regarding the 
expected utility hypothesis also proved inconclusive. 
Brady and Lee (1989) provided a literature review of the topic of subjective probability. 
They discussed many of the papers covered in this work, as well as some others. 
Assuming the expected utility hypothesis to be insufficient in providing an explanation 
for decision making under risk, the argument of the paper was that up until then, no 
explanation had been offered for the observed differences between objective and 
subjective probabilities. Brady notes that many experiments performed by various of the 
authors support the same conclusion. This is that the quality, relevance, reliability, type 
and amount of information upon which the probability is calculated, influences decisions 
as well as the probability itself. 
It is pointed out that Keynes had in 1921, arrived at the same conclusions as the more 
recent investigators, and had also provided an explanation for the convex shape of the 
subjective probability curve. A conclusion drawn is that the underweighting of subjective 
probabilities is owing to the fact that such probabilities are not based on "perfect" 
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information. This paper is important in that it considers the problem of decision making 
between gambles to be hardly one just of money and probabilities, but rather one which 
involves many other possible factors. 
All the above papers have dealt with the topics of decision making and gambling, but 
not horseracing. Quite a few papers have been published since 1949 which examine 
similar topics in decision analysis but approach the subject from the point of view of the 
"natural gambler". The advantage of these experiments is that they are carried out in a 
natural surrounding (the racetrack), and are carried out by subjects (punters) who don't 
even know that they are part of an experiment at all. 
The first paper to consider horserace betting useful for the study of human behaviour and 
decision making was Griffith (1949). He noted that the odds as reflected by the tote were 
socially determined, and therefore COl;lld cast light on the field of the psychology of 
probabilities. An important comrnent regarding different forms of gambling is made. 
This is that not all forms of gambling are psychologically equivalent. Thus the conative 
predictions of the fall of a dice, contrast strongly with the cognitive factors involved in 
predicting the winner of a horserace. 
The data for,the tests consisted of the winners and runners at each of 30 odds categories, 
from 519 races at three specific racecourses, as well as this information on seventeen 
selected odds categories for a further 867 races, which were run at all other tracks in the 
U.S.A. The odds are defined as the actual return for a $1 bet, which includes the $1 
originally staked. A posteriori odds of winning are calculated for each odds category by 
dividing the number of runners in the category by the number of winners in the 
category. If these a posteriori odds equal the psychological odds determined by the 
public, then the product of these psychological odds and the number of winners would 
equal the number of runners in that odds category. Such calculations are made and the 
results are compared to the actual number of runners at each odds level. 
The results show that the product of the winners and the odds is less than the total 
runners for all odds categories. When the tax and track take are added back, however 
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this is only true at long odds (low probabilities), while at the short odds the product 
exceeds the total runners. The point of indifference calculated by interpolation, is 6.1/1 · 
or 5.1/1 (which are the odds the bettors react to), if the actual odds are used. This 
corresponds to a probability of 0.16 or 0.2, which is noted to be close to the results of 
Preston and Baratta, which were derived in a laboratory environment. The results also 
show that too much money is wagered on longshots and not enough on favourites. This 
is the first evidence of the favourite-longshot bias reported in many racing studies in 
later years. 
McGlothlin (1956) extended the paper of Griffith, using more detail as well as some new 
ideas. The primary purpose of the paper in fact, was to examine the stability of risk-
taking behaviour over a series of events. The data consisted of 9 605 races run between 
1947 and 1953 in the U.S.A. Odds categories were defined as in the Griffith study and 
horses were allocated to the categories depending on their starting prices. In this study 
subsamples of data were also considered. Thus the data was split according to the 
position (race number) of the race through the racing day. The expected returns at each 
odds level are calculated for each race number, and the results are shown in Table 4.1. 
Note that the odds categories are quoted from the actual returns payable, while the 
expected returns have been calculated by adding back the track take and breakage. 
The overall results are consistent with those of Griffith. and ·previous laboratory 
experiments. At odds of less than 3/ 1 we note positive expected returns while at odds 
of greater than 6/1 we note expected losses. When the odds used are actual, instead of 
those adjusted for take and breakage, losses are observed at all odds categories. The 
indifference point occurs between the probabilities 0.15 and 0.22, which is also in 
agreement with other experiments. 
It is noted that the patterns of expected returns versus odds category for race numbers 
seven and eight, are markedly different to the patterns observed for races one to six. It 
is unlikely that this has to do with changing behaviour patterns through the day as 
neither of the adjacent races in the program show similar features. The differing pattern 
for race seven is explained by noting that race seven is the feature race for the day and 
4-12 
EXPECTED VALUES OP ONE DOLLAR Bns AS A FUNCTION OP TRACX Ooos 
Track odds 
o.o;- l. ::,0- 3.co- 4.00- f.00- 6.co- 8.oo-
I.Qi l.Qf 3.9; 
Pc.sition Number 
4.95 ,..Qf 7.9f 10.9; 
oi Ra~e of Races 
n;6 .08 .CJ .Of -.II -.06 .04 -. IO 
l It)6 .q .I! -.O) .Ol .oS -.o6 -.11 
11;6 .o; .OQ .06 .08 -.07 .01 -.Il 
4 n;6 .o; . IO .04 .I:l -.o; -.n -.o6 
~ n;6 .Oj .IO -.Ol -.07 .Ol -.07 -.Cl 
6 n;6 . I l .o;. -.01. -.o; -.06 -.07 .CI 
11;6 .OI .O·O .oo .o& .03 .IQ -.I7 g 1;13 .ll • II -.CQ .04 .OQ -.11 -.1; 
1-8 Ql-18 .08 .d -.OI .01 .00 -.03 -.It 
'u£!1_: .048 .01\4 .077 .OQl . 108 .086 .OQf 
(uf."!• .on .c;6 .or-; .o6Q .c8Q .073 .071 
luF.I Total .c17 .C~l .016 .031 .c3& .031 .033 
z 
0 
I-
< I-
u 
w 
a.. 
x 
w 
z 
0 
I-
e 
zo 
10 
00 
-10 
- 20 
- 10 
• co 
.20 
·10 
00 
t -10 
w 
a.. 
x 
-.20 
W -.JO 
-.co 
- t FOA UACI ODDS 
--·· t FOR TUCI OD~ CORRtCTtD 
fOA TUC uo 8~tAUGC 
-""\ 
\ 
\ 
'-,, 
'~......,--------------------
10 IZ 14 ll II 2ol !1 
ODDS, RACES 1-8 (N 9248) 
...... 
I \ 
10 ll 14 II II 20 U 
ODDS, EIGHTH RACES (N = 1513) 
II.CO-
If 0 95 
.Il 
-.oS 
-.I3 
-.03 
~.Ol 
-.o; 
-.13 
-.11 
-.07 
.lq 
.o~h 
.039 
16.00-
::.; .Q) 
-.11 
-.c; 
-.Cj 
-.IC 
-.q 
-.10 
-
. ,:; . 
.o; 
-.II . 
• Ill 
. Ill 
.OH 
EXPECTED v ALUES OF ONE Dou.AR. BETS AS A FUNCTION OF ODDS. 
Table 4.1 reproduced from McGlothlin (1956) 
4-13 
receives a lot more press coverag~ than the other races. The public are also more aware 
of the horses running in such races, as they are normally of a higher quality than other 
races. 
Two interesting results were obtained from the subsample of eighth (and final) races. 
Firstly the expected return of horses in the lowest odds category is much higher than for 
any of the other races. This indicates that short priced favourites which are avoided in 
general, are avoided even mor~ so in the last race of the day. Secondly, a marked dip 
in return at odds of about 7/2 is observed. Bettors are thus wagering larger quantities 
than usual on _horses in this odds category. Since the eighth race does not differ in type 
from several of the races run earlier in the day, it is postulated that the difference in 
return patterns, is owing to a change in the bettors behaviour through the day. 
It is conjectured that bettors have up until the last race, lost three times what they plan 
to wager on the last race, and therefore have to resort to backing horses at approximately 
3.5/1 to break even or show a moderate profit. The greater avoidance of short priced 
horses indicates that bettors are not prepared to bet on horses that, if successful, will still 
leave them as losers for the day. 
An examination of the possibility of probability preferences was performed. Three types 
of simple bets are available to bettors, namely win, place and show, with odds typically 
ranging from~2/1to50/1, 1/1to20/1 and 5/10 to 6/1 respectively. Thus the proportion 
of total money wagered on each pool gives a measure of preference for probability 
ranges among alternatives with approximately equal expected values. The proportions 
split by race number are shown in Figure 4.1. A test was performed to indicate whether 
there was a difference in behaviour between winners and losers. This as done by 
comparing the relationship between the odds o( the winning horse, and the amount bet 
per person in the following race. An assumption is made that each person at the track 
bets the same amount. From this assumption the proportion of winning bettors is given 
by Q =. 0.87/(a1+1.025), where 0.87 is the track take, a1 are the odds-to-win for the 
horse finishing first in the previous race, and 1.025 adjusts for breakage, (rounding 
down of the dividend). This measure was used to test the correlation between winning 
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Figure 4.1 reproduced from McGlothlin (1956) 
bettors and amount bet in the following race. Since there are eight races per day there 
were seven pairs of variables to be correlated. The seven coefficients ranged from -0.1 
to -0.47, indicating that bettors increased their bets more after having lost than after 
having won. 
The betting behaviour· of the group is to increase the variability of their assets through 
the day. This is achieved by increasing the amount bet per person as well as choosing 
a higher proportion of win category. wagers, in preference to place and show betting. 
Despite the fact that size of wagers and preference for low probability bets are 
increasing, the pattern of returns for races one through six is constant. This suggests that 
the utility scale of money is equivalent to the dollar scale, and the more important 
psychological variable is subjective probability. It appears that variance preferences are 
of some importance in determining decisions of the type involved in these experiments. 
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Rosett (1965) investigated the relationship between the observed prebability of winning, 
(given the odds category that the horse belonged to) and the average actual return that 
would have been paid, had all the horses in that category won. The question, "Are 
gamblers rational?" is posed. The observation that gamblers pay more than the "fair" 
amount to play the game, is explained by Rosett, not by utility analysis, but rather by 
suggesting that either the gambler misunderstands the game or that he has all the 
information required but cannot perform the calculations involving probabilities. 
A theoretical model is constructed whereby gamblers are assumed to be sophisticated, 
in that they know which factors affect a horses winning chances, as well as knowing how 
to calculate such probabilities. If gamblers are rational, in the sense that they will not 
accept bets with lower expected value than some alternative, their betting behaviour 
should yield a specific relationship between probability and return. This function will 
differ, depending on whether the majority of bettors are risk seeking or risk averse, and 
is defined in the paper. The empirical relation between return · and probability was 
investigated under both scenarios (risk averse and risk seeking). The equations derived 
giving the relationships were unsatisfactory for the purpose of d-escribing the data in the 
context of the assumed model. Thus the model assuming rationality and sophistication 
does not hold. 
The main deviance of the observed situation from the model was that at very low 
probabilities, the returns were too low to be accounted for by the model. Explanations 
which are consistent with rationality are offered. The first is that some bettors want bets 
of such low probabilities, (parlays of the lowest probability horse in each race) that the 
lowest probability horse in each race attracts too much money. The second is that some 
bettors bet nearly at random, which results again in low probability horses attracting too 
much money (relative to their offered return). It is pointed out that irrational behaviour 
of several types would also explain the observed deviation. 
The conclusion of the paper is that rational decisions can be expected from bettors, 
except where the decisions concern horses with probabilities of winning of less than 
about 0.03. An important point regarding the sophistication of bettors is also made. This 
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is that although the tools of statistics are hardly available to the vast majority of track 
gamblers, they still act as though they are sophisticated, and are well versed in 
probability theory and calculus among other topics. The conclusion drawn is that we 
would expect people in other fields, faced with risk and uncertainty, to act as if they are 
sophisticated, and respond appropriately, merely after having had sufficient experience 
with the situation. 
Snyder (1978) investigated the favourite-longshot bias for the public as well as· for the 
official track handicapper and four newspaper handicappers. The task of the 
handicappers is to provide a guide to the public as to likely starting odds (publicly 
-
determined) of each horse on the card. The data comprised 94 race meetings and 7657 
horses. The rates of return were adjusted for the take so as to make the results 
comparable with other studies. Rates were also calculated for the last race of each 
2 3 4 s to 1s 20 30 
TRACK ODDS llot tcllel 
Rates of return. take subtracted 
Figure 4.2 reproduced from Snyder (1978) 
meeting separately. The results are shown in Figure 4.2. 
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The results confirm the findings in the other studies. It is noted that the possible profit 
available by backing short odds horses in the final race, disappears when associated costs 
(transportation, entrance fees and appropriate cost for time involved) are taken into 
account. In addition the number of betting opportunities are few, and even a moderate 
bet would push the odds lower, which might well reduce the profit level to zero when 
the take is taken into account. 
The main aim of the paper is to test whether the so called "experts", the handicappers, 
are less biased than the public with regard to the odds. If the experts had no biases of 
their own, returns to their predictions would be randomly distributed around the returns 
observed for the public. The results shown in Figure 4.3, indicate that the "experts" 
tended to accentuate the public's betting bias. The public therefore do not set odds which 
closely resemble those predicted by the newspapers, usually on the morning of the 
meeting. The pattern is similar for last races on the card. The reason for the discrepancy 
is likely to. be the unwillingness of the handicappers tq point a finger too clearly at 
horses with strong or weak chances of winning. The problem with such morning line 
odds has been discussed at some lerlgth in section two. 
Weitzman (1965) used racetrack data to derive a utility of money curve for an average 
bettor at the track. His approach differed from previous studies along these lines in that 
it was not conducted using the laboratory approach. Further he did not restrict himself 
to deriving the utility curve for individuals and then try and aggregate, but rather derived 
a utility curve based on an aggregation of individuals behaviour. The basis of the 
analysis is the expected utility model rather than the subjective expected utility model, 
which means that subjective probabilities were taken to coincide with their objective 
counterparts throughout. The reason for this is that it would have been too difficult to 
incorporate subjective probabilities into the study. Further, expected utility is only 
dependent on probability and money, all other -possible influences are taken as static. 
The expected utility hypothesis implies that maximising U(p,m) is equivalent to 
maximising p*u(m), where U(p,m) is the utility attached to the risk situation consisting 
of the possibility of winning m dollars with probability p, and u(m) is the utility of m 
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dollars. It was found experimentally that the probability of a horse's victory could be 
expressed as a smooth function of the return which it paid. Each horse in the data set 
was classified according to the return it would have paid had it won. An empirical 
probability of winning (number of winners over number of runners) was than associated 
with each value (level) of return. A function relating p and m, where m is the return for 
horses with probability of winning p is derived, and from this the curve u(m) can be 
derived exactly. It is necessary here, to quote from Weitzman, who explains the usage 
of the term function in this context. "The reader may be confused at this point by the 
usage of the word "function". It is being employed here in its strict mathematical sense; 
a function of a variable x is a unique association of a number f(x) with each number x 
in the domain of the definition. No causality in the physical sense is meant to be implied 
by this definition. Thus it is not being maintained tha't the crowd-determined return 
causes the objective probability of a horse's victory - more likely it is the other way 
around and the crowd's estimation of the, horse's probability of victory sets the return .. 
The existence of probability as a function of return in the mathematical, not the causal, 
sense is under investigation." The data used to derive -the relationship between the 
probability of winning and the return required by bettors to bet at that probability level, 
consisted of over 12,000 races involving over 110,000 horses. 
The best fitting curve turned out to be in the form of an adjusted hyperbola, i.e. such 
that, 
p(x)= A+ B log(l +x) 
x x 
where x is the return to $1 and p(x) is the empirical probability of winning associated 
with that return. 
This gives a supposed indifference curve for the average bettor in the sense that he 
doesn't mind at which pro~ability level he bets at, as long as the return is in accordance 
with the above formula for specific A and B. It is noted that under the expected value 
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hypothesis, the resulting indifference curve would be a hyperbola of the form p(x)*x = 
constant. The conclusion is that the expected value hypothesis gives a good indication 
as how the average bettor behaves. 
It is assumed that the average bettor gambles $5 per race. This is close to the observed 
amount actually wagered per person at the tracks surveyed. We thus have m = 5x, as 
well as a functional relationship between p and m. By assuming that the average bettor 
obeys the expected utility hypothesis, we have p*u(m) = K, where K is the constant 
utility of an indifference curve for the bettor. In addition we have p=p(m), and therefore 
K = p(m)u(m). To set the utility scale, let u(5)=5 utiles. Then K = 5*p(5), where p(5) 
is the probability related to the return of $5. Now u(m) = K/p(m), which can be derived 
for dollar values within the range considered. 
It is noted that a vast quantity of data was used to derive theoretical probability function 
upon which the utility curve was based. This stands in contrast to the usually 
indeterminate nature of experimentally derived utility functions. The final point is that 
the derived utility curve is similar to the one derived on theoretical grounds by 
Markowitz as an amendment to the Friedman-Savage hypothesis. 
Ali (1977) investigated subjective and objective probabilities of winning, and from the 
relationship between the two, attempted to characterize bettors' behaviour. The data 
considered were 20 247 harness races run in the U.S.A. at three different race tracks 
from 1970 to 1974. To derive the objective and subjective probability estimates, horses 
were grouped according to their level of favouritism. It is argued that the variation in 
the winning probabilities of the horses most likely to win the races may not be 
substantial. Similar arguments are put forward for horses second most likely to win and 
so on. It is therefore decided to group horses based on their level of favouritism rather 
than their actual odds as determined by the public. 
The results are in accordance with other studies which have compared subjective and 
objective probabilities. Thus we see that horses at short odds, (high probabilities) have 
probabilities of winning underestimated by the public, with the opposite true for horses 
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with long odds. Instead of explaining these differences using the psychological make up 
of the bettors, Ali explores the possibility that the differences are owing to a specific 
form of utility function applicable to them. It is suggested that if bettors are assutned to 
be sophisticated in the sense that the objective probabilities of winning are completely 
known to them, then the relationship between the objective and subjective probabilities 
can be explained by the expected utility hypothesis. Bettors are then characterized as risk 
seekers. 
An alternative suggestion is that if bettors are not wholly sophisticated, then the data are 
consistent with bettors who are risk neutral and are unable to estimate objective 
probabilities exactly. The following assumptions are made, by Ali, regarding a typical 
bettor in order to derive his utility function from the data. He is a utility maximizer, 
sophisticated and acts as if his betting opportunities are limited to a single race. In 
addition his utility is assumed to be a function of wealth alone. His utility function is 
derived and its shape implies that he is a risk seeker who takes more risk as his level of 
capital declines. 
A new measure of risk is defined and used to further investigate the behaviour of 
bettors. The risk factor was computed separately for the three tracks for which data was 
available. The track which showed bettors taking most risk was that which had 
substantially lower betting per person per race than the other two tracks. This was taken 
as further evidence that bettors' risk attitudes increase when their capital decreases. Risk 
factors are also calculated for the first, second and last races of the day. These show risk 
attitudes to be about equal for the first two races but higher for the last race. Since 
bettors have less capital at the end of the day than at the start, (owing to the track take) 
this also suggests that as capital declines so bettors are prepared to take higher risks. 
Metzger (1985) examined laboratory established biases from optimality, in the natural 
setting of the racetrack. Two separate experimental findings were tested. Firstly, the 
gambler's fallacy, where bettors bet less (more) on favourites after a series of favourites 
have won (been beaten). Secondly, variation in the reference points for the framing of 
outcomes lead to variations in the acceptability of risk. In particular, the status quo at 
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the start of the day is chan;cd continually through the racing day, and outcomes are 
framed increasingly in terms of getting back to·the status quo rather than on winning for 
the day. This should lead the public to increasingly avoid favourites through the day. 
The data consisted of 11 313 races run in the U.S.A. during 1978. The public's 
subjective probabilities, p, were calculated for each horse. In addition, after all horses 
were assigned to an odds class, the objective probability, P, of a horse in each class 
winning was calculated as the ratio of the number of winners to the number of horses 
in each class. The public's accuracy in estimating the winning probabilities is then given 
by a=p/P. For the investigation of the gamblers fallacy, a was classified by odds class 
and the result of the two previous races. An F and S indicate that the race was won by 
the favourite or second favourite respectively, while an L indicates that another horse 
won the race. The results are shown in Table 4.2. 
ACCURACY OF PuBLIC EsTIMATIONS OP PROBABILITIES I' 
Public Outcomes of Pre-previous and Previous Race+ 
Estimi:ret LL SL FL LS SS FS LF SF FF 
First Choice 
51 (46-77) 104 98 91 85 91 96 94 86 85 
244§ 122 189 98 . 55 94 209 83 145 
35 (31--46) 103 109 100 109 92 97 100 97 97 
792§ 347 561 394 166 242 540 235 469 
27 (25-31) 96 108 113 113 108 90 100 87 96 
423§ 168 265 181 67 124. 295 130 187 
24 (17-25) 98 93 115 100 159 87 89 106 89 
454§ 172 288 200 87 114 312 142 201 
Second Oioice 
25 (22-35) 96 96 93 100 114 119 96 104 108 
19 ( 17-22) 106 95 127 119 66 90 95 173 100 
774§ 349 586 383 173 252 557 250 463 
15 (14-17) 100 104 99 94 88 88 150 115 89 
744~ 307 479 331 131 197 494 223 355 
395§ 153 238 159 71 125 305 117 184 
*Ratio ( X 100) of average public estimate to true probability of winning for runners 
in each odds range. tExample: SL means the pre-previous race was won by the second 
choice ( S) and the immediately previous race was won by a long shot ( L) . L is any 
other than che first ( F) or second choices. tMean percent of win pool wagered on 
runners in each odds range. Ranges in parentheses. §Number of observations in each 
row below ratios. 
Table 4.2 reproduced from Metzger (1985) 
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Table 4.2 shows that the public are influenced by the results of the most recent races. 
For example, for horses categorised as F, note that the value of a, for horses in the 
shortest odds class, after two favourites have won the last two races is 85 indicating a 
large ·underestimation of the favourites chances in the following race. For horses 
categorised as F, there are 8 overestimations of favourites chances, ( a > 100) when a 
favourite has not won one of the two preceding races, while there is only one 
overestimation when the favourite either won the last race or won the penultimate race 
and the second favourite won the last race. For horses categorised as S, the analogous 
comparison was not significant. 
The results relevant to the second investigation are shown in table 4.3. In this table a has 
been categorised by the number of the race on the caid and by odds class. For. first 
choices, races 1 and 9 show consistent underestimation of the horses' chances no matter 
ACCL"RACY OF PUBLIC EsTlMATIONS OP PROBABIUTIES II* 
Public Ordinal Number of Race 
Escimate! 1 2. 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
First Cioice 
51 <46-77) 96 100 100 94 91 91 91 93 93 
106§ 84 206 137 173 164 228 275 56 
35 (31-46). 97 97 106 100 109 103 106 90 9; 
523§ 458 593 526 547 515 595 599 3il 
27 ( 25-".'3 l) 96 129 100 100 104 117 96 93 93 
279§ 327 251 286 269 276 225 190 343 
24 (17-25) 86 131 108 96 87 111 112 110 92 
349§ 388 207 308 267 302 207 192 48i 
Second Cioice 
25 (22-35) 109 100 100 114 100 96 93 96 104 
372§ 379 569 540 563 552 569 664 330 
19 (17-22) 106 106 95 100 112 100 119 112 100 
542§ 576 464 489 472 457 448 402 531 
15 (14-17) 115 97 107 104 87 92 125 92 116 
343§ 302 224 228 221 248 238 190 396 
*Ratio ( X 100) of average public estimate to true probabilitr of winning for runners 
in each odds range. 
!.Mean percent of win pool wagered on runners in each odds range. Ranges in paren· 
theses. 
§Number of observations in each row below ratios. 
Table 4.3 reproduced from Metzger (1985) 
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what the odds class. The second choices show no consistent pattern. It is suggested that 
the unexpected finding of similar betting patterns on the first and last races, may be 
explained by the generally larger fields in these two races, or the availability of exotic 
betting on the first and last races, which is not be available on other races. 
Busche and Hall (1988) undertook to replicate previous studies of the favourite-longshot 
bias using data from Hong Kong racing. The data consisted of 2 653 races run between 
I 
1981 and 1987. Two methods of grouping horses are used, namely, by odds class and 
by level of favouritism. The odds classes were chosen, subject to the constraint that no 
class have zero winners, to maximise between-group (minimize within-group) variation. 
A regression of subjective odds on empirical odds was performed for the Hong Kong 
data and separately on U.S.A. data available from previous studies. 
The derived regression lines were as follows, 
U.S.A Subjective Odds = 1.144 + 0.747*0bserved Odds R2 = 0.993 
Hong Kong Subjective Odds = -2.908 + 1.251 *Observed Odds R2 = 0.99 
A slope of the regression line of less than one implies risk seeking behaviour, while that 
of greater than one implies risk averse behaviour. The results from grouping by level 
of favouritism are shown in Table 4.4 along with the results from two similar studies 
using U.S.A. data. Column three gives the objective probabilities of winning, while 
column four gives the subjective probabilities. The tendency to overbet long shots 
evident in the U.S.A. studies is not apparent in the Hong Kong data. No explanation is 
offered for the results other than to note that the betting volume in Hong Kong is far in 
excess (approximately 10 times as much per race) of that in the U.S.A. 
Vannebo (1980) commented on Snyder's paper that had appeared two years earlier. He 
stated that the tests of the E.M.H that Snyder had carried out were not actually tests of 
efficiency. He suggests that it may be quite rational for bettors to bet on long shots 
which have a lower expected return, as long as the skewness of the returns are 
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Hong Kong Betting Data Classified by Favorite Position 
No. of Win Fraction of Standard Asch . .Malkiel. 
Races Fraction Money Bet Errors Ali and Quant 
Rank (N) <O (ljl) (iii - ') 1977 1982 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
I 2.653 .276 .284 .92 -10.29 -2.119 
2 2.653 .190 .187 -.39 .99 -.903 
3 2.651 .151 .142 -1.29 -.52 -1.972 
4 2.647 .0985 .1104 2.05 3.45 -.961 
5. 2.638 .0835 .0862 .46 3.49 .074 
6 2.598 .0627 .0662 .74 3.01 -.279 
7 2.509 .0483 .0498 .35 5.80 .480 
8 2.346 .0473 .0370 -2.35 6.20 1.096 
9 1.992 .0336 .02n -1.46 2.095 
10 1.620 .0209 .0209 .0 
11 969 .0227 .0175 -1.09 
12 726 .0138 .0133 -.12 
13 411 .0098 .0103 .IO 
14 233 .0129 .0078 -.69 
Table 4.4 Reproduced from Busche (1988) 
sufficiently large to compensate for the lower return. People in his scenario have a trade 
off between expected return, variance of the return and skewness of the return. In all the 
studies considered thus far, only two moments were considered. In a sense, this single 
paper negates all weak form tests of efficiency, (i.e. comparing expected returns for 
different odds levels) that have been performed in previous papers. The difference 
between his paper and others is that he does not explain the differences between 
objective and subjective probabilities using utilities or psychological misconceptions, 
regarding the probabilities, but rather with the aid of a third variable. 
Only one other paper to our knowledge, examined the existence of skewness of returns 
using horseracing data. This was Bird (1987). The data consisted of bookmaker odds at 
four points in time prior to each race. The races considered were run in Australia in 
1983 and 1984. All horses were grouped by their level of favouritism. Each horse had 
its odds adjusted so that the sum of the probabilities for each race added to one. This 
implies a zero take by the bookmaker. Subjective probabilities were calculated by adding 
the "sum to one" probabilities for each level of favouritism and dividing by the number 
of runners at that level. Objective probabilities were calculated by observing the number 
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of winners at each level and dividing this by the number of runners at each level. 
The results shown in table 4.5, are consistent with the findings of similar studies. In 
particular the favourite-Iongshot bias is clearly evident. To investigate this bias further, 
a $1 bet was placed on all horses and average rates of return were calculated for each 
level of favouritism. Actual odds as well as "sum to one" odds were used. The results 
shown in table 4.6 reconfirm the favourite-longshot bias in that rates of return decrease 
with increasing level of favouritism. Note that the market is weakly efficient if charges 
are included in the returns. Since the variance of the return, (risk) increases as the level 
of favouritism decreases (and thus returns decrease), the results indicate risk taking 
behaviour under a two moment (mean, variance) model. 
• 
Estimates of Obiective and Sub;ective Probabilities by Level of Favoritism 
Favorite 
(Sample Subj. 
Sizel Prob. 
1(1026) 0.256i 
:2(10261 0.1686 
. 3(1026) 0.1296 
'-1-(10261 ·o.lOli 
5(10261 0.0811 
: 6(102-1-) 0.0635 
i7(1009) 0.052-1-
: 8 (985) 0.0-1-21 
• 9 (931) 0.03-1-0 
; 10(8i-I-) 0.021-l-
; 1 l(i91) 0.0225 
. 12(690) 0.0186 
: 13(5-1-5) 0.0162 
14(41-1-) 0.0138 
15(2i-I-) 0.0125 
16(193) 0.0111 
Period 
Obj. Subj. Obj. Subj. Obj. Subj. \ Obj. 
Prob. 1 Prob. 1 Prob. Prob. Prob. Prob. j Prob. 
0.3000"' i 0.2598 I 0.3060"' : 0.2732 0.3171"' 0.2806 I 0.31 i9"' 
o.1~00 .. ' 0.1~93 J 0.1133 I 0.1128 0.18:0 0.1740 l 0.189~ 
O.b40 0.1.>01 I 0.1404 I 0.1288 ! 0.1318 ·i 0.1296 I 0.128.l 
0.1014 0.1020 1
1
0.1104 0.1008 '. 0.0940 II 0.1003 I 0.0933 
. I I • I 
O.Oi05 0.0809 0.0661 l 0.0793 : 0.0644 I 0.0793 : 0.0666 
0.0540 0.0647 0.0570 ; 0.0629 i 0.0632 0.0626 ! 0.060i 
o.o44o 0.0520 o.o43s i 0.0548 
1 
0.0390·· 0.0495 i o.o4o3 
0.031 r· 0.0415 0.0369 .. ! 0.0399 I 0.0211:· . 0.0385 I 0.0334. 
0.0236. 0.0333 o.0214 '. o.0318 i o.0219 .
1 
o.0303 I o.0206 
0.0284 0.0257 0.0213 i 0.0250 I 0.0305 0.0239 0.0266 
0.0180 0.0218 0.0220 i 0.0200 I 0.0174 I 0.0189 .,· 0.0144 
0.0095"' 0.0180 0.0101' ! 0.0163 ; 0.0098 ; 0.0149 I 0.0116 
0.0117 0.0157 0.0131 I 0.0141 I 0.0121 I 0.012610.0115 
0.0099 0.0135 0.0078" I 0.0118 I 0.0060' I 0.0105 I 0.0060 
0.0063 ·0.0122 0.0069. I 0.0105 I 0.0085 0.0091 I 0.0091 
0.0043 l 0.0109 0.0041 . o.0088 i 0.0069 I 0.0015 j o.oos2 
·· Difference between subjective and objective probabilities significant at 0.05 level 
· Difference between subjective and objective probabilities significant at 0.10 level 
Table 4.5 reproduced from Bird (1987) 
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·Period 
t1 t2 
Favorite •"Sum to I ! ·"Sum to 1 ! (Sample Actual One"' Actual One" 
Size) Odds Odds Odds i Odds 
% oio ' o ii O/o 
1(1026) -15.28 ... 14.08.. -9.~0 .. ; 16.42·· 
2r1026) -2~.57::: -~.13 .. : -20.61:: I u2 
3(1026) -b.38 . -11.83 . -17.80 I 5.46 
40026, -24..io .. : i.31 -14.9r I 9.o8 
5(10261 -35.72"" I -13.43 . -36.20 .. ! -18.36 .. 
:6(1024); -39.95 .. :-19.72"": -33.55 .. 1'-14.85 
7(1009). -42.59 .. : -22.73.. -38.56 .. -21.43"" 
8 (985) -51.11 .. i -32.54 .. : -53.51 .. 1· -39.53 .. 
9 (937) -52.30 .. ; -35.85 .. '-53.34 .. : -39.67 .. 
. 10(~74). -32.~1::: -7.·:~ : -:8.59:: I -8.27 
11(191);-44.10 -25 . .)t -.)1.95 :-12.35 
' ! : ! , 
12(690). -64.92"" : -52.09 ... -68."15 .. : -58.43"" 
13(545): -56.54 .. : -39 .. 61°" : -43.87" i -27.74 
1-+(414): -66.12"" ! -52.97"": -70.65° 0 ! -62.04 .. 
. 15(274) -80.21 .. i -71.97""; -n.43·· 1 -10.00·· 
'16(193) -86.70 .. ! -80.84 .. ; -86.20 .. 1-81.8_6 .. 
.. Significant at 0.05 level 
· Signifi~ant at 0.10 level 
Actual 
Odds 
O/o 
-5.40 
-13.22 .. 
-11.54" 
-22.61·· 
-33.64 .. 
-20.08 .. 
-41.63"" 
-53.43 .. 
-43.56 .. 
-6.73 
-38.38 .. 
-59.48° 0 
-37.53 
-72.~2 .. 
-61.74 .. 
-67.70 .. 
t3 t4 
I "Sum to : "Sum to 
1 One" Actual One"' 
J Odds Odds Odds 
Oo 
13.97"" -7.38" 11.66 .. 
4.31 : -10.81° . 7.56 
7.50 : -17.99 .. : -0.24 
-6.79 .. 1-24.45::: -9.05 
-19.81 I -29.61 -14.39 
-3.92 1-27.12'" i -11.39 
-29.68 .. I -38.96 .. ' -25.36 .. 
-43.80·· 1-41.76 .. 1 -29.37 .. 
-31.62·· -47.92'": -35.82"" 
13.24 -8.42 . 9. 77 
I 
-25.73 -41.21"" ! -27.54 
-5u1·· -49.05·· 1 -37.61°. 
-24.05 -39.82 : -26.75 
-66.61". -71.44 .. : -64.6i"" 
-53.37'" -56.84 .. : -48.13·· 
-60.35·· 1-75.78 .. ! -70.36 .. I 
Table 4.6 Average rates of return to a $1 bet by level of favouritism reproduced from 
Bird (1987) 
Bird notes that well informed, risk averse stock market investors take account of 
skewness of the returns when choosing between risky investments. Thus there· exists a 
precedent for investors to consider more than just the mean and variance of the returns. 
The standard measure of skewness is calculated for each level of favouritism, and this 
is noted to increase as the level of favouritism decreased. The relative preference for 
variance and skewness were evaluated using regression analysis. The returns were 
regressed against a constant and terms for variance and skewness. The coefficients of 
these variables were significant and the variables themselves explained a large proportion 
of the variation in the rates of return. The variance term has a positive coefficient, 
indicating that gamblers needed a larger return to compensate them for accepting higher 
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variance. The skewness term has a negative coefficient, suggesting that gamblers are 
willing to accept a lower return in order to have an opportunity of winning unusually 
large returns. 
The results and conclusions of the regression, stand in contrast to the two moment 
interpretation, that suggests that gamblers are in fact risk taking individuals. In all the 
regressions, (at different time points before the races) the return and the variance of 
return were positively related, indicating risk averse behaviour. 
Even if gamblers are risk averse, participation in a game that promises negative returns 
must surely be viewed as risk seeking in an intuitive sense. This is considered as a 
further question within the framework of the expected utility hypothesis. Utility of 
wealth models have been criticised for not accounting for non-wealth benefits derived 
form g~mbling. Among others, those mentioned are excitement, recognition, status 
seeking, demonstration of skill and having a good time. It is suggested that these non 
financial benefits are aligned with the pursuit of skewness of returns. It is also suggested 
that gamblers do not believe that individually, they are faced with a game of negative 
returns. The final conclusion is that racecourse gamblers are risk averse individuals who 
derive particular pleasure from certain non-wealth factors associated with gambling. 
4.3 Comments, Further Ideas and Proposals 
Griffith (1949) performed a similar investigation, to that undertaken by later researchers 
who investigated the Efficient Markets Hypothesis. Whereas their emphasis was on the 
returns available, Griffith concentrated on the probabilities, objective and subjective, of 
the events concerned. Later researchers thus considered the results of the data, while 
Griffith considered the reasons for arriving at those results. He was looking for evidence 
of psychological misconceptions related to probabilities. The results of the data analysis 
were similar. In the E.M.H section of this work, we have performed a similar 
investigation to that of Griffith. We concentrated on the returns, rather than the 
probabilities involved. In an investigation conducted at the racetrack, subjects were asked 
questions which would relate their views regarding probabilities without them having to 
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bet. The findings and conclusions Jrom the investigation, reported later in this work, 
provide some answers to the questions posed by Griffith as to why the observed pattern 
of probabilities emerged the way it did in his study. 
McGlothlin (1956) conducted a similar study to that of Griffith. In addition he 
investigated the probabilities involved for the last race on_ each card separately. The 
possibility exists that favourites in the last race are avoided more strongly than usual. 
In South Africa where bookmakers compete with the tote for the bettors funds, an 
additional aspect of this idea is the following. Consider a bettor who has a "live" pick-
six ticket on the favourite in the last leg (which is the last race of the day). Assume the 
price of the horse at opening betting, which generally reflects a conservative estimate 
ofthe horses winning chances as set by the bookmakers, is 1/1. ~ssume further that our 
bettor is one of only a-Jew that have a "live" ticket on the horse, (not an unlikely 
scenario) and stands to win R50 000, say. His outlay may have been anythipg from 
RlOO to RlO 000, He may now approach a bookmaker and offer him odds of 15/10 on 
the horse for a bet of say 15 000 to 10 000. Then if the horse wins, he collects R50 000 
and pays the bookmaker R15 000, and if the horse loses he gets RIO 000 from the 
bookmaker. The bookmaker agrees to this since he can "sell" the horse to the public at 
odds shorter than 15/10 and therefore can make a profit on that particular horse, whether 
the horse wins or loses. 
Such bookmaker facilities are not available in the U.S.A, so we would expect the results 
obtained by McGlothlin in regard of final races to be more pronounced in South Africa. 
A similar investigation will be carried out using South African data. An investigation of 
risk taking behaviour through the racing day will also be undertaken using South African 
data. Use will be made of the size of the pools on win, place, swinger and trifecta 
betting for each race, as these reflect different levels of risk, as defined by the variance 
of the return. 
Rosett (1965) proposed a model of parimutuel betting behaviour based on three 
questionable assumptions. These are (i) that the factors involved in determining winning 
probabilities are known to bettors, (ii) that bettors use this knowledge to correctly 
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forecast these probabilities, and (iii) that bettors know how to calculate both the 
probability of winning a combination of simple bets (win bet on a single horse) and the 
corresponding payoffs to such combinations. Since the data conform to the model, it is 
assumed that the assumptions (which effectively imply rationality and sophistication of 
bettors) are correct in practice. However, this conclusion is not intuitively appealing as 
it is very difficult to disentangle the data in such a way as to be able to say which of the 
three assumptions is most often violated in practice. Simply because the results are in 
concordance with the model, does not say anything regarding the process whereby such 
results were achieved. The differences between analysis that concentrates on results as 
opposed to that which centres on processes is discussed later in this section. 
Ali (1977) also makes questionable assumptions regarding human behaviour as well as 
some doubtful comments on the grouping of data for analysis purposes. The problems 
with grouping horses for the purpose o( investigation by odds class, probability or level 
of favouritism have already been discussed. Ali suggests that the variation of winning 
probability within a group determined by level of favouritism is likely to be small. This 
is clearly not so, as a favourite could start at 112 or 5/1, (say). The range of probability 
here is 0.167 to 0.667! If groupings were based on probabilities or odds such variation 
would never occur as the maximum length of a probability group would be, say, 0.1. 
The variation in probability of horses most likely to win from race to race is thus far too 
large in Ali's study. 
Ali discards the psychological analysis of differences in objective and subjective 
probabilities and derives a utility of wealth function under the assumption that the 
objective and subjective probabilities are equal. The assumption that bettors are 
sophisticated, in the sense that the objective probabilities are known to them, is highly 
suspect. The observed differences may be owing to the misconception of probabilities, 
rather than to a difference in peoples subjective and objective scales of money. Further 
dubious assumptions are necessary in order to derive the utility function itself. In 
addition to assuming sophistication, bettors are assumed to be utility maximizers and to 
behave as if betting opportunities are limited to a single race. 
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Although it is unlikely that people are so simple as to be described as utility maximizers, 
we shall not argue the point here. We are in serious doubt, however, regarding the view 
that bettors only consider one race at a time and in total isolation to other races on the 
day or even other races at meetings to be held in the near future. For example, a bettor 
may bet on a race early in the day simply to try and win enough money so as to increase 
the size of an exotic wager (jackpot, pick six) to come later in the day. It is very 
unlikely that the possible payoffs from a particular race are not included in any plans for 
betting later in the day, implying that bets may be struck with a view to future 
opportunities. The derived utility function of Ali, must therefore be looked upon with 
caution. 
Snyder (1978) examined newspaper tipsters predictions and compared these with returns 
to the public. The methodology of the examination is the best way of analysing such a 
situation, but as has been discussed at some length in section 2.3.2, many problems exist 
with the use of forecast price information. Similar analysis using South African data 
would yield meaningless results. 
In keeping with the high standard of his other research paper, Bird (1987) makes a 
significant contribution to the understanding of human behaviour in gambling situations. 
A similar investigation is conduc.ted to Griffith's original, but an additional variable, 
namely skewness of returns, is con~idered to explain bettors preferences. Mention should 
also be made of Vannebo (1980) who was the first to suggest that bettors preferred 
positive skewness of returns, and that this was reflected in their betting behaviour. 
Following the conclusions of his own study, Bird suggests methods of analysis of human 
behaviour that could be used in the future. Of particular importance, is the suggestion 
of models which make no underlying assumptions of rationality or maximizing 
behaviour. These models are concerned with cognitive mechanisms, simplifying 
heuristics and information processing strategies that people make use of before making 
decisions. 
The early papers of Preston and Baratta (1948), Edwards (1953), Edwards (1954(i)) and 
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Edwards (1954(ii)), being by psychologically inclined experimenters, all concentrated 
on the probability variable as opposed to the money variable in the gambling situation. 
They were all conscious of the process leading to the. results, rather than in the results 
themselves. The papers concerned themselves not with horseracing, but with laboratory 
experiments designed to elicit information about subjects behaviour under risk. This 
seems to be the only drawback of these works, in that a natural setting of decision 
making is not used, and the results of the laboratory experiments could not really be 
generalized until it was later shown that the results obtained, were reproduced in the 
natural setting of the race track. These papers are of considerable importance, although 
they have not found favour with researchers such as economists who have tended to 
concentrate on the monetary aspect of the problem of gambling. 
4.4 Results and Conclusions 
An investigation was made into the winning probabilities of horses with specific odds 
running in the last race of the racing day. The odds categories were grouped in the 
following way: 
1) 1110 to 9/10 
2) 111 to 2/1 
3) 22/10 to 33/10 
4) 7/2 to 9/2 
5) 5/1 to 6/1 
6) 7/1 to 8/1 
7) 10/1 
8) 12/1 
9) 14/1 
10) 16/1 
11) 20/1 
The data were from 189 last races involving 2 487 horses. The observed probabilities 
were compared against the expected probabilities as determined from the average odds 
of the group. 
The results are shown in Table 4.7. 
Average odds in group Wins 
0.45 15 
1.46 27 
2.76 34 
4 31 
5.5 19 
7.5 16 
10 13 
12 15 
14 8 
16 10 
20 -- 1 
tJserved Table 4. 7 Ex ected and ol p 
the day. 
* = significant at the 10% level 
** = significant at the 5 % level 
p 
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Runners Expected Observed 
22 0.689 0.681 
60 0.406 0.450 ** 
118 0.266 0.288 
162 0.200 0.191 
185 0.154 0.102 ** 
217 0.117 0.073 ** 
225 0.091 0.057 * 
492 0.077 0.030 ** 
-
361 0.067 0.022 ** 
259 0.058 0.038 * 
386 0.047 0.002 ** 
robab1hties of wmnm · for runners m the last race o g
The results show that there exists a significant difference between the actual probability 
and that expected on the basis of the odds, in the short odds categories. The direction 
indicates that these horses are underbet (leading to odds that are to high/probabilities that 
are too low) relative to their real chances of winning. Comparison was now made 
· between the observed probabilities in categories two and three with the observed 
probabilities of similar groups of horses, which had been based on all races, (not simply 
the final race). The tests showed a significant difference at the 1 % level between the 
observed probabilities of the two samples (the first sample is made up of horses that ran 
in any race, whereas the second is made up of those horses that ran in final rac;:es only). 
It therefore appears that punters do avoid betting on short priced horses in the final race, 
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and turn rather to longshots in what seems to be a final desperate attempt to even out 
their losses of the day. 
In order to further investigate a change in bettor behaviour through the day, we analysed 
the proportion of the total amount bet on each of the following bets; Win, Place, 
Swinger and Trifecta, for each race during the day. Owing to the fact that the number 
of races varied from 7 to 10, the following adjustments were made. Firstly the data was 
analysed by the original number of the race conc.erned. This inevitably meant that race 
7 on a Wednesday (the last race on the card) was grouped with race 7 on a Saturday 
(which is usually the third last race of the day). So that we could see what was actually, 
happening d'uring the last race of the day, the data were regrouped, this time adjusting 
all Wednesday races 7 to a notional race 9 with the problem now that race 1 on a 
Wednesday becomes race 3 on a Saturday. The two data sets taken together should 
however give an indication as to what differences exist between betting on the _opening 
races of the day and the final races. The results are shown in Tables 4.8 and 4.9. Tests 
to compare the average percentages bet in the first and last races for each bet type, 
indicated that there was no significant shift in the proportion wagered for any of the four 
bets. Further analysis of this data would require specific questioning. of bettors at the 
track regarding their bet preferences through the day. 
4.5 Decision Analysis: A Psychological Approach 
The value of the Expected Value Hypothesis and the Expected Utility hypothesis, lies 
in their simple mathematical nature, as well as their natural and intuitive appeal. In 
addition the Expected Utility Hypothesis correctly describes human behaviour in many 
areas of observation. A problem exists, however, in that although human behaviour often 
conforms to the suggested model, this does not mean that the assumptions underlying the 
model are correct. 
In many instances, the axioms underlying utility theory are "proven" to be true through 
some set of data, and the conclusion that follows, is that humans therefore have these 
axioms consciously or unconsciously in their minds and behave so as to satisfy them. 
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. r- 40 
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_J 35 
0 
RACE NO. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
RACES WIN 
57 15.55 
57 13.85 
57 13.56 
57 15.21 
57 15.7 
57 15.84 
57 15.42 
53 15.64 
30 15.98 
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PLACE. SWINGER TRI FE CT A 
5.99 26.64 51.81 
7.04 27.97 51.13 
6.5 26.57 53.35 
7.02 27.61 50.15 
6.99 25.64 51.65 
6.41 23.43 54.31 
6.04 24.32 54.21 
6.18 24.66 53.51 
6.28 24.16 53.55 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 
RACE NUMBER 
7 8 9 
1--WIN -+-PLACE ~ SWINGER --a- TRIFECTA 
Table 4.8 Percentage of total amount bet per race split by bet type, where race number 
was taken as the actual number of the race. 
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RACE NO. 
9 
8 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
RACES 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
57 
53 
30 
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WIN 
14.45 
16.29 
16.24 
15.44 
15.1 
14.52 
14.08 
14.45 
16.05 
PLACE SWINGER TRI FE CT A 
5.6 24.71 55.23 
6.14 23.8 53.76 
6.15 23.61 53.98 
6.7 24.81 53.05 
7.15 26.42 51.31 
6.92 27.88 50.67 
6.83 27.98 51.09 
7.11 27.51 50.91 
5.75 25.14 53.05 
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9 8 7 6 5 4 
RACE NUMBER 
3 2 1 
1---- WIN -+-PLACE __,.._SWINGER -8--- TRIFECTA .1 
Table 4.9 Percentage of total amount bet per race split by bet type, where race 9 
represents· the last race of a particular day, and not necessarily races which are the ninth 
race. 
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Clearly, causal relationships between behaviour and any proposed axioms are very 
difficult to prove, but the fact that some correlation exists between predicted and actual 
behaviour cannot mean that the axioms underlying the _predicted behaviour are actually 
responsible for the observed behaviour. 
Although the most commonly used models of human behaviour have the considerable 
advantage of mathematical sfmplicity, it is our opinion that models need to be developed 
using a more general approach (incorporating factors other than the usual money and 
probability variables). This would not be so that the models could be generalized to 
many areas, but rather that they might apply with a higher degree of accuracy to one or 
two specific instances. This approach would obviously then have to be repeated every_ 
time a new situation required description or explanation. 
We are also of the opinion that the Expected Utility Hypothesis has been accepted so 
widely because it is used by economists who, in our. experience, pose the question 
"What?" far more often than the questions "How?" or "Why?". In contrast to this, 
psychologists, who generally eschew the Expected Utility Hypothesis in favour-of more 
complex explanatory models, or at least take the view that money is not the variable that 
should be concentrated on, in any decision analysis, are more concerned with the process 
behind the results, rather than what the results actually were. 
Consider the following from Reder (1986), "Finally, both the challenges and difficulties 
of fruitful coexistence of economics and psychology are encapsulated by the reductio ad 
absurdum cited by Arrow: "There cannot be any money lying in the street, because 
someone else would have picked it up already". For the economist operating within the 
rational choice paradigm, this statement can be taken to mean that, for all practical 
purposes, the world behaves as if there were no money lying in the street. The 
psychologist, however has no reasons to accept this statement as a working hypothesis. 
Instead, he would accept the possibility that some money may be lying in the street and 
would consider it worth learning who finds it and why"~ 
In this work we shall concentrate on the approach taken by psychologists, and pursue 
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an understanding of the process whereby people make decisions. We shall disregard to 
a large extent the mathematical formulations of the decision making process and start 
anew. We suggest that people do not consciously act so as to maximize anything, and 
that if on the whole they do so, there are other forces at work which lead to such 
observed behaviour. We shall include the influence of non-wealth variables if we find 
that they applicable to describing actual decision making. Most importantly we shall 
consider how, and why, decisions are actually made, i.e. the process of decision making. 
Consider Reder (1986) again, " ... economic explanations involve showing that outcomes 
(i.e., what agents decide to do) are consistent with the maintained hypothesis of the 
rational choice paradigm. For psychologists, on the other hand, explanation requires 
specifying the process by which choices are made. Moreover, for an economist, the 
process explanation of the psychologist is; at most, of incidental interest unless it leads 
. . 
to outcomes at variance with the maintained hypothesis". Psychologists on the other hand 
are not threatened by unexpected empirical results. The challenge to the psychologist is 
to construct a theory of the observed process, which may include any number of 
contradictions to the suspected hypothesis, and to see wl}ether this might generalize to 
domains other than choices as in the given experiment. For the gambling process at 
least, this too is our challenge. 
Before we begin investigating the alternative approaches suggested above, we briefly 
review the most commonly used and easily understandable mathematical models that 
have been proposed as either descriptive or prescriptive of the decision making process. 
The Expected Monetary Value (EMV) hypothesis assumes people will maximize the 
expected value of their return when making decisions. This implies they will be prepared 
to pay the expected value of a game, in order to participate in the game. If Pi = the 
probability of outcome i and Xi is the payoff resulting to the bettor if the outcome of the 
event is i, then by the EMV hypothesis, the amount a bettor will pay to play the game 
is 
i=n 
E(X)=°L,p;X; 
i=l 
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Note that it is assumed in the model that the objective scales of money and probability 
are equal to the respective subjective scales. 
We next consider the von-Neumann/Morgenstern Expected Utility Hypothesis, which 
incorporates the Bernoullian Expected Value criterion. Under such an hypothesis, the 
aim of the decision maker is to maximise his expected utility. Consider u(X), a function 
of the value of money. This function, generally called a utility function, can take any 
form, but specific shapes, often used, represent different attitudes towards risk. In this 
case a bettor would pay the monetary amount which he equated with the utility worth 
of 
i=n 
to play the game. Note under this hypothesis the objective and subjective scales of 
money differs, but the subjective scale of probability is assumed equal to the objective 
scale. 
Under Certainty Equivalence Theory, the reverse is true. Thus the objective and 
subjective scales are assumed equal for money, while the scales are assumed different 
for probability. This subjective or personal school of probability was primarily developed 
by Frank Ramsay (1931), Bruno de Finetti (1937), Leonard Savage (1954) and Pratt, 
Raiffa and Schlaifer (1964). In their view, probabilities are degrees of belief, applicable 
to both repetitive and unique events. 
If f(p) represents a function of probability, then under this hypothesis, the amount a 
bettor will pay to play the game is, 
i=n 
Lftpi)Xj 
i=l 
Under Non-linear Expected Utility Theory,- both probability and money have subjective 
scales differing from their objective scales. It should be noted that in order to derive a 
subjective scale of money it is necessary for subjects (at least) to be completely aware 
of the objective probabilities of all outcomes of the event. In ·addition, subjects should 
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not prefer betting at certain probabilities to others. Similar problems exist when 
subjective scales of probability are determined. Under such a scenario the bettor should 
pay the monetary equivalent of the utility worth of 
i=n 
Lftpi)u(Xi) 
i= 1 
to play the game. 
Under Prospect Theory, the function of probability f(pJ is replaced by a Decision 
Weight function, w(pJ. Decision weights are not probabilities, and do not obey the 
mathematical constraints of probabilities. In addition they cannot be interpreted as a 
measure of belief. They are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities , except 
in the range of very low probabilities. Another key aspect of Prospect Theory is that 
utility values are attached to gains an~ losses, rather than final wealth states, as in 
Expected Utility Theory. 
How should we go about determining how and why people make certain decisions when 
faced with risky outcomes? We suggest that the best manner is to investigate the 
subject's psychological state close to when the decision is being made. There will be 
many variables which affect such a state and the difficult part lies in determining which 
of these gains the upper hand at the time of the decision ,and thereby play a larger then 
expected role in the decision making process. 
Examples of these could be the reliability and availability of information regarding the 
bettors subjective probability estimate of a particular horse winning a race. A most 
important consideration which needs particular attention, is the timing of events that are 
likely to affect decisions. In this regard it is highly probable that events having occurred 
most recently, give rise to factors having a stronger hold, (in order to gain the upper 
hand described above) than events that have occurred in the more distant past. This will 
be discussed in more detail shortly. 
As we have stated above the key to such analysis is through the psychological processes 
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of the subjects. We therefore looked into some relevant psychological literature, before 
coming up with our own suggestions regarding why people make certain decisions. The 
literature relates to gambling in general as well as to broader topics of decision analysis, 
while our suggestions are based·on observations of, and discussions with gamblers at the 
racetrack. In addition a field study was undertaken to shed more light on the psychology 
of bettors at the race track. 
4.5.1 Literature Review And Comments 
McCauley et al. (1973) investigated the difference in behaviour between groups and 
individuals using subjects at the race track. In previous laboratory studies, groups had 
sometimes shifted towards more risk than the individuals that comprised the group, but 
on others the reverse was observed. The paper was the first to study this phenomenon 
in a natural setting. 
The riskiness of a bet was defined by the odds, with long odds indicating risk and short 
odds, caution. Subjects were approached at the track after having made a bet. They were 
then offered money with which to have another bet, if they would participate in the 
experiment. The odds of the horse that the subject had originally bet on were recorded 
as the pretest riskiness level. Four such subjects were brought together in a group and 
three were randomly chosen to make a group decision as to where to bet their sponsored 
money, while the fourth made his decision alone. The group had to come to a unanimous 
decision as to which horse to bet on within about three minutes. The odds of the 
individuals choice was recorded as the individual posttest riskiness level, while the odds 
of the group's choice was recorded as the group posttest riskiness level. Initial riskiness 
for the group was taken as the average of the odds that the groups members had bet on 
original! y. 
A shift in risk was measured by the difference in pretest and posttest odds. A positive 
difference indicated a shift to shorter odds or a cautious shift, and vice versa. 
The results were as follows. 
Condition 
Group 
Individual 
Cautious Shifts 
16 
6 
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Zero Shifts 
1 
13 
Risky Shifts 
5 
3 
The chi- squared value associated with the table is 12.4, which indicates significance at 
the 1 % level. It is however not pointed out that the numbers within the table are small 
( <5.for some of the cells). The conclusion is that group discussion and the requirement 
of a unanimous decision produced a shift towards caution. This result is surprising if 
examined in the light of the fact that these subjects have actually paid an entrance fee 
to the track in order to take risks with their money. The assumption from this, is that 
risk is valued more than cautl.on, which is in contradiction to the observed behaviour. 
Leopard (1978) investigated risk preference in consecutjve gambling, using laboratory 
experiments. Previous studies of this idea, had produced mixed results. As discussed in 
section 4.2, McGlothlin (1956) analyzed bettors behaviour, in the real world setting of 
horseracing. He suggested that risk, as indicated by variance, was greater in subsequent 
bets when bettors were losing than when they were winning. However, other studies had 
failed to show any effects of prior outcomes on variance preferences, or found them to 
be in the opposite direction from those reported by McGlothlin. In Leopard, changes in 
risk preference over a series of consecutive decisions were related to outcome history 
and financial state. The alternative gambles available to subjects, differed in risk as 
defined by variance and skewness. 
Risk was assumed to be monotone with variance, but no a priori assumptions were made 
regarding the relationship between risk and skewness, implying that such a relationship 
has no fundamental basis. Initial tests of the i;esults showed that. subjects were indeed 
influenced by whether they were ahead or behind, in making their decisions. Two 
possible reasons are suggested for such behaviour. Firstly, bettors preferences for the 
amount of risk changed with their status within the game, and secondly, bettors 
perceptions of the amount of risk involved in the choice of a particular gamble changed 
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with their changed status. The results were examined by subject, on an individual basis. 
The first explanation accol!,nts for the observation that some bettors chose higher risk 
gambles when they were behind. The second explanation accounts for the observed 
behaviour of those bettors, who chose higher variance after a run of losses, and were 
expecting a win owing to the gamblers fallacy. In addition, subjects whose behaviour 
implied a belief in runs of luck, by choosing higher variance gambles when winning and 
low variance gambles when losing, is also explained by the second point above. Leopard 
suggests that b9th preferences, and altered perceptions are simultaneously present, when 
making decisions on consecutive gambles. 
Skewness was adjusted using a trade off between amount to lose and probability of loss. 
Since risk increases with both of these, there was no reason to believe that one factor 
would dominate the other. Such non domination would result in no obvious risk ordering 
between gambles with equal expectation and variance, but differing skewness. It was 
therefore surprising to the researcher, the extent to which agreement between subject's 
choices, was noted. This is because she had expected random results since no a priori 
reason existed, to suspect that the results might be in a specific direction. It was apparent 
that subjects viewed the probability of loss as the more important risk factor at low 
levels of variance, while the amount that could be lost was the major risk factor at 
higher levels of variance. 
Wright and Ayton (1986) examined what, how and why psychological factors affect 
people's estimates of probabilities regarding future events. Desirability and perceived 
controllability are two psychologically determined variables that affect probability 
estimation. Other variables are also discussed, but are not relevant to the horserace 
bettor. 
An example of the possible operation of the "availability" heuristic, whereby easily 
recalled instances are given too high a probability, is given. Subjects are asked to assess 
the probability of positive (lottery win) and negative (involvement in a car accident) 
events, occurring to them and someone identical to them in terms of certain social and 
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cultural factors. It was found that subjects believed that desirable events were more 
likely to occur to themselves, and that negative events were more likely to occur to 
someone else. The availability of many instances of negative events occurring to others, 
explains the belief, for negative events, but no explanation is given for the 
overestimation of the positive event probability. The pattern of responses was termed an 
optimistic bias. It is quite possible that similar questions asked of subjects on the 
racecourse would yield a pessimistic bias, especially if the "availability" heuristic was 
playing a part. 
Rosecrance (1986) investigated gambler's behaviour by examining a number of inveterate 
gamblers at the racetrack. He found that almost all the subjects had similar stories to tell 
regarding their gambling careers, and through this he was able to put together a general 
picture of an inveterate gambler. The work therefore regards the question; "Why are 
gamblers at the track at all?", as opposed to "Why do gamblers exhibit certain b~haviour 
once they are at the track?" Our interest in the first question is .based on the belief that 
much can be learnt regarding the second question by examining the results of 
psychological analyses of the first question. 
Rosecrance defines inveterate gamblers as those persons that attend the races at least 
twice per week and who consider themselves regulars. The behaviour of these gamblers 
is then analysed within an historical framework, beginning when they first start to 
gamble until past retirement age. Interviews with more than 30 subjects were conducted. 
Seven distinct phases were identified as common to all the participants in the study. 
These are shown in figure 4.4. Of importance to us and our investigation into bettor 
behaviour in gambling situations, are the first three phases. 
The first phase is the acquisition of the behaviour pattern known as playing the horses. 
In our view this is the most important phase, since given that someone has acquired such 
behaviour, it is likely that they have experience of risky situations which will allow them 
to make rational decisions within their own framework of risk, that may appear irrational 
to most other people, including researchers, who are not gamblers, and are therefore 
assumed never to have been provided with sufficient stimulus to acquire gambling 
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The career lines of inveterate horse players arc fairly similar until the disillusionment and resolu· 
tion phase is reached. Then there is a considerable branching due to the various life styles of the 
panicipams. Broken lines indicate drop outs. 
Figure 4.4 reproduced from Rosecrance (1986) 
behaviour and alternate attitudes towards risky situations. 
Two factors were present in almost all the serious players interviewed. These were the 
exposure to gambling before age 21, and the winning of a large amount, (usually in 
excess of 10 times· their average winning) shortly after having started gambling. (From 
a personal viewpoint, both Rosecrance and this researcher can testify to being serious 
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gamblers and to satisfying both the ,above conditions). The early big win is vitally 
important in determining future behaviour, since those that are rewarded early, begin to 
believe that winning at the track is possible. This would certainly not be the attitude of 
another person of similar background to the gambler in question. 
The power of the first big win may partly explain why bettors avoid favourites and 
pursue long-shots with such consistency. Consider the following from Rosecrance; 
"Almost all serious horseplayers can vividly recall their first big score, how much they 
made, the name of the horse, the flush of excitement when their horse won, and their 
wonder and surprise at such an occurrence. The big score often becomes such a 
significant part of gamblers' memory systems that mere recall of the event provides 
sensory stimulation." If a repeat performance of this event is of any importance to the 
bettor, it is likely that he will be observed to make decisions contrary to those predicted 
by a utility function that was derived for him while away from the racetrack 
environment. 
The other factor of importance in acquiring gambling behaviour is sufficient exposure 
to gamblers, as well as gambling situations, such as horseracing, which usually occurs 
through the media. It was found that gamblers with middle class upbringings did not 
usually have contact with gamblers in their early years, and were generally introduced 
to horseracing through exciting accounts of the sport in the media. They then associated 
horseracing and gambling with a colourful and unorthodox life style, which was 
appealing when contrasted with their own mundane middle class environment. People 
of such character are almost certain to have different attitudes towards risk than their · 
more "mundane" counterparts and therefore, their behaviour may include examples of 
apparent irrationality at the racetrack. 
Consider the following real life example of one of the subjects in Rosecrance's study. 
"The life of the race gambler was so different from my own - so much more stimulating, 
it really turned me on. When I heard on the radio that horse racing was opening in my 
town, I got a couple of buddies - almost on a dare- to go to the track. When I got there, 
the crowd, the noises, the charged atmosphere - Man, it blew me away. I bet $5.00 on 
the first race. The horse actually won. I couldn't believe it! I said to myself, 'This is for 
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me!'"- · 
It appears, therefore, that gamblers are easily capabl~ of separating their worlds into 
two, boring and exciting, say. It would surely not be assuming too much to believe that 
they could, in addition, separate their financial accounts into two different worlds as 
well; an account for the exciting world and an account for the boring world. They could 
then act completely differently as far as financial decisions are concerned because the 
money being used is in its own specific sit_uation where the person may assume a totally 
different psychological outlook on that specific world. We believe that this point is also 
very important in explaining gambler's so called irrational behaviour at the track. 
Phases two and three in the gambler's career are the recognition of the difficulties of 
sustaining a gambling trait, and the development of a gambling strategy. In the second 
phase it is quickly acknowledged that simplistic methods of betting are not rewarded and 
this leads to the third phase, in which a complex gambling strategy is developed. Figure 
Do not wager on a horse unless: 
I) it pre\·iuusly raced within tWt:nty·onc <lays; 
'.Z) it was a1 kast third in its last rac:e; 
J) it had a workou1 wi1hin livl' days of today's ract"; 
-~) it is riddl'll liy a lt-ading jockq· (in lht• top tl·n); 
5) it is trained by a lt·ading 1rai1wr (in 1hc top 1e11); 
6) it has won al leas1 twen1y pcn:cnt of i1s races; 
7) i1 was no worse than third at 1he lirst quarter mile in its last ran·: 
8) it is no more than eight to one in the belling. 
Figure 4.5 reproduced from Rosecrance (1986) 
4.5 shows a betting system devised by one of the subjects in the study. 
The key point to note about the system is that it is_ a rule based, or heuristic system. The 
individual and collective effects of these rules need to be learned, and incorporated into 
the gambler's psychology. We believe that apparent irrational actions of bettors are 
based on the inadequate application of system heuristics. For example, assume that the 
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above eight rules were sufficient to suggest winners to a high degree of accuracy, and 
that owing to this fact, our bettor had been very successful in his betting. In addition, 
assume that following the heuristics rigidly will lead to what observers would call 
rational behaviour, according to Expected Utility, (say). The bettor's mind will soon 
most likely associate one or two specific heuristics with his victories, and soon he will 
bet on the basis of these alone, rather than on the collective effect of all the rules. 
A specific example of this, may be a memorable late dash by the jockey aboard his last 
winning bet. Although the bet was made on the basis of much more information than the 
jockey alone, the bettor is so impressed by the jockey, that the next time he bets, he 
weights the jockey far too highly, at the expense of the other variables. This easily 
recalled instance, (which may be recalled for years ahead) is biasing the bettor away 
from optimality and so called rationality. Thus, we may well observe an irrational choice 
owing to one specific heuristic playing too great a role in the decision making process. 
If we assume that bettors DO in fact devise some system that allows them to make 
rational decisions , (and this is evidenced empirically), then we must assume that 
eventually decisions are made using only part of that system (probably owing to the 
effects of the above, or even just plain laziness in the analysis of the available data) 
which inevitably results in both sub-optimal, but also apparently irrational choices. 
The favourite-longshot bias apparent in so much of the economic literature, is easily 
explained from a psychological standpoint. Consider the following from Rosecrance; 
"Inveterate race gamblers frequently indicate that winning a large bet generates an 
incredible high. Gamblers report that when their conviction is verified and the ensuing 
. . . 
payoff is substantial, they feel a sense of exhilaration and omniscience." These feelings 
are almost certainly those sought by gamblers who select high risk and lower return bets 
(longshots) in favour of those with lower risk and higher return (favourites). 
We have attempted to explain why gamblers behave the way they do. Having read many 
papers on the relevant topics we have come to the conclusion that gambler's behave they 
way they do BECAUSE they ARE gamblers. Thus the Expected Utility Hypothesis 
which may be applicable to "normal" people would not approximate gambler's behaviour 
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even remotely, because gamblers, having experienced gambling, have had their 
psychological outlook changed to the extent that they are not "normal" anymore. 
4.6 A Field Study 
4.6.1 Background 
The failure of Expected Utility Theory as both a predictive and descriptive model, most 
likely stems from an inadequate recognition of the various psychological factors which 
are used in the judgement of choices. Many problems with the Expected Utility Theory 
approach to decision making have been reported in the literature. We wanted to know 
which of the observed violations of the theory were taking place at the racetrack. In the 
following paragraphs we have made a summary of some of the observed problems with 
utility approaches to decision making, as· well as citing examples of how these would 
manifest themselves at the track. We then present the results of the study. 
1) Utility models generally consicfor only rewards, not regrets. 
At the racetrack a bettor may violate the rational decision according to the utility model, 
of say, betting on a particular horse for a win, by choosing rather to bank that horse in 
a Jackpot or Pick-6 bet. This means that only one horse is selected as the possible 
winner of one of the legs and the bet cannot be won if this horse (the "banker") does not 
win. These high risk, high return bets offer a large amount of regret if they could have 
been won by betting them rather than the win. A return to the win bet is more likely but 
offers a far lower return with concomitant lower regret at not having bet for a win, 
assuming that the Jackpot bet is lost, while the win bet would have been successful. 
Let us consider a specific example. Our bettor is convinced he has a winner for the day, 
and the horse's odds are approximately 4/1. He has, say, R400 to spend on the day. If 
he backs the horse for a win he will receive Rl 600 less tax plus his stake back if the 
horse wins. If he takes a Jackpot with his selection as a banker, his return if successful 
could range from RlOO to RIO 000 (say). Note that a successful Jackpot bet implies a 
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successful win bet, but the converse is not necessarily true. Since ·it is far more likely 
that the return to the Jackpot will be in the region of R300, utility theory would suggest, 
given the subjects utility for money curve, that he would bet on the horse for a win. The 
observed behaviour is likely to be otherwise, however, since the fear (regret), of missing 
out on the possible RIO 000 Jackpot weighs more heavily than any other factor on the 
bettors mind. 
2) Utility models conventionally attach utility values to final wealth levels, not to gains 
or losses occurring within the specific decision making environment. This point requires 
the introduction of the concepts of reference points and aspiration levels. 
The racetrack bettor may violate his expected behaviour, according to Expected Utility, 
because he attaches an "irrational" value to a certain return that at other times he may 
not do. Jn addition he may bet irrational~y because he is attempting to achieve a specific 
target and he attaches an "irrational" value on this target. It is likely that these two 
scenarios would occur at different points in the racing day. 
Let us consider an example of the second point first. Suppose that our bettor will only 
be satisfied if he wins at least R5 000 on the day. He will therefore only bet on the high 
risk, high return bets available. These would be the Jackpot, Pick-6 and Trifecta. This 
scenario would likely take piace early in the racing day. Now assume that our bettor has 
lost all except 10% of his money. He does not have enough to win R5 000 anymore but 
he does have enough to get his money back that he has lost during the day. He now 
looks for those bets which will provide him with this return and attaches special value 
to them. This scenario most likely occurs at the end of the racing day. Clearly, the risk 
taking behaviour in both these cases depends both on where you are as well as where 
you want to be financially. 
3) Single attribute utility models do not consider the non wealth factors associated with 
making a bet. 
Besides the potential monetary gain, any bet also includes the utility derived from 
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making the bet. These include, the analyzing of the relevant information, pitting one's 
predictions against one's contemporaries at the track in order to seek status, and 
probably most important of all, excitement. These factors are largely absent if one 
selects the known favourite. Thus even though utility theories would suggest that bettors 
would bet on such favourites, observed behaviour is likely to differ owing to the 
derivation of utility other than that derived from money. 
4) Utility theories assume a holistic approach, whereby multidimensional alternatives are 
each assigned a separate level of utility before a decision is made. Thus decision makers 
are required to take a portfolio perspective before making any decision. 
Decisions are more likely made in decomposed fashion, whereby each alternative is 
compared against a standard and eliminated if it does not measure up~ It is also possible 
for alternatives to be compared against each other directly, without preset standards, and 
the choice is that which has the most favourable aspects. In both of these approaches the 
comparisons are made on a piece-meal basis, i.e. one dimension at a time. Suppose one 
is offered an insurance policy, Expected Utility Theory assumes that the decision 
regarding the policy will be made taking account of all other risks that you face. It is far 
more likely that people do not approach· decisions in this comprehensive manner and 
rather treat such problems in isolation. 
The following points all relate to the psychology of probability judgements. Subjective 
probabilities commonly violate basic statistical principles thereby invalidating the axioms 
of utility theories. 
5) Easily recalled instances which are memorable and have also occurred in the recent 
past have too great an effect on the assessment of the probabilities involved in the 
decision making process. This is generally known as the availability bias. 
Let us consider a specific example that could occur at the racetrack. Assume our bettor 
wants to bet on the Jackpot, which is his regular form of bet. Assume last week that he 
bet on the Jackpot, and was knocked out by a horse that he considered to have no 
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chance, because the horse was· eight years old and he could not remember the last time 
an eight year old won a race of any description. In one of the legs of the Jackpot today 
he is faced with a field of 10, of which two are eight year olds. In this instance he is 
likely to include these two horses which last week, according to him have been no-
hopers. The reason for there inclusion is not only that the instance of an eight year old 
winning occurred in the recent past, but also that it was a memorable (if not happy) 
occurrence, which had caused him to lose money the previous week. 
6) In attempting to determine true probabilities, initial estimates are often made close to 
a median value, and then adjusted. This leads to an underestimation of the variance of 
the probabilities involved and is generally known as the anchoring bias. 
Assume our bettor is faced with a race involving twenty runners. ~pproximately 10 of 
these will fall into the bookmakers betting class of "others" as the rank outsiders of the 
race. Cleady they all do not have the same true probability of winning but owing to the 
subtle prompting of the bookmakers the bettors will deem this to be so. Assignments of 
probabilities to these horses are likely to be incorrect because of the initial estimates 
which rank all these horses at some basic level. 
7) Any alternative which displays certain characteristics which are typical of previous 
occurrences will most likely be assigned a probability which is overestimated. This is 
generally known as the representativeness bias. 
Punters in general will have a perception of what characteristics a typical winner 
possesses. On this basis, a horse with such characteristics will be deemed a likely 
winner, irrespective of the number of losers that also have such characteristics. 
Given this large number of possibilities for failure, it is likely that at an individual level, 
expected utility maximization is the exception rather than the rule as regards observed 
behaviour. As a descriptive model of the decision making process, Expected Utility 
Theory fails firstly, because people do not. structure problems as holistically and 
comprehensively as the theory suggests. Secondly, they do not process information 
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regarding probabilities according to the theory's rules, and thirdly it is highly unlikely 
that Expected Utility can be used as a general descriptive model, since it barely 
describes behaviour in controlled laboratory situations. 
4.6.2 Procedure 
In order to gain some insight into gamblers' behaviour we thought it necessary not only 
to investigate their group behaviour via aggregate tote and bookmaker data, but also to 
approach individuals at the track and ask them how they went about betting and how 
they would react to certain situations. A questionnaire was devised to extract information 
in such a way as to be able to easily identify subjects' biases, which had been observed 
in previous aggregate· data work. 
At the time the field study was being undertaken, we were approached by a student 
investigating racing from a marketing point of view, and it was decided to group our 
resources and to have one questionnaire for both topics. The questionnaire is shown 
here. The first three pages of questions relate to the marketing section of the 
investigation, while the final two pages concern the decision analysis section of the 
work. 
People were approached at random at the racecourse and asked whether they would be 
prepared to fill in the questionnaire. They were told that it would only take a few 
minutes, although some of the subjects got quite engrossed and took up to forty five 
minutes to complete it. Both Wednesday and Saturday race meetings were attended by 
the researchers when there joint schedules permitted. Up to four hours at a time were 
spent at the racecourse, and approximately ten visits were required to collect the sample 
of eighty six respondents. 
The researchers sat with some of the subjects while they completed the questionnaires, 
in order to explain some of the questions but were careful not to prompt any specific 
type of answers. The majority of subjects took the questionnaires away and returned 
them later in the racing day. A brief check was made to see if all the questions had been 
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answered. If some had not, the researchers asked the subjects to please complete the 
questionnaire. This was often the situation in the· case of question twenty in the decision 
making section of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire is shown on pages 4-55 to 4-59. For the purposes of this work we 
need have no regard for the marketing section of the questionnaire and it is only shown 
so that an idea can be obtained of what the subjects had to go through before answering 
the questions which do concern us. It is likely that about two thirds of the time spent on 
the questionnaire was spent on this section and it is quite possible that by the time 
subjects proceeded to the decision making section they were already tired of answering 
questions. In addition, the more complex nature of the questions on the final page rnay 
have elicited an attitude of apathy in the subjects, who may then have answered without 
much thought in order to get on with what they had come to the races to do. Overall 
however, we believe that sufficient thought went into the answering of the questions to 
make the results of the investigation meaningful. The data was transferred to computer 
by professional data capturers and random checking indicated that the transfer was 
accurate. 
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QUESTIONARE 
Good afternoon, my name is ••.••••. , I am presently 
completing my thesis at UCT. I would appreciate it if you 
would answer a few questions with respect to racing. All 
answers are stictly confidential, and are only used for 
research purposes. · 
DEMOG~APHICS. 
1.CLARIFY : Member 
Non member 
2 . AGE: 1 . 16-34 
2.35+ 
B 
B 
Reach limit = close interview. 
3.How of ten do you attend the races.· 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Basically every racemeeting. 
More than once a· month. 
Once a men th. 
Twice or more in this past year. 
Once in the past year. 
Less of ten. 
--
·-
If attend less than once a year in the past year, close 
interview. 
4. For what reason.did you decide to come to the races? 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
An interest in Racing 
To gamble 
It was a feature day 
' You were invited as.a 
I am an owner /trainer I 
Other please specify. 
,,. 
as a sport. 
ie. the J&B Met. 
gues~. 
breeder. 
5. Thinking back on your first racemeeting, please tell me 
your reason why you decided to attend it. 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
F'or purely monetry gain. 
A friend/family member encouraged 
A oenuine interest in racino as a 
I was inquisitive. 
Other, please specify. 
me to go. 
scort. 
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6. What do you enjoy about coming to.a ~ace meeting. Read 
the 1 is t below and rank the first three • order of in 
preference. <eg. 1 = most imper tan t; 2 = 2nd and 3 = 3rd 
most imper tan t) 
1 • Make money.<profitable) 
2. The c:hallange of gambling. 
3. Relaxing. 
-4. !he an tic ipa tion of the big win. 
-5. Sociable. i-... 
6. Friendly racing atmosphere. ~ 
7. Enjoyment of racing <as a sport) 
7.Listed below are statements concerning the racing 
ind us try. The scale rates the statements from STRONGLY 
-
AGREE to STRONGLY DISAGREE. Place an x in the box that you 
feel accurately rates the statement in your op in ion • 
I ST. AAR.E.E A~ft.£E N1£TM£.R. 1""b1~a£ 5. ";b1~r.m. 
1. Horse racing is a game of skill. 
2. I enjoy watching the horses run. 
3. Most horse races are rigged.· 
4. Horse racing is well advertised. 
5. Horse racing is the most enjoyable 
form of camblinc. 
6. " A day at the races" would be tun 
.eg. The Met ;Durban July 
7. Restaurant facilities· are pleasant 
iand com for tab le. 
8. !The racecourse is an undesirable 
place that at tr ac ts the wrong type 
tlf person. .. 
9. I enjoy gambling at casinos, rather 
than on the horses. 
10. I would like to own a racehorse if 
I had the choice. 
1 1. The di tferen t types of betting on 
the course totally confuse me. 
12. Racing is a .sport frequented by the 
wealthy, upper class. 
13. Bar facilities are accessible and 
comfortable. 
-
14. Parking is convenient and sate. 
15. R7 is a acceptable entrance fee to 
pay considering the tac i 1 i ties. · · 
16. Food is overpriced. . .. 
17. They could· improve facilities tor 
the spec ta tors. 
18. Food and drink are easily accessible 
at the track. 
19. The raceclub caters for the whole 
family. 
-- --
S.14f.£E A4e~&. Nlt=.Tit~C: 
20. I would rather bet at the racetrack 
than bet through the tote. 
At tending a racemeeting is my idea of a good Saturday afternoon entertain-: mt. 
Other than gambling Horse racing is 
baring. 
21. 
22. 
I pref er to watch horse racing. on 
T.V. than actual lv attendinQ rac ina. 
Bookmakers are generally honest. 
23. 
24. 
8. What, in your opinion are the major problems with racing 
in the Cape? 
9.Read the list below and then give me in your opinion what 
the three most important improvements needed in Cape racing. 
Rank the first three in order of prefe~ence. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Better racec:ourse amenities. 
More tote tac i 11 ties. 
More pre-race inl'orma tion Qn t;he: . 
rtrainers. ... . - . . 
. . 
New t:ypes of bet: t:ing , 
More accessible parking. 
Serious pun ishmPn t for offenders 
the betting. 
More information on how to bet. 
~ 
~or.ses , ;ioc keys and 
who manipulate 
:?l 1$/V;rue $, 2>1!Jl'r:.etJ. 
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DECISION MAKING (CIRCLE THE ANSWERS TO THE RIGHT OF TEZ 
QUESTION.) 
1) Do you generally bet on favourites or outsiders? FAV 
2) Which of these three favourites would you prefer to bet on; 
1) 6/10 1 2 
2) 2;1 
3) 4/1 
3) ivhich of these three outsiders would you prefer, to bet on; 
1) 7/1 
2) 20/1 1 2 
3) 66/1 
4) Do you bet on horses that you have backed before? y 
O/S 
3 
3 
5) Do you bet on newspaper selections? y N 
6) Do you bet on Computaform/Winning Form.selections? y N 
7) In which of the following betting categories do you spend ~ost 
money; A) Pick Six 
B) Jackpot WRITE YOUR TC? 
C) Trifecta THREE IN ORGER. 
D) Win 1) 
E) Quinpot/PA/Swinger/Place 2) 
3) 
8) Do you generally listen out for "inside information"? Y N 
9) If you obtain "inside information" would you act on it? Y N 
10) Is your decision to bet influenced by how much you have lost 
on the day? Y N 
11) Is the amount you bet influenced by how much you have lost on 
the day? Y N 
12) Do you generally consider the possible win from your bet or 
the possible loss? WIN 
13) Do you bet cmore on feature races than any other single race? FEAT 
14) Do you bet more on late races than early races? L E 
15) Do you pref er backing horses in large or small fields? L s 
LOSS 
OTH 
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16) Do you follm; :::arJ.:et movements? y N 
17) Which of the fellowing horses that firm in the market ~ould 
you bet on if you could only back them at Starting Price? 
Opening Price Starting Price 
CIRCLE TEE 
l ) 2/1 15/10 NUMBERS 
2. ) 3/1 15/10 YOU WOULD 
3) 4/1 15/10 BET ON. 
4) 3/1 2/1 CHOOSE AS :-!ANY 
s ) 4/1 3/1 AS YOU wcu:..D 
6) 4/1 2/1 BET ON. 
7) 5/1 1/1 
8) 16/10 15/10 
18) Which of the following horses that drift in the market would 
you bet on? 
l ) 
L. ) 
:: ) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
15/10 
15/10 
15/10 
2/1 
. 3/1 
2/1 
1/1 
15/10 
Starting Price 
2/1 
3/1 
4/1 
3/1 
4/1 
4/1 
5/1 
16/10 
CIRCLE TEE 
Nu:'1BERS 
YOU WOULD 
BET ON. 
CHOOSE AS M.~:NY 
AS YOU WOULD 
BET ON. 
19) Which of the following are most important in helping you 
decide whether to bet or not; please rank the top 5 in order. 
20) What 
with 
1 ) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
A) possible retur:i 
B) possible loss 
C) amount of money on you 
D) amount previously won 
E) amou~t previously lost 
F) inside information 
G) newspapsr tips 
Selections 
1) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
H) Computaform/Winning form tips 
I) support for horse in market 
J) been following the horse 
is the percentage chance, in your e:i:.perience, of horses 
the following odds winning; 
% % 
1/3 5) 3/1 
7/10 6) 5/1 
11/10 7) 10/1 
2/1 8) 25/1 
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4.6.3. Results and Conclusions 
The results of the study will be statistically interpreted using the non-parametric chi-
square test of proportions. It is assumed th.roughout in the null hypothesis that the 
answer to any of the questions, is equally likely' to be any of the alternatives on offer. 
In all cases, the number of respondents to an individual question is less than the sample 
size of eighty-six. This is because not every subject answered every question. A 
summary of the results is shown in Tables 4.10 to 4.12-. 
-
Question Number of Results 
Number Respondents 
1 68' Favourites = 23 
Outsiders = 45 
2 73 6/10 = 3 
2/1 = 32 -
. -· 
4/1 = 38 
3 74 7/1 = 45 
20/1 = 19 
66/1 = 10 
4 77 Yes = 72 
' 
No= 5 
5 76 Yes = 20 . No= 56 
' 
6 73 Yes = 32 No= 41 
7 75 First Choice Only 
Pick-6 = 10 
Jackpot = 14 
Trifecta = 7 
Win = 15 
Place= 29 
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8 79 Yes = 42 . No= 37 
' 
9 78 Yes = 60 
' 
No= 18 
, 
10 78 Yes = 41 
' 
No= 36 
11 75 Yes = 38 . No= 37 
' 
12 73 Win= 52 
' 
Loss = 19 
13 74 Feature = 18 
' 
Other = 56 
14 64 Late = 38 . Early = 26 
' 
15 68 Large = 40 
' 
Small = 28 
16 69 Yes = 43 
' 
No= 26 
17 79 Number of respondents choosing 
alternative 
l) 19 
2}24 
3) 31 
4) 28 
5) 39 
6) 25 
7) 33 
8) 17 
4-62 
18 79 Number of respondents choosing 
alternative 
1) 30 
2) 25 
3) 17 
4) 28 
5) 32 
- 6) 21 
7) 17 
8) 35 
Table 4.10 Results ot q uestions one to eighteen ot held stud y 
I I first choice I 
a) possible return 21 
b) possible loss -· 1 
c) amount of money on you 13 
d) amount previously won 6 
- . 
e) amount previously lost 0 
f) inside information 6 
g) newspaper tips 1 
h) Computaform tips 2 
i) betting support for the horse 5 
j) been following the horse 14 
Table 4.11 Results of uest1on nineteen of field stud· - number of res ondents - b~ q y p 
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I : choice I ~ond 
I cumulative 
I 
a) possible return 13 34 
b) possible loss 1 2 
c) amount of money on you 17 30 
d) amount previously won 7 13 
e) amount previously lost 1 1 
f) inside information 9 15 
g) newspaper tips 4 5 
h) Computaform tips 3 5 
i) betting support for the horse 3 8 
j) been following the horse 9 23 
-. 
Table 4.11 Results ot q uestion nmeteen ot held stuc y - number o~- res ondents = oj p 
4-64 
Respondents Odds Average True Ratio 
Observed Probability 
Probability 
63 1/3 0.7811 0.7500 1.04 
61 7/10 0.6926 0.5882 1.18 
62 11/10 0.5976 0.4762 1.25 
61 211 0.5000 0.3333 1.50 
62 3/1 0.4189 0.2500 1.68 
60 5/1 0.3498 0.1667 2.10 
60 10/l 0.1985 0.0909 2.18 
59 25/1 0.0989 0.0384. 2.57 
Table 4.12 Results of question twenty of field study 
Question one (along with some others) is helpful to elicit information regarding the well 
known favourite-longshot bias. We note that twice as many people prefer backing 
outsiders to backing favourites. The chi-square test statistic of 7 .11 is si~nificant at the 
1 % level of significance. There are probably many behavioral factors at work here, and 
for different reasons. Firstly, bettors might overestimate the chances that long shots will 
win, therefore believing they are getting value for money by backing such horses. 
Secondly, bettors might derive sufficient extra utility from betting on a longshot that they 
do not worry about the monetary and probability aspects. Thirdly, it is more fun and 
more status is derived from backing an outsider rather than a favourite. Finally, it is 
possible in a large market, that bettors choosing horses for essentially irrational reasons, 
such as the horses name, boost the pool and drive the odds down on unfancied horses 
to a larger extent than they could do on fancied runners. 
The results of questions two, three, five and six ~e also useful for gaining insight into 
the favourite-longshot bias. Question two indicates that bettors avoid very strong 
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favourites (horses with probabilities of winning in excess of 0.6 (say)), while they are 
indifferent between favourites in the range of 2/ 1 and 4/ 1. This again indicates a 
reluctance to bet on high probability events if an alternative is available offering a lower 
probability of success. The chi-square test statistic of 28. 79 (p < 0.005) indicates a 
significant difference between the alternatives; in the direction as explained above. 
Since it is widely acknowledged that the press generally suggest horses that end up as 
favourites, it is no surprise that the respondents indicated that they did not follow the tips 
of the newspapers. This is in keeping with their attitude towards betting on fancied 
horses. The results for question five, regarding newspaper tips yielded a test statistic of 
17.05, significant at any conventional level. On the other hand, the professional tipping 
guides are assumed to provide fewer tips on favourites than the press, as well as the 
occasional outsider. It is likely for this reason that punters take these guides more 
seriously when making their choices. It is probably not because they provide a superior 
service (in terms of return to their bets), that the guides are more readily used, but 
because they suggest horses with characteristics that the public find attractive, i.e. lower 
probabilities of winning than the tips suggested elsewhere. 
The results of question three are anomalous in the sense that they go .against what is 
observed in aggregate at the track. We have observed that the returns to horses at odds 
of around 7 /1 are far greater than the returns to horses at around 20/ 1 or 66/ 1. The 
reason for this is that too much money is placed on horses at the longer odds, i.e. the 
longshots are relatively (to their "true" chances of winning) more popular than the 7/1 
shots. It appears therefore that when faced with a 20/ 1 or 66/ 1 shot against a full field, 
a bet would readily be placed on such horses. However, when these longshots are 
compared against a single horse at 7I1, it is the 7I1 ·shot that is chosen significantly mo.re 
often, even when the data for the two longshots is combined. Further work is required 
in this area in order to understand this problem fully. 
The results of question four demonstrate the emotional involvement of the bettor, which 
is likely to allow him to make "irrational" decisions according to Expected Utility 
Theory. Bettors are often heard to say that they are backing a particular horse because 
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they are following it. This means that they have bet on it in one or more of it's Ia.st 
races, have most likely lost, and are expecting it to win this time. Clearly this approach 
does not pay any regard to the rest of the field! The extent to which this behaviour is 
practiced is evidenced by a test statistic of over 58, indicating a significant preference 
for following horses. The reason for such behaviour is probably an attachment of some 
kind to the horse, having bet on it recently. Consideration must also be taken of the 
irrational attitude of bettors that believe that the horse will win as soon as their money 
is not riding on its back. This close emotional involvement with the situation itself, is 
far removed from the assumptions underlying Expected Utility Theory. 
Question seven investigates risk taking attitudes on a broade~ scale than looking at 
individually priced horses in a single race. We regard the Pick-6, Jackpot and Trifecta 
to be high risk, high return bets, while Win, Place, Quinpot, Place Accumulator, and 
Swinger are considered to be lower risk and to provide lower returns than the first three. 
By combining the original data into two categories we have the following results. We 
consider only the first choice of subjects, i.e. that bet type which they would spend most 
money on. 
High Risk = 31 ; Low Risk = 44 
The test statistic for these data is 2.25, ind.icating there is not a significant difference 
between the number of bet types chosen. 
Questions eight, nine, sixteen, seventeen and eighteen have implications for the Efficient 
Markets Hypothesis. Questions eight and nine examine attitudes towards inside 
information that bettors may acquire directly, (from an owner or trainer, (say)) question 
sixteen asks whether bettors follow inside information not directly ayailable to 
themselves, while questions seventeen and eighteen examine what level of movement in 
the odds is necessary for bettors to act on such perceived inside information. 
The test statistic for question eight is 0.31 which is evidently not significant. Bettors are 
therefore as likely, as not, to pursue inside information directly. The test statistic for 
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question nine however is 22.61 which is highly significant. This indicates the belief 
among the general betting public that inside information does exist, and that they would 
use it if it came to hand directly. The results of these two questions, taken together, 
imply that the majority of bettors, (of our sample anyway) believe that inside information 
is available, but would not be able to obtain such information. This is therefore 
indicative of a perceived strongly inefficient market. 
A further indicator that bettors perceive the market to be strongly inefficient, is provided 
by the results of question sixteen. By following market movements, bettors are implicitly 
suggesting that information not available to the bookmakers at the start of the betting 
period, is being made available during this period, thereby influencing the odds. We 
wanted to know the level of movement required before bettors_ themselves would place 
a bet on a horse they believed was being backed on the basis of inside information. 
Tables 4.13 and 4.14 give the sixteen market movements our subjects could chose to bet 
on, arrang¢ in order of the number of times chosen._ The percentage change in the 
odds/probability is also shown. 
Firming of Odds in Betting 
Option Number of Times Chosen Percentage Change in 
Probability 
5) 4/1 to 3/1 39 25 
7) 5/1 to 1/1 33 200 
3) 4/1 to 15110 31 100 
4) 3/1 to 2/1 28 33 
6) 4/1 to 2/1 25 67 
2) 3/1 to 15/10 24 60 
1) 2/1 to 15/10 19 20 
8) 16/10 to 15/10 17 4 
Table 4.13 Anal sis of results of y q uestion ei hteen of held stud g y 
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Easing of odds in betting 
Option Number of Times Chosen Percentage Change in 
Probability 
8) 15/10 to 16/10 35 25 
5) 3/1 to 4/1 32 200 
1) 15/10 to 2/1 30 100 
4) 2/1 to 3/1 28 33' 
2) 15110 to 3/1 25 67 
6) 2/1 to 4/1 21 60 
3) 15/10 to 4/1 17 - 20 
8) 1/1 to 5/1 17 4 
Table 4.14 Anal sis of results of y q uestion e1 hteen of field stud g y 
If we assume that the greater the change in probability; the greater the value of the 
inside information causing such changes, the subjects have exhibited a high degree of 
understanding in this regard, especially with respect to horses easing in the betting 
market. The number of horses easing in the market that are chosen, decreases almost 
monotonically with an increase in the percentage change in probability. For horses. 
firming in the market the pattern is not quite as clear, although the two smallest changes 
in probability are chosen least often, while the two greatest changes in probability are 
chosen 2nd and 3rd most often. 
Questions ten and eleven investigate risk attitudes to consecutive gambling. The method 
of investigation is probably too simple to gain any insights into gambler's behaviour. 
The questions themselves are very broad, and coming one after another, probably 
confused some of the subjects, although no queries were reported. Of the 70 people that 
answered both questions, only seven had different answers to the two questions. ·In 
addition the questions would have made less sense to bettors that may have been winning 
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on the day they were questioned. Other studies into this area have shown mixed results 
as described above in Leopard (1978). The results here (chi-square values of 0.32 and 
0.013 for the two questions respectively) indicate that bettors are as likely as not to be 
affected by their betting history, (for the day) when deciding whether to bet, and if so, 
how much to bet. In order to gain clearer insight into this topic it would be probably be 
necessary to observe gamblers losing, and then ask them specific questions relating to 
their next bets. 
Question twelve examines bettors attitudes to positive and negative in connection with 
the outcome. Clearly a win is viewed as positive, while a loss is viewed as negative. We 
are thus investigating the direct viewpoint of the subjects as regards the framing of the 
problem. Consider the example from Tversky and Kahneman (1986), which studied the 
preferences for different medical treatments. Two treatments are presented in both a 
survival frame, wherein numbers of people surviving each treatment are quoted, and in 
a mortality frame, wherein numbers of people dying as a result of each of the two 
treatments are quoted. The net result (numbers dead) of each treatment, in both frames 
is identical, but the choices of the respondents differed markedly depending on the way 
the scenarios were described to them. 
In our case, which is far simpler than that described above, subjects essentially indicated 
that they might bet differently if the gambling game as it exists (everything presented in 
terms of returns (wins), without attached probabilities) was presented rather in terms of 
expectations, (which inevitably would be negative (losses)). Under such a situation 
bettors would most likely consider the possible loss before any possible win, which 
might lead to different choices than we currently observe at the track. In any event, the 
fact that one alternative was chosen significantly more often, (chi-square test statistic = 
15.34, p<0.005) than the other, suggests that the framing of the scenarios is important 
in determining choices. 
The results of question thirteen are in sharp contrast to those expected. It is possible that 
the question was misinterpreted by the majority of subjects, in that they ignored the 
word "single" and assumed the question was asking them if they bet more on feature 
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races as opposed to all other races. If this is the case the results become meaningless. 
We do not pursue the problem further. 
Question fourteen essentially asks bettors whether they have some preconceived plan of 
betting, on arrival at the track. If this were the case, we could assume that their 
behaviour was quite well thought out, and determined well before their actual actions. 
The results show that bettors are as likely to bet on early races as late races, which 
means that it is possible that they have little or no specific plan regarding their actions 
for the racing day. 
If we assume that the perceived risk (variance of returns) associated with betting on 
horses, with the same expected return, in races with large fields is larger than for small 
fields, the results of question fifteen can be interpreted as supplying evidence that bettors 
prefer greater risk. The test statistic of 11.32 (p < 0.005) indicates that bettors 
•· 
significantly prefer betting ori races where the risk is perceived to be greater. 
Question nineteen _is a broad question which combines some of the other questions in an 
attempt to confirm the earlier results. In addition we can now compare the relative 
importance of factors which we have already deemed to have an influence on bettor 
behaviour. We have treated the first two choices as interchangeable and have therefore 
supplied cumulative data for these choices above. Using these data we note the 
following; Firstly it is evident that the possible return from a bet is far more important 
a consideration than the possible loss. Secondly, current financial status at the track is 
more important in determining choices than the days betting history. Thirdly, an 
important factor is the emotional attachment to some horses, (described above) that 
bettors get by having bet on them recently, and/or often. 
These three factors are clearly the most important, of all the alternatives considered, in 
determining behaviour. Combined, they are chosen nearly twice as often as all the other 
factors combined, implying that one of them gains the upper hand in bettors minds at the 
time of their decisions. The tipping guides and the press are shown to have little 
influence over bettor's behaviour, which confirms the results above. Directly obtained 
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inside irtformation, as well as that indirectly obtained via the betting market, are of 
secondary importance as far as bettor's behaviour is concerned. It is likely however, that 
were such information more freely available, it would be utilised to a greater extent, and 
would probably replace the "following of specific horses" as a betting determinant. 
Question twenty reveals the perceptions and biases of bettors. The range of answers 
obtained, indicated that subjects, in general, do not understand percentages and 
therefore, probabilities. Although the question specifically states, "in your experience" 
we took the answers to be compatible with the question: "What is the percentage chance 
of horses with the following odds winning?" 
The ratio of the observed probability to the theoretical probability, as shown in the 
results above, indicates that bettors overestimated the probabilities of horses with specific 
odds winning, in all odds categories. The overestimation is far greater in categories of 
low probability. In order to test for differences between the theoretical and observed 
probabilities, we calculated the standard deviation for each odds category. These are 
shown in table 4._15 along with the range of answers for each category, and the test -· 
statistic against the t-distribution. 
Category Range(%) Std. Dev. (%) observed t 
1) 1/3 33 - 100 22.38 .1.10 
2) 7/10 20 - 100 19.37 4.21 
3) 11110 20 - 99 20.25 4.72 
4) 2/1 10 - 90 22.59 5.76 
5) 3/1 5 - 90 22.26 5.97 
6) 5/1 4 - 90 21.23 6.68 
7) 10/1 0 - 80 18.99 4.39 
8) 25/1 0 - 50 11.24 4.13 
Table 4.15 Anal sis of results of y q uestion twent of field stud y y 
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All the.test statistics are highly significant except that for the category with the highest 
probability, which is not significant. The reason for this category being estimated close 
to the theoretical probability, is probably owing to the fact that it is the category most 
difficult to overestimate since the theoretical probability itself is so high. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS OF HORSERACES 
" ... in Wiesbaden I invented a system, used it in actual play, and 
immediately won 10,000 francs. The next morning I got excited, 
abandoned the system and immediately lost. In the evening I 
returned to the. system, observed it strictly, and quickly and without 
difficulty won back 3,000 francs." 
Fyodor Dostoyevsky in a letter to his brother Michael 
5.1 Literature Review 
Simple Systems 
The volume of literature on this topic is extremely small (we found 3 papers) and also 
of a somewhat rudimentary nature. The first paper to broach the field of horseracing, 
proposing a systematic approach to the evaluation of fundamental information, was 
Vergin (1977). lilstead of using sophisticated statistic~! techniques to evaluate the 
information, he derives a rudimentary form of expert system. A database is available, 
rules are set up, and in this way decisions regarding betting are made in a systematic 
manner. 
The starting point for the derivation of the expert system is the testing for profitability 
of 6 betting systems, using fundamental information, proposed by professional authors 
of handicapping guides. Examples of such systems are reproduced in Figure 5 .1. All the 
systems use straight-forward rules to determine whether or not a horse should be bet on. 
The aim was now to combine the "best" elements of each system into a superior expert 
system. 
Each system was tested on 102 races run in the U.S.A. in 1972. Only one of the 
systems, McQuaid Elimination, made a profit on win betting. It was therefore decided 
that the basis of the expert system should be this system with some adjustments. An 
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A brief description 0fsix betting systems 
1. System 73 by Ainslie [1] rates each horse on its winning percentage, per-
centage starts in the money, average winnings, speed rating, previous class rating, time 
of last race and last workout, and change in weight carried. A bet is placed on the 
horse with the highest rating in each race. 
2. Singularly Best Race and Speed by Cohen and Stephens [2] suggests betting 
on a horse which had a last race within the past fifteen days at a distance within one 
furlong of today's race and has a best pace rating two points greater and a best speed 
rating one and a half points greater than any other entry, with the last three races of 
each horse used as the basis of comparison. 
3. Singularly Easy Win by Cohen and Stephens [2] suggests betting on a horse 
which had a race within the last fifteen days at a distance within one furlong of 
today's distance and was first at the stretch call and won the race by at least one and a 
half lengths. 
4. An Elimination Rule advocated by McQuaid [6] eliminates any horse which 
does not meet all of a set of nine criteria. Eliminate any horse which: 
(a) has not hid one race at today's track; 
(b) has not run today's distance at todays' track(+ 1 furlong); 
(c) has not raced within one month of today's race; 
(d) has not won a race; 
( e) in· its last race did not finish in the money; 
(f) did not finish within eight lengths of the winner in its la~t race; 
(g) in. its last race lost more than * lengths in the stretch; 
(h} has a speed rating at today's distance which is not within five points of the 
highest speed rating for any of the competing horses for the past four races; 
(i) has a consistency rating which is not within five points of the highest con-
sistency rating for any of the competing horses unless the horse's speed rating is as 
high or within one point of the highest speed rating. 
S. The Consistent Horse System was also suggested by McQuaid [6]. To qual-
ify for a bet the horse must have: 
(a) had a race at today's distance at today's track(± I furlong); 
(b} had at least ten races in his' past perfonnance; , 
( c) finished no worse than second in at least five of its last ten races; 
( d) won at least three of its last ten races; 
( e) either raced and finished second or better in the last ten days or shown an ex-
ceptional workout in the last four days; 
{f) not moved up more than 25 percent in its claiming price. In addition, if the 
horse is a three-year-old against older horses early in the year or if the horse is a filly 
against males-pass the race. 
6. A Breaks and Trials System was suggested by Reynold [8]. To qualify for a 
bet, a horse must have attained specified positions at the fust call in its past three races 
and had a successful workout as described in a table in [8]. 
Figure 5.1 reproduced from Vergin (1977) 
------------------------------------------------
5-3 
examination of the rules was made to determine which could be modified to allow more 
winners. Modifications were made and new rules were introduced and this resulted in 
the return rising from 17 per cent to 78 per cent. Clearly the model has been derived to 
fit the data so the new system was applied to new data. One hundred races run in. the 
U.S.A. in 1972 yielded a return of 42 per cent, but 160 races run in Canada in 1972 
yielded a loss of 4 per cent. It is interesting to note that none of the systems uses odds 
· data as an input. 
The paper was published in the journal "Interfaces", the editor of which suggested to the 
author, (Vergin), that he was only interested in real-world applications. The author 
therefore went to the track and watched 80 races which produced 31 system bets. The 
results are shown in Table 5 .1. 
The Extreme Value Distribution 
Henery (1984) examined race results in England in- the years 1979 and 1980. This paper 
could be viewed as using technical rather than fundamental data as its base. A comment 
on this point is made in section 5.2. Horses are first categorised by their odds (SP's) and 
an average time rating is derived for each of 11 odds categories. The time rating is 
inversely proportional to the time taken t~ run a race. The rating is derived as follows: 
-
R= (L-L) 
d 
where L is the average distance of all horses behind the winner 
L is the distance of a particular horse behind the winner 
and a is the distance of the race in furlongs. 
It is hypothesised that the times to run races have an extreme value distribution (Gumbel. 
distribution). A location parameter {3 is calculated for each odds class. The model 
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Results of Professor Vergin's System Application April 15-27 
Payoff• 
Date Race Horse Bet Finish Win Show 
Position Place 
15 6 Oh Really 2 4.10 2.50 
6 Full Moon Charlie 3 2.30 
7 Rippling Snow .· 4 
16 3 Kim's Shadow 2 3.50 3.10 
8 Alberta Green 1 3.40 2.60 2.40 
8 Run Joy 2 2.90 2.50 
18 7 ·Money Hush 3 2.40 
8 Chery's Capri 1 4.10 3.20 2.50 
9 All American Kid 9 
20 8 Tudor Tay 1 53.50 . 14.40 4.50 
8 Duoro Valley 4 
9 Kim's Shadow IO 
22 6 Summer Shot 1 7.30 4.60 3.90 
7 Poona ward 7 
8 Ticket Count 4 
9 Title Victory 2 3.40 3.00 
23 1 Better Peace 2 3.00 3.00 
5 El Escorial 2 2.90 2.70 
6 Lord Hubert 4 
7 Alberta "Green 1 3.40 2.80 2.50 
7 Run Joy 2 3.20 2.80 
10 Apache Boy 8 
25 6 James Jessie 2 2.80 2.50 
8 Gian Sal 1 6.50 3.70 2.70 
9 First Purchase 2 2.60 2.10 
10 Poo Koo 6 
27 6 Winner's Deal s 
6 Double Dew 3 2.60 
8 Dandy Homer 4 
8 Lucky Gary 5 
10 Oh Really 3 2.70 
--
Total Payoffs 78.20 59.70 52.70 
Total Bets 62.00 62.00 62.00 
Dollars Won (Loss) 16.20 (2.30) (9.30) 
% Won (Loss) 26.1 {3.7) (15.0) 
•Payoff on $2.00 wager; author placed bets of l 0 times this amount, i.e., $20.00. 
Table 5.1 reproduced from Vergin (1977) 
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predicts that the true probabilities of winning, p, for the odds class is 
exp(P0 - P) p=-----
e 
for some constant /30, where 8 is a scale parameter common to all odds classes. Thus, 
given the odds of a particular runner, we will be able to predict his probability of 
winning using the extreme value distribution which predicts the time the horse will take 
to run the race. The reason for using this approach to calculating the probability of 
winning as opposed to simply using the odds directly is discussed in section 5.2. 
Six hundred and thirty-three races confined to 3-year-old horses were examined. The 
data consisted of SP's for all horses as well as the distances between the horses at the 
finish. From this data, a relative time rating for each horse is derived by comparing the 
distance of a particular horse behind the winner to the average distance behind the 
winner of horses in that particular race. For a given horse and race we thus have the SP 
of the horse and a time rating for the horse. The joint distribution of the time ratings and 
SP's is specified in a contingency table. Extreme value distribution parameters are now 
derived for each odds class. 
The empirical distribution functions for each odds class are plotted against the times. 
These functions are shown to conform to the theoretical extreme value functions at the 
lower tails. Thus the lower (faster) times are well approximated by the model and 
therefore the probabilities of winning (fast time) as opposed to not winning (slow time) 
of a horse in a particular odds class can be accurately predicted via the model. 
A Stochastic Utility Model 
Bolton and Chapman (1986) presented the first paper attempting to process a large 
amount of fundamental data using a systematic, statistical basis. The paper consists of 
two distinct sections. The first postulates a model of the horserace process and derives 
parameters for the model in order to predict, accurately, the probability of winning the 
race for a given horse. The second section uses the probabilities calculated in section one 
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as input to various algorithms for determining the optimal betting strategy. The topic of 
section two falls into another area of this research and therefore is not discussed here. 
Bolton notes that previous attempts to model the horse race process have either used ad 
hoc filter techniques, (Vergin (1977)) or regression analysis. It is noted that these models 
fail to account for the within-race competitive nature of a horserace. This means that the 
predicted probability of winning for a horse with certain characteristics is the same 
regardless of the other horses in the race. This is intuitively unsound. 
A stochastic utility model is proposed and is parameterized in the form of the 
multinomial logit model. It is assumed that a stochastic utility function exists which 
measures the overall worth of each horse for a particular race, as follows, 
where Xb is a vector of attributes of the horse 
and Yb is a vector of attributes of the jockey. 
The stochastic function consists of a deterministic component Vb, and a random 
component Eb which reflects the measurement errors in the modelling process and, 
supposedly, the existence of variables which are not included in the model but which 
may influence the results. Included here would obviously be any variables whose values 
would only be known by people with inside information. 
The probability of a horse winning a race is now given by the probability that its 
stochastic utility function is greater than that for all the other horses in the race. That 
is, the probability of horse h* winning a race of H horses is 
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The stochastic error terms are assumed to be i.i.d. according to the double exponential 
. . 
distribution which leads to the winning probabilities being calculated as follows, 
· exp(Vh.) 
Ph.=-H----
:E exp(Vh) 
h=I 
Note that the probability for horse h. depends not only on its own characteristics but also 
on the characteristics of all the other horses in the race. 
It is now clearly necessary to specify the form of Vh. A linear-in-parameters 
specification leads to: 
where Ziin is the measured value of attribute n for horse h. 80 is then the relative 
importance of attribute n in the determination of the winning horse. Maximum likelihood 
estimation is used to derive .the parameters. 
The collection of data for model estimation is time consuming and costly. For these 
reasons use is made of the Chapman and Staelin (1982) explosion process. Each race is 
split into independent subsets which are themselves races which can be used in the data 
set. For example, the winner is removed from the original race leaving the 2nd placed 
horse the "winner" over the rest of the field, which then constitutes another race. The 
data set is only exploded to a depth of 3, since horses finishing lower than 3rd may not 
to have run to their true worth. 
The data base consists of 200 races run at 5 racetracks in the U.S.A. Restrictions were 
placed on the data with regard to the track condition, distance of race and age of the 
competing horses. 
5-8 
The specification of the model was as follows: 
Uh = 81LIFE%WINhh + 82AVESPRATh + 83WIRAC~ 
+84LSPEDRATh + 85JOCK%WINh + OJOCK#WINh 
+87JMISDATAh + 88WEIGHTh +89POSTPOSh 
+810NEWDISTh + Eh. 
where 
LIFE% WIN = % of races won in the past two years 
A VESPRA T = average speed rating over last four races 
W/RACE = average earnings per race in past year 
LSPEDRAT = speed rating in last race 
JOCK% WIN = % of races won by jockey in last year 
JOCK#WIN = number of winning rides by jockey in last year 
JMISDAT A = indicator variable relating to jockey data 
WEIGHT = weight carried by the horse 
POSTPOS = barrier draw of the horse 
NEWDIST = indicator variable relating to distance of race. 
Comments on the likely relationships between the variables and the probability of 
winning are given and explained. A very important assumption is that the quality of the 
competing horses is the primary determinant of the outcome of the race. Quality is split 
into long-term quality and current quality. Each of the above variables is assumed to 
measure either current or long-term quality. Jockey variables are also included. 
The parameters of the model are now estimated. The test of the null hypothesis that the 
parameter vector is zero is conducted at the 0.005 level of significance, and the null 
hypothesis is rejected. A _parameter vector of zero means that all horses have the same 
probability of winning the race. It is noted that the signs of the coefficients are consistent 
with a priori theoretical expectations. The relative importance of each variable is 
calculated as the product of the coefficient of the variable and the standard deviation of 
the variable. Collinearities among the variables would lead to interpretation difficulties 
of the relative importance values. 
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The relative importance of the variables is shown here. 
Variable Std. Dev. * Coefficient 
AVESPRAT 0.562 
W/RACE 0.228 
JOCK%WIN 0.195 
NEWDIST -0.172 
POSTPOS -0.109 
LSPEDRAT 0.099 
JMISDATA 0.086 
LIFE%WIN 0.077 
JOCK%WIN 0.076 
WEIGHT 0.012 
For the logit model, a measure of goodness of fit is given by 
R2 = L(0 =El) 
L(8 = 0) 
where e = the parameters as determined from the data 
0 = the vector of zeros indicating equal probabilities for all horses. 
Now to the extent that the MLE parameters, 0, explain the horse race process 
completely, R2 will approach unity. If the vector of parameters is essentially equal to 0, 
R2 will approach zero. Hence R2 varies between zero and one depending on the 
explanatory power of 0. Different parameter estimates for the model of the horse race 
process are derived using the original 200 races, as well as 400 "races" and 600 "races" 
through use of the aforementioned explosion process. 
It is observed that using 600 "races" leads to an R2 of 0.055 while using the original 200 
races leads to an R2 of 0.091. Thus the explanatory power of the model is decreased 
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when the number of races is increased, probably as a result of some "noisy" 
observations being included. This means that the additional "races" are not as reliable 
an indicator of winning probabilities, as the original races are. However, using more 
data does lead to more accurate estimates of the model parameters, and this is cited as 
the main reason for the use of the explosion process. The apparent trade off between 
estimation accuracy and explanatory power is not mentioned, nor is it stated which 
model is to be preferred. Comments are given regarding the relative importance of the 
variables of the model. 
A final caveat is inserted, stating that it remains to be seen whether the model yields 
sufficiently accurate estimates of the winning probabilities to implement a profitable 
betting system. The rest of the paper examines various betting systems proposed by other 
authors. 
5.2 Co~ents And Further Ideas 
Vergin's paper is .the only one of the three examined, that suggests the concept of an 
expert system. His system is too elementary to be of any use, since the average bettor 
could quite easily assimilate the few rules into his own decision making system. What 
is required from a money making expert system is a complexity of nature that requires 
the speed, accuracy and consistency of a computer to make the decisions; This type of 
system will involve rules, meta rules, meta-meta rules etc. 
Besides the simple nature of the derived system, the paper has one other problem. This 
,is the sparseness of the data used in testing the systems. The results are thus statistically 
meaningless. This can be clearly seen in the results as obtained from the "real-world" 
in Table 5.1. The payoff for a win on Tudor Tay has distorted the results. This payoff 
is clearly an outlier which would probably not occur in repeated samples. Without this 
payoff the 26.1 per cent profit turns into a 59.5 per cent loss! 
Henery's paper could be viewed as technical .in nature since one of the two variables 
relating to the horses is the odds. The odds, however, are only used to group the horses 
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and not to predict their performance. The extreme value model of times to run the races 
is used to predict racing performance. The likely time taken by the horse to run a race 
is specific to that horse and therefore is considered to be a piece of fundamental 
information related to the horse. Note, however, that the predicted time is essentially 
determined by the odds class the horse falls into. 
A problem arises with the data used, in that the distances between successive horses 
finishing in 6th position or lower were taken as 1 length regardless of the actual distance 
between them. This approximation could lead to large inaccuracies. It is important to 
consider the reason for the apparent success of the model in predicting relative race 
times. This is because of the high correlation between odds class and predicted time, as 
well as the high correlation between predicted time and estimated win probability. The 
question now arises as to why we do not derive estimates of winning probabilities 
directly from the odds rather than first calculating a model for relative times from which 
estimates of winning probabilities are derived. 
The reason for this is not explained in the paper but must be based on the assumption 
that the estimated probabilities are more accurately estimated using the extreme value 
model. The reason for this assumption is probably that in deriving probabilities from the 
odds alone, account is not taken of the other horses in the race. Consider the following 
example. Suppose we are concerned with a horse whose SP is 111. The theoretical 
winning probability of the horse based on the odds is 0.5. Assume that we have observed 
a large number of horses going off at 111 in the past and that their win ratio is 0.46 (i.e. 
win probability = 0.46). This ratio has been derived without reference to the odds of 
other horses running in the races considered. Assume now that the same large number 
of 111 horses are given time ratings relative to all the other horses in each of their 
particular races. From these a model would be derived to predict the winning 
probabilities of horses in the 111 odds class. Suppose this results in 111 horses being 
given a predicted winning probability of 0.47 by the model. 
The observed ratio of wins to runners, of these horses is still 0.46, but they have been 
relatively more impressive in victory and closer up in defeat than the average horse. 
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Impressiveness here is measured by relative time rating. If the winning probability 
predicted by the model was 0.45 we would know that these horses were relatively 
unimpressive in victory and were further behind the winner in defeat, than the average 
horse. By taking account of the other runners in the race we are refining our estimate 
of winning probability for a given odds class by examining the performance of such 
horses in the class relative to the average performance of all the horses. 
Bolton and Chapman (1986) have published the most complex by far of the three papers 
regarding fundamental research. The paper follows nicely from Henery's in that winning 
probabilities are also calculated taking account of the other horses in the race. The logit 
model as specified by Bolton is intuitively appealing, but the variables utilised are too 
elementary (and too few) to provide an accurate indication of winning probabilities. The 
most important variables have been considered but many less obvious ones have been 
excluded. 
A further shortcoming of the model is that only linear-in-parameters specifications are 
considered. This is obviously for practical convenience and is not necessarily the optimal 
approach. Given the results of the regressions with and without the exploded data, no 
comment is made as to the model which the authors consider to be better. No 
explanation is given as to the meaning in this specific context of R2, other than "we 
should expect low values". 
The null hypothesis in the context of the regressions, is that all the horses have equal 
probabilities of winning. The improvement in probability estimates does not appear 
substantial, yet it is not explained. It would surely make more sense to compare 
regression estimates with the null hypothesis that the true winning probabilities are given 
by the odds of the horses and try and improve on those with some model. 
Although the topic of this chapter was most appealing at the outset of this research, we 
realized quickly that the difficulties involved pushed this topic beyond the sphere of our 
research. These difficulties are succinctly described by three separate books and we 
quote directly from them here. 
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Firstly, from a book on horseracing called 11 The Winning Horseplayer 11 , Beyer (1983), 
we find the opening paragraph. " When I started playing the horses and trying to 
comprehend the mysteries of the game, I thought I was searching for great, immutable 
truths. I thought there must be a set of principles that governed the outcome of races and 
was waiting to be discovered, just as the laws of physics had always existed and were 
waiting for Newton to discover them. By the middle of the 1970's I had realized that 
there were no such timeless verities - but I wished there were. 11 
Secondly, from a book called 11 The Theory of Gambling and Statistical Logic 11 , Epstein 
(1977), we find a paragraph from the horseracing section. 11 Predicting the outcome -of 
a horserace is an activity that exerts continuing appeal to the extraordinarily opulent. It 
is intellectually lucrative albeit fiscally ruinous. So many factors can affect the outcome 
that a strategic decision by weighted statistical logic without the use of a high speed 
computer for each application is unfeasible. An enumeration of the pertinent factors 
might include considerations of post position, weather, weight carried, previous 
performances, appearance or condition of the horse, earnings, jockey, owner, trainer, 
class of race;· equipment changes and numerous others. Many of these factors comprise 
statistical phenomena of a non stationary nature. For this reason, data samples gathered 
over a few seasons of racing at several tracks offer little predictive value, although 
copious records o~ past races have been sifted in the search for significant patterns. Any 
finite data sample, if analyzed sufficiently, can be shown to exhibit patterns of 
regularity. A simple prediction, however, cannot be sensibly constructed on the shifting 
sands of nonstationary processes. 11 
Finally, from a well known book called 11 Generalized Linear Models 11 , McCullagh and 
Nelder (1989), we find a paragraph from the introductory text. 11 Modelling in science 
remains, partly at least, an art. Some principles do exist, however, to guide the 
modeller. A first, though at first sight, not a very helpful principle, is that all models 
are wrong; some, though, are more useful than others and we should seek those. At the 
same time we must recognize that eternal truth is not within our grasp. 11 
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CHAPTER SIX 
STATISTICAL THEORY 
"This remarkable regularity occurs sometimes in streaks - and this 
is what throws out the inveterate gamblers, always doing sums with 
a pencil in their hands. And what terrible jests fate sometimes 
plays!" 
· Dostoyevsky - The Gambler 
Introduction 
This chapter considers those papers which _concerned themselves mainly with exploring 
statistical theory and methods, and which used as illustration of these methods, examples 
from horseracing or gambling. In these papers the methods are more important than the 
results, which were derived simply to demonstrate the theory more clearly. 
Two main topics of theory are covered in the various papers, viz. optimization and 
permutation probabilities. Optimization has always been a specific goal of statisticians 
in various situations. The hope of the researchers is probably that the methods that they 
have developed, can be carried over from horserace betting, to other areas where 
probabilities are either known or estimated with some accuracy. 
The probabilities of permutations involve assigning probabilities to the various possible 
outcomes of any multi-entry competition. It is assumed that the probabilities of finishing 
first are known. In addition any other information, relevant to the situation, needs to be 
to built into the models which are derived to predict specific finishing orders. 
Optimal Betting Methods 
Willis (1964) investigated the optimal placing of win and place bets, assuming only that 
the amounts bet on each horse in the separate pools is available. This is in contrast to · 
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previous no risk strategies. that concentrated simply on wi~ betting and required as input 
to the algorithm, the true probabilities of winning for each horse. A similar idea, 
examining the subjectively determined win and place probabilities, that encouragingly 
showed profitable results, is encountered in the papers by Hausch, (1981) considered in 
section 2.2.4. Unlike Hausch's model which does not guarantee a return greater than or 
equal to the original investment, Willis' algorithm ensures that no matter what the result 
of the race, the return to the investor will be greater than the bet, or no bet will have 
been made on that race. 
As in the scenario which yielded profit proposed by Hausch, the requirements for such 
a no-risk system are inconsistent estimates of win and place probabilities, (through their 
betting) by the public. Since the take (tax and charges) is approximately 18% and a 
profit is guaranteed, the patrons forming the win and place pools need to be highly 
inconsistent in order for a bet to actually be made. The problem of finding the optimum 
no-risk strategy for placing simultaneous win and place bets, is formulated as a linear 
programming problem. Assuming a race with n horses, a set of [n(n-1) + l] linear 
equalities in [2n +n(n-1)] unknowns is derived from the original conditions. It is shown 
that any feasible solution, (amounts bet on each horse to win and place) will ensure that 
the return is greater than the original bet, or alternatively, no bet is made. It is pointed 
out, (as it was in Hausch's study) that it is impractical to use the final win and place 
pools as inputs to the problem, since these are only known after the close of betting for 
that race. 
Arvesen and Rosner (1971) proposed a procedure to enable a bettor to optimally place 
a bet on a parimutuel event. In this case the actual probabilities of winning are required, 
as well as the odds of each runner and certain other quantitative handicapping factors 
such as speed and class etc. Note that risk is present in that only one horse is to be bet 
on, (if a bet is placed at all) and the return is positive or negative depending on the 
outcome of the race. Parimutuel wagering is treated as a problem in statistical decision 
theory. The states of nature, (different horses winning) are defined, as well as the 
possible actions (bet on any horse or not at all). The optimal Bayes procedure is given 
assuming certain conditions hold. The conditions compare the relationship between the 
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handicapping factors for each pair of horses, with the expected return relationship, 
between the pair of horses. The problem of estimating the true winning probabilities is 
addressed to the extent of suggesting that the probabilities used be the same for each 
horse, and be equal to the reciprocal of the number of horses in the race. It appears 
quite possible that on introduction of real values for the handicapping factors, (whose 
estimation is considered beyond the scope of the paper) the procedure will suggest no 
bet. In any event the calculations are of too complex a nature to be performed quickly 
at the track once the approximate final odds are available and therefore the model seems 
of theoretical interest only. 
Rosner (1975) suggests an optimal algorithm for betting on a parimutuel event given that 
the true probabilities of winning are known. Hausch et al, approached the problem after 
discovering discrepancies between win and place betting. They suggested placing bets 
so as to maximize the expected log return. This is also the optimality criterion of 
Rosner. The purpose of the paper then being, how to wager optimally within the system. 
A desirable property of the rule, maximize the expected log return, is that if the amount 
we wish to win is fixed, the expected number of trials to achieve the amount is 
minimized. 
The inputs to the problem are the true probabilities of winning, the public's predicted 
probabilities of winning and the corresponding win odds for each horse. Given certain 
conditions regarding the amount bet, a theorem gives the optimal allocation between all 
the runners and the amount not to be bet on that race. The theorem suggests betting on 
horses where the objective and subjective probabilities are sufficiently different. 
Essentially the horse being bet on has to be substantially underrated by the public. 
The given theorem is reduced to a simplified form when the condition is introduced that 
only one horse is to be bet on per race. In this case the optimal amount bet on the horse 
considered is equal to the expected return on that horse divided by the win odds on the 
horse. The expected return is given by 
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P. 
R=(l-f)X_;-1 
Pi 
where Pi = true probability of winning for horse i 
Pi = subjective probability of winning for horse i 
. f = the track take. 
Various consequences of the.optimizing procedure were noted, and some examples were 
given. The optimal bet on a favourite is always higher than an optimal bet on an 
outsider, when the expected return from the two bets is the same. In addition, one does 
not necessarily bet the largest part of one's holdings on the horse with the largest 
expected return. Further, the optimal amount bet on a horse cannot exceed that horse's 
true probability of winning, (assuming the total holdings to be 1). Finally, it is possible 
that a bet is made on a horse even though the expected return on the horse is negative. 
Two other points are raised in the paper. Firstly, consideration is given to the effect of 
one's own bet. A formulation of the problem is given, and it is pointed out that the 
author knows of no solution to the problem. As one's bet increases in size, (which is 
likely to occur in this situation) so the return approaches the negative track take, since 
eventually, your individual bet swamps the whole pool. Secondly, optimal place betting 
is considered. This differs from win betting in that, the payoffs to a horse placing is 
dependent on the other horses placing along with him. The maximization problem in this 
instance is far more complex and is simply posed in the paper as an interesting ext~nsion 
of the previous work. 
Probabilities and Odds 
Henery (1985) examined the returns from betting on horses in certain odds categories. 
He used several data sets dating from 1973 through-to 1980 Although his approach did 
not consider either the Efficient Market Hypothesis or utility related aspects, his results · 
had implications for both topics. Average returns, measured as a percentage of the 
amount staked, are calculated for odds classes at SP. The data from the 1973 flat racing 
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season in Britain and the results are shown in table 6.1. As usual the favourite-longshot 
bias is present. In addition it was possible to make a profit backing all horses at 4/ 1, and 
at very short odds, although these results were not subjected to significance tests. 
Returns from bets at given SP ( 1973 flat season) 
Number of bets winning Rate of return 
SP odds at these SP odds % 
2/1 on 15 out of 22 102.3 
6/4 on 34 " 51 111.1 
Evens 55 II 116 94.8 
6 /4 against 68 II 183 92.9 
2/1 II 74 II 298 74.6 
5/2 II 97 " 365 93.0 
3 /1 " 128 
II 538 95.2 
4/1 II 155 
II 742 104.4 
5/1 II 133 
II 867 92.0 
6/1 " 131 
II 970 94.5 
8/1 " 113.5 
II 1294 78.9 
10/1 II 119 
II 1561 83.8 
12/1 " 88 " 1830 62.5 
14/1 " 81 " 1689 71.9 
16/1 II 37 
II 1508 41.7 
20/1 II 40.S " 3957 21.5 
25/1 II 25 
II 2019 32.2 
33/1 . II 19 
II 3567 18.1 
50/1 II 4 
II 530 38.5 
Table 6.1 reproduced from Henery (1985) 
A further 883 races were considered from the seasons of 1979 and 1980. The horses 
were divided into odds classes, with class limits based on a logarithmic scale. The 
midpoint of the j'th class, X;. was chosen so that 1 + X; = (G-0.5)/3). The average 
returns to all such classes were calculated and the results are shown in table 6.2. 
A model of betting is now hypothesised. The model suggests that if the true probability 
of losing for a given horse is q, implying that the fair odds should be q/(1-q), bettors 
rate the horse's chance of losing as fq = Q, where f is a fraction between 0 and 1, and 
are therefore prepared to accept odds of Q/(1-Q). Depending on f, the ratio of fair to 
accepted odds is determined, with the accepted odds always less than the fair odds. To 
investigate the validity of the hypothesis, the empirical losing probability is calculated 
for each odds class. The accepted odds by the bettor is the average of the odds class, 
leading to Q =XI ( 1 + X), where X = the average odds for a particular class. If the model 
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Average return from a unit bet on horses with SP odds in the given classes 
(883 races in the 1979-80 flat seasons). 
SP odds Mid-point Number of bets Total winnings to Rate of return 
class limits 
. Xj in class unit stakes % 
0.0 - 0.396 0.181 14 13.7 97.9 
- 0.948 0.649 126 117.3 93.1 
-1.718 1.30 218 198.8 91.2 
- 2.794 2.21 514 485.1 94.4 
- 4.294 3.48 687 663.0 96.5 
- 6.389 5.25 1095 924.0 84.4 
- 9.312 7.73 1231 1089.0 88.5 
- 13.39 11.2 1116 891.0 79.8 
- 19.09 16.0 1024 567.0 55.4 
- 27.03 22.7 1206 608.0 50.4 
- 38.12 32.1 968 306.0 31.6 
38.12 or more 45.2 512 51.0 10.0 
Table 6.2 reproduced from Henery (1985) 
is correct, the plot of Q against q will be a straight line, with slope f. The results are 
shown in figure 6.1. 
The 1973 data fit well on average but have substantial deviations at certain odds levels. 
The 1979/80 data fit the straight line better. It is suggested that this is owing to the point 
in the season that these races were selected from. 
The bookmaker's take is the excess over one, of the sum of the probabilities of all the 
horses in a particular race. The model also predicts that this take should vary linear! y 
with the number of runners in the race, and that the line should have slope 1-t The 
average take, Ru, was calculated for races with n=3 through 20 runners. The take was 
then regressed against the number of horses and the regression line, Ru = 0.0222(n-1), 
was obtained. The graph of Ru versus number of horses is plotted along with this line, 
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Q = SP/(l +SP) Q = SP/(1 +SP) 
1.0 1.0 
0.5 0.5 
x x 
q empirical q empirical 
0. 0 -J.-__ ---+-_.....--+-~-,___----
0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0. 0.5 1.0 
(a) 197 5 flat season (b) 1979-80 Selected races 
A comparison of two estimates for the probability that horses with given SP odds will lose the 
race: the empirical lose probability q is the relative frequency of losing; the subjective lose probability 
Q = SP;'(l +SP) is implied by the Starting Price SP. The straight lines are weighted least squares fits: 
q = 0.974Q in (a);q = 0.978Q in-tb). 
Figure 6.1 reproduced from Henery (1985) 
and is shown in figure 6.2. No R2 value was reported, but the fit looks close to the data. 
The conclusion of the examination, is that the average return from a bet at SP odds, 
without regard to the number of horses in the race or the odds of the other horses, 
decreases nearly ·Jinearly with the SP odds. Two practical rules are now suggested. 
Firstly, only bet on favourites which are at short odds. Secondly, bet on races on which 
the take of the bookmaker is lower than that predicted by the regression line derived 
. above, for a race with a particular number of horses. 
Probabilities of Permutations 
Henery (J. R. Statist. Soc. B (1981)) describes properties of models which yield 
estimates of placing in a horse race given that the win probabilities for each horse are 
known .. If the win probabilities are pi, then as suggested by Plackett (1975), the 
probability that horses i, j and k finish in 1st, 2nd and 3rd places respectively, is 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
Average 
Over-round 
Rn 
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Rn = 0.0222 (n - 1 ) 
)( 
0 -+-.._~+---+--+~1"'"----+~-------
0 10 20 
Number of runners n 
The average over-round Rn plotted against the number n of runners in the race (1979-80 data). 
The straight line Rn = 0.0222 (n - 1) was found by weighted least squares. 
Figure 6.2 reproduced from Henery (1985) 
Now, if Pi > pj > ~' then the order ijk is more likely than jik which is more likely 
than jki. Thus the relative orders of ijk are as suggested by their win probabilities. 
Stochastic ordering over permutations is defined in the paper as follows. "Given two 
permutations D and E which differ only in the transposition of two numbers, and 
supposing D to be the permutation in which these two numbers are in the natural order, 
we maintain that D has a greater probability than E." By natural order is meant that if 
horse A has a greater win probability than that of B, then it is natural for A to finish 
ahead of B. 
Let {i,j,k} represent the permutation that horse i finishes first, horse j finishes second 
and horse k finishes third. If we have a sequence of permutations D,E,F, ... ,Tin which 
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we proceed from D to T by changing one pair of numbers that were in natural order 
each time, we can say D has a greater probability than T, or D > T. For example, if 
p1 > p2 > p3, then 
{1,2,3} > {2,1,3} > {2,3,1} > {3,2,1} 
and also 
{1,3,2} > {2,3,l} 
by transposing horse numbers 1 and 2. Note however that the two permutations { 1,3,2} 
and {2, 1,3} are not stochastically comparable. 
Assume X1 ,X2, ••• ,X0 to be independent continuous random variables, and to represent 
the times taken by the n horses to run a particular race. The probability of the 
permutation {l,2,3} is the probability that X1 < X2 < X3• Since stochastic ordering 
over the permutations is both natural and desired, distributions for the X's are 
investigated to see whether they provide such ordering. Examples of families of 
distributions that lead to stochastic ordering are the Normal with fixed variance, the 
exponential and the gamma distributions. 
In another paper Henery (J. Appl. Prob 1981) applies the Normal model to a horse race 
scenario. If X is the time for a particular horse to run a race, then F(X) is the 
distribution function for this horse and the other horses are allocated distribution 
functions F(x-9J, 1 < = i < = n. The probability of an outcome· will then depend on 
the e·s which may be. interpreted to be the means. 
It is pointed out that for non-identically distributed variables, e.g. for horses with 
differing probabilities of winning, the calculations required to determine the probability 
that the a given horse finishes in k'th place are prohibitively difficult. The rest of the 
paper is devoted to suggesting theoretical approximations to the exact probability and 
developing these to the level of available formulae. 
Stem (1990) determines the probability of a permutation involving n horses under the . 
assu.mption that the distribution of times to run races follows the gamma process with 
common shape parameter but different scale parameters for each horse. If the shape 
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parameter is set to one, the probability of the finish 123 is given by the formula 
suggested previously by Plackett (1975) and Harville (1973). If the shape parameter is 
greater than one the model becomes more complex and this is an obvious drawback. In 
some situations however the increased complexity is worth the addition to explanatory 
power of the model. Consider the example of a horse i that has a greater probability of 
winning a race than horse j, but given that some other horse k has won the race, has a 
smaller probability of finishing ahead of j, than the probability of j finishing ahead of 
i. Under the gamma model with shape parameter equal to one, this phenomenon, known 
in racing as the Silky Sullivan phenomenon, cannot be modeled. Gamma models with 
shape parameter greater than one are useful in modelling such situations. 
Some empirical data was investigated to test the appropriate~ess and accuracy of the 
models for predicting place probabilities in horse races given that the win probabilities 
were known. The probabilities of winning for each horse were taken as the subjective 
probability_ estimates derived from the starting odds. The data consisted of 47 races in 
which there were six runners each. The data were restricted owing to the calculation 
difficulties when the shape parameter used was 2. Two separate models, one with shape 
parameter one, and the other, two, were used to predict the probability that each horse 
finished second in a particular race. The actual results of the 47 races were used to 
determine which model gave better probability estimates Horses were divided into 
classes based on their probability of running second. The results are shown in table 6.3. 
The expected number of second place finishes for a particular group is computed as the 
sum of the estimated probabilities for the horses in that group. Horses that have a high 
probability of finishing second,. do so less often than predicted. By taking the shape 
parameter to be two, some of this problem is solved. In this example the more complex 
model did provide better results, although it is noted that the amount of computation 
increases exponentially with the number of objects being ranked. It is pointed out that 
approximations that are easily computed would be particularly useful. 
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Expected and Observed Second-Place Finishes 
r = 1 r = 2 
p Number Observed Expected Number Observed Expected 
.00-.10 66 6 4.15 58 4 3.75 
.10-.15 61 7 7.69 63 9 7.94 
.15-.20 49 13 8.56 57 13 9.97 
.20-.25 55 12 12.54 62 13 14.10 
>.25 51 9 14.06 42 8 11.23 
Table 6.3 reproduced from Stern (1990) 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 
"In short, he must regard all these roulette or trente-et-quarante 
tables as an amusement arranged solely for his pleasure. He ought 
not even to suspect the greed and trickery on which the bank is 
founded and constructed. " 
Dostoyevsky - The Gambler 
Introduction 
It was suggested in section 2.3.3, with regard to the informational efficiency of the 
betting market, that the rriost important link in the chain that is the horseracing industry, 
is the betting public. Without the bettors there would be no money to pay for the stakes 
that the owners' horse's race for, and clearly everyone involved in the industry is 
affected. 
Attendances at the racetrack and at off-track betting shops and concomitant volumes of 
wagering, are thus of paramount importance to the racing industry, and of some 
importance to the local government who collect betting taxes. 
At the time of writing (March 1993), the above points are of major concern in Cape 
Town in particular, as well as at other racing centres around the country. The racing 
clubs of the Cape reported losses for the 1992 financial year. In an effort to cut costs, 
the clubs have decided to merge, and other measures include cancelling ten race 
meetings over the next few months. 
The reasons for the problems cannot be laid only at one door. Firstly the poor 
performance of the South African economy has kept people away from gambling by 
concentrating their spending on essentials. The introduction of casino gambling reduced 
those prepared to bet at the racetrack where the take out rates (gambling charges) are far 
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higher. Large capital expenditures undertaken .when profits were still being made, and 
appeared certain in the future, are not being utilised anywhere near their capacities. The 
prime examples, are the luxurious stands built at Kenilworth and Milnerton which cater 
to a handful of owners a few times a year. 
With declining attendances at the track itself, have come declines in the volume of 
wagering overall. However, instead of aiming to attract new punters to the sport, 
authorities have rather attempted to get those currently involved to bet more than before. 
The methods employed thus far include the introduction of new bet types (such as the 
quartet), and the altering of the unit of wagering (such as the adjustment in the unit of 
pick-6 betting from 50c to lOc). Provision has also been made for bettors to place bets 
by phone, thus making it easier for business people to bet during the week. 
One aspect of the equation that has not been used i~ the price of gambling (the take out). 
The reason is probably that this is under governmental control and not alterable at the 
will of the race clubs. Most of the papers reviewed in this section analysed what factors 
were -most influen.tial in affecting the volume of public wagering. 
Literature Review 
The Demand for Gambling 
Suits (1979) investigated the price elasticity of demand for gambling in the U.S.A. using, 
bookmaker and parimutuel data. The reason this is of importance, is that the 
government's ability to raise taxes via gambling is to a large measure dependent on the 
size of this elasticity. In discussion with gamblers, Suits determined that the main 
reasons for gambling were not monetary gain, but instead the participation in a fun and 
exciting activity. The view is then taken that gambling is a good, in the sense that it can 
be purchased and has a price. This price is the average expected loss for all bettors and 
is equal to the track take which includes taxes and contributions to the track and the 
horseracing industry. 
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A theoretical relationship between the handle (amount bet by the public) and the track 
take is put forward. The theoretical price elasticity of demand is -1. 6, which suggests 
that the seller's revenue (handle) would be greater at lower prices (track takes). An 
empirical study was made of bookmaking turnover following the reduction in federal tax 
on bookmaking in 1974, from 10% to 2%. The average handle per quarter was 
calculated for 1974 (10% tax), and 1975 (2 % tax). The decrease in price led to an 
increase in handle which suggested an elasticity of demand of -1.64. It is conjectured 
that a large portion of the additional amount wagered with legal bookmakers, came from 
people who had been betting with tax free illegal bookmakers. The estimate of the 
elasticity of demand would in such a case be overestimated, since the extra wagering is 
not new, but existing and transferred fr:om another outlet. 
The investigation into the effects of the track take on parimutuel wagering, covered 24 
states that offered thoroughbred racing from 1949 to 1971. Regressions can be 
performed to d~termine the effects of price on handle, since the track take varies from 
state to state and from time to time. The regression equation estimating demand is of the 
form 
where Qit = real handle at all tracks in state i in year t divided by the population 
of the state 
Yit = real per capita income in the state 
dit = number of days on the racing calendar 
Pit = parimutuel take out rate in state i in year t. 
To compensate for small states where visitor betting presented a problem, a dummy 
variable was used to indicate whether it was a small state or not. Three regression 
models are presented, although two of them have R2 values of 0.12 and 0.49. The third 
model which includes the small state dummy variable (the other models did not), has an . 
R2 value of 0.81. In addition the number of racing days variable is adjusted to be the 
number of racing days divided by the state population. 
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Elasticities of demand are calculated for various factors. The elasticity of demand with 
respect to income is 0. 86, which means that gambling increases almost proportionally 
to any increase in income. Elasticity with respect to the number of racing days is 0.027, 
which means that an increase in the number of racing days will have virtually no effect 
on the betting volumes. The price elasticity of demand is -1.59, which means that an 
increase in the take out will lead to a considerably greater, in percentage terms, decrease 
in betting volumes. The revenue to the government is maximized by adopting a 
monopoly pricing formula. This leads to an optimal take out rate of 18.9%. During the 
period of investigation the average take out rate was 14.3%. 
Off Track Betting 
Coate and Ross (1974) investigated the allegation that the decrease in attendances and 
turnover at New York City's local race tracks, was owing to the opening, in 1971, of 
off-track betting shops throughout New York State. Table 7.1 summarizes the relevant 
data for the period under consideration. Such data is typical of that used in the papers 
considered in this chapter. Although it is evident that the total handle decreased through 
1971 and 1972, the president of the Off-Track Betting Corporation, cited a slow down 
in the national economy, poor weather and the increase in the track take from 16 % to 
17 % during 1971, as reasons for the declining handle. Through the use of regression 
analysis the paper attempts to determine the effect of the introduction of off-track betting 
on the race tracks' handle and attendances. 
Two separate regressions are performed against the same independent variables. Firstly, 
the daily attendance at the track is used as the dependent variable, and secondly the daily 
parimutuel handle at the track is used as the dependent variable. Dummy variables 
represented day of the week, off-track betting activity (yes or no), and whether a major 
sports event occurred on the day in New York or on television involving a major New 
York based team, and the season of the year. Quantitative variables included the 
temperature, rainfall, weekly earnings in manufacturing industries, unemployment rate, 
and average number of hours worked per week in manufacturing industries per 
employee. The results are shown in table 7.2. Only those variables which had a 
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st:MMARY STATISTICS, NEW YO~K CITY AREA RACE TRACKS. 1969 TO 1972 
1972 1971 1970 1969 
Handle (000) 
Roosevelt $ 289.201 $ 297,815 $ 310,923 $ 28'>.846 
Yonkers , 297,773 312,884 316,666 314.997 
$ 586,974 $ 610,699 $ 627,589 $ 598,843 
Aqueduct $ 396,515 $ 486,394 $ 484.873 $ 450,311 
Btlmont 207.022 218,874 2B,088 209.577 
$ 603,537 $ 705,218 $ 707,961 $ 659.888 
Combined Tot:il $1,190,'.511 $1,315,917 $1,335,550 $1,rni.131 
.Attendance ( 000) 
Roosevelt 2.648 3,013 3,078 2,992 
Yonkers 2.502 2,794 2,964 2.955 
5,150 5,807 6,042 5,947 
Aqueduct 3,053 4,046. 4,169 4,020 
Bdmont 1,601 1,875 1,983 1,891 
--
4,654 5,921 6,152 5,911 
Combined Total 9,804 11,728 12,194 11,858 
Racing Days 
Roosevelt 154 142 155 143 
Yonkers 145 155 142 152 
299 297 297 295 
Aqueduct 136 147 138 136 
Belmont 96 72 72 72 
232 219 210 208 
Combined Total 531 516 507 50) 
Handle Per Racing Day ( 000) 
Roosevelt $1,878 $2,097 $2.006 $1,985 
Yonkers 2,054 2,019 2,230 2.072 
Aqueduct 2,915 3,309 3.514 3,311 
Belmont 2,156 3,040 3,098 2,911 
.Attendance Per Racin.i; Day ( 000) 
Roosevelt . 17.2 21.2 19.9 20:9 
Yonkers 17.3 18.0 20.9 19.4 
Aqueduct 22.4 27.5 30.2 29.6 
Belmont 16.7 26.0 27.'.5 26.3 
Average Handle Per Person 
Roosevelt $109 $ 99 $101 $ 95 
Yonkers 119 112 107 107 
Aqueduct 130 120 116 112 
Belmont 129 117 II 3 I II 
Table 7.1 reproduced from C_oate (1974) 
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significant effect are shown. 
The conclusion drawn is that, ceteris paribus, the introduction of off-track betting caused 
a decline in daily attendance at the thoroughbred tracks of approximately 4 750 people, 
and a decline in daily handle of about $440 000. It can be seen that harness racing was 
also negatively affected. A further regression was performed, the dependent variable 
being the average handle per attendant at the thoroughbred tracks. The results showed 
that the introduction of off-track betting caused in increase in the average handle per 
attendant of $8.51. This implies that the bettors lost to the off-track betting shops were 
below average bettors when measured by amount staked. The conclusion is that they are 
casual bettors, who are more sensitive to the reduction in price via the elimination of 
DEMAND MODELS 
· Thoroughbred Harness 
Variables .AFl PH Fl .AHl PHHl 
Monday 5700 520,505 2138 335,591 
(9.11)** (9.22)** (5.04)** (11.65) .. 
Thursday -1155 -89,263 1100 31,556 
(-1.84) (-1.57) ( 2.92) •• ( 1.23) 
Friday 813 164,758 5009 348,511 
( 1.30) (2.92) .. (13.26) •• (13.58)** 
Saturday 19148 1,955.919 10399 514,933 
(30.66)** (34.78)** (2(5.51 )** (20.61)** 
Temperature 48.8 90.1 3,624 
(3.36)** (12.01)** (7.26)** 
Precipitation -2361 -240,091 -2244 -232,646 .... 
(-5.00)** (-5.65)** (-7.83)** (-11.95)** 
OTB Dummy -4755 -439,034 -1904 -102,557 
(-8.92)** (-11.11)** (-5.80)** (-5.78)** 
Trend -1.48 -1.19 
(-2.39). (-2.81)** 
Fall Season -2241 -160,961 -1670.0 -136,415 
(-4.76)** (-4.04)** (-5.26)** (-6.41)** 
Total Unemployment .214 20.33 
(2.01). (2.n)• 
Knick TV 
-1388 -119,839. 
Ran,i:er TV 
(-2.83)** (-3.61)** 
-1230 
NFL's MonJay Night 
(-1.98)* 
-2017 -306,732 
Football (-2.64) .. (-5.94) •• 
Intercept 23482 3,007,432 14341 1, 782,835 R2 
.698 .726 .593 .522 
Adjusted R2 
.694 .722 .587 .516 F 143.8 206.7 104.9 94.6 # Observations 632 632 877 877 
*t statistics are significant at the 95% confidence level in a two tail test. 
• *t statistics are significant at the 99% confidence level in a two tail test. 
Table 7.2 reproduced from Coate (1974) 
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transport and admission costs associated witli going to the track itself. 
The Price of Gambling 
Gruen (1976) also poses the questions about gambling, "does it have a price?" and "do 
consumers act in the same way towards it, as they do towards other goods?" Some 
theoretical analysis is presented to show how a bettor maximizing his utility at the 
margin would bet on a particular race. The expected return (bettor's subjective 
probability of wining multiplied by the available odds) is calculated by the bettor for 
each horse. Horses with expected returns greater than zero are assumed to attract bets. 
The amounts bet are not considered. Now assume that for a particular race, the track 
take is increased from 10% to 18%. The expected return for all horses will decrease, 
and some will have negative expected returns whereas before these were positive. These 
horses will now not be bet on by punters, who had fixed subjective probabilities, before 
the change in take out. The point is that the number of bets will decline following an 
increase in take out rate. 
This hypothesis is tested empirically using data for 1 specific race track in the U.S.A. 
from 1940 to 1969. 1940 was the year in which the parimutuel system was instituted, 
while 1969 was before the advent of off-track and exotic betting, both of which are 
factors which are likely to have affected the results of tests relating handle to price, since 
they affect the handle as well. The single location is chosen in order to correct for tastes 
and customs which may vary geographically. In addition, the quality of the track is such 
that competition from other nearby tracks is small. 
The model postulates that the number of bets per race· per capita is a function of the 
price of the bet and the real income per capita of the potential patrons, who are defined 
as those that live in certain areas near the track. In addition dummy variables are used 
to represent a depression or pessimism factor, as well as an optimism or prosperity 
factor. The former is set to 1 for the years 1940 to 1944, while the later is set to one 
in years when the unemployment rate is less than 4 % . 
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The general form of the model is thus 
where BETS = number of bets per race per capita 
P = track take or price of the bet 
Y = income per capita converted to 1967 dollars 
PES = pessimism factor 
OP = optimism factor 
A regression using all the variables gives an R2 value of 0.814. The income elasticity 
of demand is 0.98 while the price elasticity of demand is -1.57. Thus the results are very 
similar to those found in the previous study. The derived curve was used to calculate the 
price which yielded maximum revenue for the 1969 data. This was 14.88%, while the 
take out rate in 1969 was actually 17.16%. Thus by decreasing the take out rate by 
2.28%, the state and track could have increased their net proceeds by over eleven 
million dollars in .1969. 
Determinants of Betting Behaviour 
Degennaro (1989) attempted to model betting turnover (handle). in terms of certain 
variables, with the aim of providing racetrack managers with strategies to optimize 
returns to state and track: His explanatory variables were as follows; 
i) P1 = total stakes available on day t, 
ii) A; = number of people attending the track on day t, 
iii) Totei = 0 if the observation is before the installation of the new tote system and 1 
otherwise, 
iv) Trackcondt = 0 if all races on day t are run on a goodtrack and 0 otherwise, 
v) Subsidy1 = sum of the state's, track's and owner's contributions to the stakes for . 
subsidized races, 
vi) TueSi , Wed1 , ThurSi , and Fri1 are 1 if the observation is .for the respective day of 
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the week, and 0 otherwise, 
vii) Holt = 1 if the observation is for a Saturday or a national holiday and 0 otherwise. 
The handle on day t, H1 , was modelled in terms of these variables and only Trackcond, 
Subsidy and Thurs were not significant in explaining the variation in handle. A negative 
sign was found on the coefficient for the Tote variable, indicating that the new system 
had reduced the handle. Overall costs were still reduced though because of the reduction 
in labour required to operate the new system. 
Tuesday is a special day in that women are permitted into the track free of charge. This 
so called "Ladies Night" also produced a negative coefficient for the Tues variable. It 
is suggested that in addition to the decrease in per capita wagering, owing to the 
presence of non gambling females, the men whom they may accompany bet less when 
they are with women. The additional people (women) that may purchase parking, 
programmes, food and beverages, apparently more than compensates for the loss in 
handle. 
In addition to modelling turnover, this paper also modelled attendance at the racetrack 
in terms of the same variables. The results suggested that racing from Monday through 
Saturday should be replaced with Sunday racing with one weekday falling away. The 
reason for this is that the turnover on non working days (Saturdays and Holidays), was 
far greater per capita than on other days. Also, days influenced by the work week, 
especially Tuesday and Wednesday, have lower per capita wagering than Fridays and 
non working days. 
Telephone Betting 
Thalheimer and Ali (1992) investigated the effects on handle owing to the introduction 
of a telephone betting service. In addition to the effects of this service, the effects of the 
takeout rate, the price of admissions, racing quality, number of racing days, personal 
income, and competition from other sports, were investigated. 
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·Two demand equations were formulated; the first to explain variation in on-track 
wagering and the second to exp~ain variation in total wagering (on-track + phone 
betting). The dependent variable was the handle per capita, for on-track and total betting. 
All the coefficients in both equations had the anticipated signs and were significant at the 
12 % , or lower, level of significance. 
The introduction of the phon:e betting system led to a decrease in on-track wagering of 
22. 3 % . It is further estimated that the introduction of the system led to a 13. 7 % decrease 
in total wagering as well. Consistent with other literature, the handle demand is found 
to be elastic, (elasticity = -1.88), with respect to the takeout rate. Handle was found to 
be inelastic with respect to the price of admissions. The impact of income on handle was 
found to be significant, and the income elasticity was 1.16. 
Competition was deemed to have a negative effect on handle. This was in the form of 
other racetracks holding simultaneous meetings, as well as the local baseball team 
playing in home fixtures on the day of a race meeting. Both racing quality (defined by 
stakes available to owners) and number of days racing were found to positively affect 
the handle. 
Comments and Proposals 
Owing to the different structure of gambling law in the United States in comparison with 
South Africa, it is likely that results of analysis similar to that described in the above 
section, would be of little practical value. In addition to the Tote, South Africa also has 
legal bookmaking, which most likely operates alongside some illegal activity. The 
difficulties in obtaining reliable data on handle in this country, should be evident. 
The above is most likely to be a problem in estimating the effects on handle of a change 
in takeout rates, which in any event are not the same for bookmakers as for the tote, nor 
do these rates necessarily change simultaneously. The takeout rate is generally viewed 
as the most important factor affecting handle, but it would be of some considerable use 
7-11 
to estimate the effects of other variables such as competition from other sources (in 
particular, newly legalised casinos), or racing quality which no doubt do have an effect 
on turnover to the extent that could seriously affect local taxes or profits to the track. 
Such variables are not beyond the control of the racing authorities (or their lobbyists). 
We suggest that there is opportunity for interesting and practically useful work in Jhe 
field of racetrack management and economics, but we do not pursue this topic further. 
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